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INSTITUTE OF HUMAN RELATIONS
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A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
OF WAR AND PEACE

A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
OF
WAR AND PEACE

BY
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PREFACE

THIS book is about the psychological foundations of war and peace. It raises and attempts to answer questions like the following:

Is war an inevitable outcome of human nature or does it result from the way people are taught to feel and think about themselves and others?

What kinds of social conditioning are most favorable to war or to peace?

What social attitudes must be changed and what ideas must become universally prevalent in order to win the peace and make it permanent?

In examining the psychological factors that underlie war and peace it is necessary to omit from consideration the immediate causes of war as well as the social and economic conditions of peace, not because they are unimportant but rather because they are marginal to the central problem and theme of the book. Nor does the book deal with the problems of teaching and learning the techniques of modern warfare. It is not a treatise on how soldiers are trained or how civilians are reconditioned to participate in a war effort. These questions are of supreme immediate importance but adequate treatment of them would require the writing of a different kind of book.

The plan of the book is briefly the following. It begins with an examination of well-known theories concerning the underlying causes of war and conditions of peace. These are contrasted with the theory advanced in the book, namely, that war and peace are basically and fundamentally the products of the types of social conditioning that have occurred in the large masses of people of the leading nations of the world. It is maintained that under certain conditions

people can learn to love war and hate peace and under other conditions they can learn to love peace and hate war; but, most interesting of all, they can and do learn to love peace and at the same time engage in war. There is no psychological inconsistency in this important fact. In order to understand it, however, it is necessary to give full consideration to the questions of how human beings learn to hate and to fight, to fear and to escape, to love and to defend, and to follow leaders. These are the basic psychological foundations of war and peace.

War and peace, however, are great social movements in which large numbers of individuals participate. It is necessary, therefore, that the nature and scope of social movements be understood in relation to the basic social conditioning of those who participate in them.

The two final chapters are devoted to a consideration of the psychological conditions of peace and particularly to the peace following the present war.

It is the hope of the author that this book may contribute something to the war effort and particularly to that part of it that is concerned with the conditions of a universal and permanent peace. Possible benefit to those who are directing the war, particularly in its psychological aspects, lies mainly in its analysis of the soil in which the seeds of propaganda can and do grow. Those who have the responsibility of planning and organizing the peace may find here useful facts concerning the attitudes and opinions which must be cultivated in order that any plan of world peace may endure.

MARK A. MAY

*New Haven, Connecticut,
December, 1942.*

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THIS book is a product of many hands. It is based primarily on the work of the staff of the Institute of Human Relations at Yale University, although much of the material has been drawn from other sources. I am indebted to my colleagues in psychology for the formulation of the theory of social learning which I have used; and to those in sociology and anthropology for concepts and materials on the structure of society. My intellectual debts are so numerous that I hesitate to call the roll of those to whom I am obligated. Ideas in the community of the Institute are so freely interchanged that it is almost impossible to cite credits for their origins.

For reading and criticizing the manuscript, I am especially indebted to my colleagues, John Dollard, Geoffrey Gorer, the late Bronislaw Malinowski, Donald Marquis, Neal Miller, G. P. Murdock, Robert Sears, and Earl Zinn, and to my wife, Ruby Patton May. For assistance in preparing the manuscript my thanks are due my secretary, Miss Sarah Greer, and my undergraduate assistant, Julian Sachs.

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A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR AND PEACE

CHAPTER I

WHY WAR?

MAN has always sought explanations for events that affect his welfare. In so doing he has been greatly rewarded. His curiosity has led to discoveries that have given him power to cope with his physical environment and to conquer many forces that tend toward his destruction. For example, he has found that by discovering the basic causes of diseases he can plan their prevention and control their treatment. It is not surprising to find that he has long cherished the idea that wars, too, may be prevented by first discovering their underlying causes. Many theories have been advanced concerning the causes of war and conditions of peace, some of which are discouraging because they find war rooted in conditions that are beyond human control. Others are more hopeful in that they place the causes of war within the control of organized society.

We begin by passing in review some of the answers that have been given to the question of the underlying causes of war. These answers are not concerned with the occasions of wars nor with the social, political, economic, and religious conditions that have led to war. They claim rather to get at the tap roots of all wars, and are presented here primarily as a basis for comparison with the theory that is advanced in this book.

A Primitive View of War

War, it has often been said, is an evil force abroad in the world with which man is powerless to cope. It is like floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, famines, and pestilences, dreaded by all mankind and beyond human control. Primitive men believed that their misfortunes were caused either by evil spirits or by the magic of enemies. They accordingly developed techniques for appeasing, frightening, or otherwise controlling the sources of their troubles. In the shift from animism to astrology man made an advance in his thinking about the causes of war. His fortunes and misfortunes were then believed to be determined by impersonal cosmic forces which were neither malevolent nor benevolent, having neither will nor intention, but simply operating according to fixed laws. Against these, also, man was powerless. He could not appease, frighten, or otherwise influence them; but he could learn their laws and use this knowledge to his own advantage. This view of the determinants of human destiny reached its peak in the Middle Ages, has since declined, but is not yet dead.

Instinct Theories of War

With the development of the biological and medical sciences during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the locus of causal forces which determine human behavior shifted from spirits and stars to the inside of the human organism. This view asserts that just as earthquakes and hurricanes result from the nature of the earth and its atmosphere, war results from the biological nature of man. Man, it is said, is a fighting animal. From his simian ancestors he has inherited an equipment of instincts which are more suited to a life in the forests and wilds than in civilization with its cities and states. These instincts, once useful, are now not only useless but a hindrance. Those alleged to be at the root of war

are the "combative" or "fighting" instincts together with those of "mastery" and "dominance."

Belief in instincts as the basic determiners of human behavior reached its height at the turn of the century and was championed most vigorously by the psychologist, William McDougall. His *Introduction to Social Psychology* went into seventeen editions, was a text for students for twenty-five years, and was read and widely quoted not only by psychologists but by social scientists generally. This book attempts to show how various forms of social behavior are based upon one or more "fundamental instincts." In the edition of this book which was written during World War I, McDougall says that the instinct of pugnacity "makes of Europe an armed camp occupied by twelve million soldiers . . . we see how, more instantly than ever before, a whole nation may be moved by the combative instinct. . . . The most serious task of modern statesmanship is, perhaps, to discount and to control these outbursts of collective pugnacity."¹

Modern psychology looks with suspicion on instincts as explanations of human conduct. To say that men fight because they possess a combative instinct has no more standing in science than to say that they fight because they are possessed of evil spirits or filled with original sin. This is not the place to review the "battle of the instincts" which has been fought out among psychologists during the past twenty-five to thirty years. It was won by those who claimed that instincts are not the basic determinants of human behavior. The modern view is that while behavior, including mass action such as war, has a broad biological foundation, the factors that determine what acts will occur in specific situations are for the most part products of learning. Ac-

1. William McDougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (Boston, John W. Luce & Co., 1915), pp. 280-281.

cording to this view, war is not inevitable because man has a fighting nature, but is a direct result of habits, attitudes, and beliefs that he has acquired.

Before dismissing "instinct theories" of war a word should be said about the theory of *life* and *death* instincts advanced by Sigmund Freud. A few years ago the Committee on Intellectual Coöperation of the League of Nations asked Einstein to choose some outstanding thinker and invite him to answer the question: Why War?² Freud was selected and among the questions that Einstein put to him was "Why is it so easy to work up a war fever? Is it because man has within him a lust for hatred and destruction?" Freud answered that this is undoubtedly correct. He went on to explain that the desire for war is quite unconscious in most people. Man may be entirely honest in his conscious opposition to it, yet, in his unconscious he harbors a sneaking admiration for it and an urge to participate in it. Psychoanalytic theory holds that a strong conscious protest against anything is often a cover for an unconscious approval of it and desire for it. The very fact that war is so universally condemned arouses in the mind of the psychoanalyst a suspicion that it is unconsciously admired.

In seeking an explanation of a large body of facts derived from the practice of psychoanalysis, especially facts concerning conflicts between love and hate, Freud postulated two opposing sources of vital energy. First is the energy which gives rise to impulses of love, friendship, generosity, altruism, and drives toward creative, constructive, and helpful behavior. It embraces the traditional instincts of self and race preservation. The second is energy that drives in the opposite direction toward behavior that is aggressive, destructive, critical, cynical, and punishing. Its impulses

2. Einstein-Freud, *Why War?* (International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, 1928).

are those of malice, envy, jealousy, cruelty, and hate. The first Freud has called *Eros* (the life drive, but commonly translated "life instinct"); the second he labeled *Thanatos* (the death drive).

The two drives are in perpetual battle, waged mainly in the unconscious. *Eros* is socially approved and is therefore more represented in conscious life; *Thanatos* is generally disapproved and hence repressed. In his unconscious every man is potentially a Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. It is the Mr. Hyde hidden in each of us who urges us on toward war and makes us susceptible to its appeals.

It is impossible to do full justice to the psychoanalytic theory of war at this point. We shall come back to it later. However, one more word may be added here. The psychoanalysts who have written on war are agreed that its basic motivations are unconscious, but disagree on their origins. Freud assumes that these motives stem from the conflict between two innate systems of vital energy. Other writers,³ notably Glover, Alexander, Brown, and Bowlby, take the view that the aggressive, destructive, hostile side of man's nature is a result of his socialization. The biological stuff out of which man is created is neutral in respect to war and peace. By nature man is selfish and seeks the satisfaction of his needs for personal survival. His private desires, however, are inevitably thwarted by society to whose customs and traditions he must learn to conform. The process of growing up or becoming socialized in any society is therefore inevitably frustrating. This arouses aggressive tend-

3. T. R. Glover, *War, Sadism and Pacifism* (London, Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1938); Durbin & Bowlby, *Personal Aggressiveness and War* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1939; London, K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd.); P. Hopkins, *The Psychology of Social Movements* (London, Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1938); William Brown, *War and Peace* (London, A. & C. Black, 1939); J. T. MacCurdy, *The Psychology of War* (London, W. Heinemann, 1917); R. Waelder, *Psychological Aspects of War and Peace* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1929).

encies which in turn are not tolerated and must be repressed. It is by the repression of impulses which society does not tolerate that the unconscious becomes filled with hatred.

War as a Means to Social Evolution

Over against "instinct theories" which find war rooted in the original nature of man there are a variety of "social theories" which find its causes in man's effort to become civilized. Civilization is held to be a product of social evolution. War is believed to constitute an important factor in the evolution of society from its primitive to its more highly civilized and complex forms.

According to Darwin, the two basic principles of evolution are variation and selection. Variation among individuals of the same species is due mainly to heredity, but selection is due mainly to the ability of each individual to adapt himself to his environment. The speed of evolution depends primarily upon the breadth of variation and the severity of the selection. It is claimed that war has figured in the evolution of society in respect to both its variation and its selection. It has aided variation by bringing out innate abilities to adapt, stimulating invention, developing individual talent, and spurring competition between rival groups. One of its results is greater inequality between individuals and groups. The weak become subservient to the strong; the heroes of battle achieve great prestige and conquerors exploit the conquered.⁴

The relation of war to Darwin's principle of "survival of the fittest" is closer than its relation to the principle of variation. In the perpetual struggle for existence which goes on among tribes and nations as well as among plants and animals, the strong and inventive tend to survive the weak and the stupid. The tribes, clans, cities, and nations

4. Sumner and Keller, *The Science of Society* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1927), I, 401.

which survive are those that have made the most adaptive adjustments to their physical and social environments. They are the ones who have invented the most effective weapons and the most efficient organizations for the destruction of the mastery of their neighbors.

Many objections have been raised to this theory of war. First, it is based on an analogy and all analogies are dangerous. Second, it assumes that social progress is accomplished mainly by aggression and destructiveness, whereas some of man's greatest achievements have been won by co-operation and constructiveness. It is not important in this connection to list all the objections, but merely to call attention to the fact that the rôle of war in social evolution is not as clear today as it once seemed to be.

War as a Necessary Social Vitamin

A second social theory of war is also based on an analogy, drawn this time from medicine. Let us call it the "social vitamin theory." The idea is that war is just as essential for social growth, vigor, and vitality as vitamins are for physical health. A political group (i.e., tribe, nation, or country) is viewed as a kind of organism which is always changing, always growing or decaying, but never standing still. Essential to the growth of most biological organisms are certain vitamins, hormones, minerals, and other chemical substances. These "vital necessities" are sometimes provided by drugs which, in large doses, are very poisonous. War, by analogy, is a poison which is essential for social growth. It acts on a nation not only as a vitamin but also as a tonic. If successful, it makes a state strong, robust, vigorous, and keeps it growing. Without it social diseases analogous to the vitamin-deficiency diseases of pellagra, rickets, and scurvy may occur!

This general view of the basic causes of war is held (though not in this extreme form) by writers of no less

eminence than the philosopher, Bertrand Russell,⁵ the psychologist, William James⁶ and the sociologists, Sumner and Keller.⁷ A few quotations will illustrate their views. First, war is supposed to put "iron" in the bloodstream of a nation. William James, in that famous and much quoted essay on the *Moral Equivalent of War* points out that the apologists for war always place it on a high spiritual plane of patriotism, love for country, adherence to principles, and the force of great ideals. It is taken, he says,

as a sort of sacrament. Its profits are to the vanquished as well as to the victor; and quite apart from any question of profit, it is an absolute good, we are told, for it is human nature at its highest dynamic. Its "horrors" are a cheap price to pay for rescue from the only alternative supposed, of a world of clerks and teachers, of co-education and zoophily, of "consumer's leagues" and "associated charities," of industrialism unlimited, and feminism unabashed. No scorn, no hardness, no valor any more! Fie upon such a cattleyard of a planet!⁸

He quotes from Homer Lea's *Valor of Ignorance* which asserts that war is not only a necessity but actually a social obligation. Lea's argument is that nations, like plants, animals, and other living things, must either grow or decay, they cannot stand still. History shows that the growth or the ascendancy phases of tribes, nations, and civilizations have always been associated with a strong military force and a policy of expansion and conquest. The decline and decay phases are associated with pacifism, efforts to maintain the *status quo*, the weakening of the military forces, high living, and gratification of desires.

James says:

5. Bertrand Russel, *Why Men Fight* (New York, The Century Co., 1917).

6. William James, "The Moral Equivalent of War," *Amer. Assoc. for International Conciliation* (Feb., 1910).

7. Sumner and Keller, *op. cit.*, pp. 398-399.

8. William James, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

The military party denies neither the bestiality nor the horror, nor the expense; it only says that these things tell but half the story. It only says that war is *worth* them; that, taking human nature as a whole, its wars are its best protection against its weaker and more cowardly self, and that mankind cannot afford to adopt a peace-economy.⁹

James accepts in principle the argument of the militarists, namely, that war provides something that is lacking in peacetime and that this something is what makes nations strong, hard, and keeps them growing.

Militarism is the great preserver of our ideals of hardihood, and human life with no use for hardihood would be contemptible. Without risks or prizes for the daring, history would be insipid indeed; and there is a type of military character which every one feels that the race should never cease to breed, for every one is sensitive to its superiority.¹⁰

He dissents from the militarists on the ground that war is not the only medicine or diet (to keep up the deficiency analogy) that will provide the lacking hormone or vitamin. There should be other national mass forms of activity which would produce the same results but which would avoid all the horrors of war. His proposal is well known. It consists of drafting the young men of a nation to go out and fight against the *natural* forces that man must overcome in order to increase his standard of living and his general happiness. There are forests to be cleared and reforested, floods to be controlled, ravaging diseases to be held in check, and roads, bridges and buildings to be constructed for the public convenience and good. The state should draft all young men of a certain age to spend a year or more in such labor. It would be an easy matter to throw a halo of glory and pres-

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Idem*, pp. 8-9.

tige around such activities so that it would really be a moral equivalent of war. He frankly confesses that this is a Utopia and probably did not seriously believe that it would ever be realized.

Another deficiency which war supplies is *excitement*. In a well-organized society the daily lives of most people settle down to a dull routine of regular hours. Ours has been called a "time-clock civilization." Even though the work we do may be varied enough to maintain interest in it, the hours we keep and the schedules we follow are sure to be monotonous and tiresome. This organized existence may provide security and serenity but it leaves unsatisfied the craving for excitement and risk which most people seem to enjoy. In peacetime this need is met in a variety of ways—gambling, horse racing, speeding, attending games and public performances, particularly those that involve serious contests which resemble fighting. Other satisfiers are the pulp magazines with stories of adventure, confessions, crime and murder. The sheer volume of "pulp" publications that are devoured by the public each year is strong evidence of the craving of the masses for excitement.

Whatever else one may say about war, it is always exciting both to those who participate in it and to those who observe it. In commenting on this point Bertrand Russell observes:

To this victim of order and good organization the realization comes, in some moment of sudden crisis, that he belongs to a nation, that his nation may take risks, may engage in difficult enterprises, enjoy the hot passion of doubtful combat, stimulate adventure and imagination by military expeditions to Mount Sinai and the Garden of Eden. What his nation does, in some sense, he does; what his nation suffers, he suffers. The long years of private caution are avenged by the wild plunge into public madness. All the horrid duties of thrift and order and care which he has learnt to fulfill in private are thought not to apply to

public affairs; it is patriotic and noble to be reckless for the nation, though it would be wicked to be reckless for oneself.¹¹

William Graham Sumner, among other writers who have commented on this point, says:

A society needs to have a ferment in it; sometimes an enthusiastic delusion or an adventurous folly answers the purpose. In the modern world the ferment is furnished by economic opportunity and hope of luxury. In other ages it has often been furnished by war.¹²

War not only stimulates invention, develops leaders, relieves monotony, and brings out qualities of hardihood, but also binds the members of a nation together into one solid in-group. This is illustrated by the change in attitude of a great many people in the United States immediately following the attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor. Prior to the attack the nation was divided between the isolationists and the interventionists, but following the attack the nation was welded together in one solid group for the prosecution of the war. Nothing will unite a group more effectively than an attack by another group. Internal hatreds, dissensions, disputes, and strife are laid aside and nearly everyone joins in the common cause. The psychological factors which operate to reduce in-group aggression and to increase the "sense of belonging" or the "consciousness of kind" are no doubt complex, but one or two stand out clearly. For one thing, anxiety is greatly increased, people feel less secure as individuals. Moreover, this anxiety is increased by the awareness that when an enemy attacks one city of a country all other cities within his reach are immediately in danger. Most people have learned that the best way to meet a common danger is to join in a common defense.

11. Bertrand Russell, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-94.

12. Maurice Davie, *Sumner Today: Selected Essays by William Graham Sumner*, "War" (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1940), p. 181.

War as a Restorer of Social Equilibrium

A third social view of war is based on still another biological analogy. This time the central idea is that of equilibrium. A normal healthy body is one in which the various organs and systems are in a state of balance. Recent medical research has shown that the glands of the body, for example, function together and maintain a chemical condition that helps to keep the various organs and tissues in a state of equilibrium.¹³

The notion of equilibrium is found not only in the medical sciences but also in astronomy. Here it is pointed out that the physical universe and particularly its various solar systems operate according to the opposing principles of gravitation and inertia. This balance results in the revolution of planets in orbits without the danger of colliding with each other.

Applying this notion of the physiological and astronomical equilibrium to the nations of the world, we come out with the idea that war is caused primarily by the lack of balance in the social and economic strength of combinations of nations. This is the basis of the "balance of power" theory. This theory asserts that as long as the military strength of the world is balanced so that no nation dares attack another, wars are not likely to occur, but when the international economic system is out of balance and one nation or block of nations appears to have military superiority, the stage is set for war. Unlike astronomical systems, relations between nations are constantly changing and the balance between them, therefore, is easily disturbed. One of the traditional ways of maintaining this balance has been diplomacy.¹⁴ But diplomacy often fails and war is resorted to

13. W. B. Cannon, *The Wisdom of the Body* (New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1932).

14. Quincy Wright, *The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace* (New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1935), pp. 105-107.

as the most effective method of restoring international equilibrium.

War as a Result of Power Politics

The various answers to the question *why war* which we have considered thus far have one element in common. All invoke or imply the existence of "forces" or powers that are more or less beyond human control. These forces may be cosmic, biological, or social, but whatever may be their origin and nature, they are conceived as the ultimate and underlying causes of war.

A less mystical view is that wars are caused not by evil spirits, astronomical forces, suppressed death wishes, the need for social vitamins, or the disequilibrium of social forces, but plainly and simply by individuals who are in positions of power and leadership. It is claimed that the great masses of people in modern states are extremely susceptible to propaganda and can be persuaded to support almost any cause provided it is skilfully presented. The leaders (sometimes called the *élite*) are a very small fraction of the total population. But having control of the political, economic, and social machinery of the nation as well as the instruments and channels of communication, and perhaps also to some degree the agencies of education, they can manipulate public opinion and "work up" a war spirit whenever it suits their purposes.¹⁵

Malinowski has advanced the view that in order to understand modern warfare it is necessary to make a distinction between political organizations called "states" and cultural entities called "tribes" or "nations." When all persons who share the same culture are organized into one political unit the state and the nation exactly coincide. It often happens, however, even in primitive societies, that persons of the same

15. This view is set forth in great detail in Lawrence Dennis' *The Dynamics of War and Revolution* and in Serge Chatokins' *Rape of the Masses*.

culture may be separated into many political units; and that a political unit embraces under its jurisdiction groups of individuals of different cultures. In modern times, for instance, persons of the same cultural or national background, as for example, Germans, Poles, French, and Italians, may be scattered over the world as citizens of many different states. On the other hand, most states number among their citizens many different nationals. For example, the population of Switzerland is composed of four rather distinct cultural groups. Nationalism is therefore the tendency to bring under one state all persons of the same culture. German nationalism before the present war was the movement to bring under the political domination of Germany all Germans throughout the world. Imperialism, on the other hand, is the tendency for a nationalistic government to bring under its jurisdiction people of other cultures.

In tracing the evolution of modern warfare Malinowski recommends that this distinction between state and nation be kept clearly in mind.¹⁶ Modern wars are always between states. Civil wars may be between nationals, but even here the struggle is for political domination. The motives back of the desire for political domination are varied. Prominent among them, however, is the economic. "Conquest, the integral occupation of another cultural area by force, combines all the benefits of loot, slavery, and increase in political power."¹⁷

An answer to the question why men wage war, even total war, on each other is, according to Malinowski's view, that they are citizens of states which have come into conflict with each other, not that individuals are fighting animals or possess a lust for power or are beset with unconscious motives of destructiveness. War is one of the products of gov-

16. Popular usage will be followed in this book and "nation" will refer to the political state.

17. B. Malinowski, "An Anthropological Analysis of War," *Amer. J. Sociol.* (1941), 66, 589.

ernment. It is the direct outcome of political machines which men have invented for their own benefit. Modern wars are, for the most part, cold-blooded business propositions. They are supported by citizens for various reasons—some selfish and some altruistic. But the essential fact is that every individual is a part of the political machinery of his state. He has been trained to interact functionally with other members, so that when the state goes to war it carries him willy-nilly along with it.

War as a Result of Economic Competition

This leaves us with the question as to why states wage war against each other. It is sometimes asserted that the main motive is economic and often the selfish benefit of some powerful group who stand to profit by war. It may be munitions makers, international bankers, exporters, farmers, and others who are out for economic gains; sometimes it is the political leaders and diplomats who are seeking prestige and a prominent place in history; it may be the military clique eager for greater domestic prestige and power, and it may be the upper social class striving to maintain its position. But whatever the power group may be and whatever may be its motives, it is claimed that aggressive war occurs only when nations are under the control of leaders who want it.

Following the first world war certain historians and social scientists attempted to ascertain as far as possible the facts about the pre-war activities of groups who stood to profit by it. That great profits were made, there can be no doubt. There is doubt, however, whether that war was the result of a great conspiracy.¹⁸ Whatever the facts of history may be, the psychologist is interested in the question of why and how masses of enlightened people can be led to war against the popular will. We are convinced that the peoples

18. Walter Millis, *The Road to War* (New York, Houghton Mifflin, 1935)

of Europe *did not want* this war—not even the Germans. Indeed, many of them were persuaded to support Hitler because they believed he could and would get them what they wanted by peaceful means. But once committed to his leadership they were powerless to break with him when he led them into war.

Most modern wars are preceded by “negotiations” between the diplomats and government officials of the conflicting countries. The behavior of these individuals in periods of international crisis is the product of a welter of motives and circumstances that defy psychological analysis. Some are swayed by pressure groups back home, some are influenced by personal ambitions, some try to adhere to policies and principles. But whatever the complex of motives may be, it is fair to assume that some honest effort is always made to avoid war. If this is true, then we must conclude either that there is no peaceful solution possible or that the negotiators are unable to find one. It is quite likely that once matters have come to a crisis, there may be no peaceful way out which is acceptable to both sides. It is equally true, on the other hand, that there are many peaceful ways whereby conflicting interests of nations could be prevented from reaching a crisis. Theoretically all wars could be prevented by international arrangements that would preclude crises developing. It is here that man has failed.

War as a Means of Settling Disputes

How may group conflicts be resolved? Minor ones are settled peacefully by an appeal to international law, by diplomacy, by appeasement, by one nation gracefully backing down to preserve peace, and so on. But sooner or later comes the time when the conflicting interests of two or more nations reach an impasse; all ordinary peaceful procedures fail. There is left one final court of appeal—war. It may take many forms. At first it may be an economic

war, then a diplomatic battle, perhaps a "war of nerves," of bluff and bluster. In modern times these "pre-wars" are usually tried out before the "shooting" war begins. The war that kills, maims, and destroys is truly the "last resort of kings." It is usually, but not always, low on the list of possibilities. Sumner and Keller have stressed this point in the following paragraph:

It should be clear enough that the primitive man, for the reason that he fought, was neither a degenerate, an obstinate and wrong-headed fool, nor a knave. He saw nothing better to do, when he had reached the end of his short list of alternatives, any more than we do when we have reached the end of our somewhat longer list. His last resort was nearer the head of his list than ours because his list was shorter. It was often a list containing but one item. He did not know that violence is a crude way of settling difficulties and by no means always efficient; it has always seemed, indeed, to be getting results even when it is later seen not to have done so.¹⁹

Men wage war against each other because they believe that it gets the desired result more effectively and decisively than any other known procedure. It is one method by which a tribe or a nation may achieve its ends, whether the need be for food, land, women, slaves, prestige, defense, or internal cohesion. If it has proved successful in the past, it will stand high on the list of possible courses of action; if it has never succeeded, it will stand relatively low. When better or more successful procedures are known they may be preferred, but only because they are believed to be more successful.

Let us now pass in quick review the various answers which have been given to the question of *why war*. First, war is inevitable because it is rooted in man's biological nature. He is a fighting animal. He cannot change his nature any

19. Sumner and Keller, *op. cit.*, p. 407.

more than a leopard can change his spots. War, like earthquakes, famines, pestilence, and storms, is to be dreaded and feared but cannot be abolished. Second, man has not abolished war because he unconsciously admires it, wants it, and needs it. Consciously he is a creature of love, altruism, kindness, tolerance, and generosity; but unconsciously he hates his fellowmen (or most of them) and even hates himself. He harbors deep and powerful, though unconscious, impulses to tear down, wreck, and kill. War is one expression of his unconscious desire to destroy society, including himself. Third, war is one of the essential factors in the evolution of society. It stimulates social variation and operates to select for survival the groups that are strong, intelligent, and aggressive. Fourth, war provides the vitamins that are necessary for healthy and robust social development. It is recognized as the tonic that makes nations strong and keeps them growing. A fifth view is that war results from disequilibrium among powerful states. Modern states, especially the more powerful ones, are in constant competition with each other and their relations are perpetually strained or tense. War is prevented only so long as a balance of power is maintained by diplomacy, alliances, non-aggression pacts and other agreements. Sixth, even though war is opposed by the masses, it often suits the purposes of those in power. By skilful propaganda the ruling minority can convert the peaceful majority into a militant group who will not only tolerate war but will ardently support it. War is therefore one of the outcomes of government. Seventh, war is the only effective method of reaching a decisive settlement of international issues that have come to a crisis. Conflicts between nations, as between individuals, eventually become intolerable; they cannot go on forever. Sooner or later one side demands a settlement and war is the only test of strength that is decisive and final.

In attempting to explain a complicated social phenome-

non like war, we are tempted to select some one principle or factor and exaggerate its importance at the expense of alternative possibilities. The human mind seeks simple explanations which can be quickly grasped and thoroughly comprehended. Unfortunately, war cannot be understood in this way. Its causes are multiple and its conditions complex. All of the seven explanations given above and more may figure one way or another in the complex constellation of underlying causes.

In this book, war is viewed as a social phenomenon which may be best understood in terms of contemporary conditions, on the one hand, and underlying principles of social behavior, on the other. These principles apply not only to war but to many other social phenomena as well.²⁰ They are, in part, the principles of social conditioning. In the following pages an effort will be made to show how human beings in the course of their social education acquire certain habits, attitudes, beliefs, and motives which under special conditions are used for mass destruction.

20. For a fuller discussion of the importance of distinguishing principles from conditions, see Miller and Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1941).

CHAPTER II

WAR, PEACE, AND SOCIAL LEARNING

Peace and War are Products of Learning

MAN'S biological nature is neither good nor bad, aggressive nor submissive, warlike nor peaceful, but neutral in these respects. He is capable of developing in either direction depending on what he is compelled to learn by his environment and by his culture. It is a mistake to assume that he can learn war more easily than peace. His learning machinery is not prejudiced, as is sometimes thought, toward the acquirement of bad habits. The bias is in his social environment. People who have found by experience that life flows more smoothly, that happiness is more abundant, that their wants and needs are better met by friendly than by hostile relations with others, are far more strongly predisposed to settle disputes, both domestic and foreign, by peaceful means. If an individual is consistently rewarded more for coöperative behavior and friendly relations with other individuals or groups than for competitive behavior and antagonistic relations, he will acquire habits and attitudes that favor peace. But even these do not guarantee peace, as we shall see later.

If, on the other hand, man's environment and his culture are organized so that fighting is more rewarding than peaceful pursuits, he will acquire habits of aggression and attitudes of hostility. People who have found that they can be happier and can satisfy their wants and needs better by war than by peace will, by habit, be more predisposed to fight. Such people are inclined to justify and glorify war

and give it a high rank in their system of moral and religious values. The procedures which have proved successful in satisfying man's wants and in meeting his needs are most highly prized and sanctioned by him. Around these his moral and religious values become organized. If man is more aggressive and warlike than he is peaceful, it is to be attributed not to perverseness in his nature or even to original sin, but rather to the fact that life, as he has been compelled to live it, has been such as to reward pugnaciousness and the use of force more than other forms of adaptive behavior. In the chapters that follow we shall attempt to explain how habits and motives, which are essential for participation in war and peace, are acquired.

Man's beliefs, opinions, habits, and especially his emotional attitudes of love and hate are influenced far more by what he is taught by his fellow men, particularly by his parents and elders, than by his physical surroundings. It may be true, as some social scientists have insisted, that the body of customs, maxims, morals, and other factors which go to make up culture is in large part determined over a long period of years by such physical factors as climate, food supply, seasons, rainfall, and the like. Be that as it may, our interest is not in the evolution of societies or cultures but rather in their impact on the learning of present populations. The main thesis of this book is that the conditions which determine social attitudes and opinions, particularly those that are involved in war or peace, are in large part products of social conditioning, although their origins may have been determined by geographical and ecological factors.

War Is Not a Human Instinct

It is recognized that this view stands in opposition to the traditional one which stresses the importance of the biological and constitutional factors in human behavior and implies

that a national crisis provides the stimulation that evokes latent but powerful unlearned tendencies to self-preservation. Those who maintain this position point to an array of biological facts concerning the struggle for existence, violent competition among animals, and to the important fact that man himself is a fighting animal. Given the proper stimulus situation, he will always fight and fight well without much, if any, previous education in the process.

The view advanced here does not deny that large segments of the behavior of animals and some unknown fraction of that of adult humans are unlearned. The fact that some animals and young children will bite, claw, kick, and attack when provoked, without previous education in what they are doing, does not force us to the conclusion that the aggressive acts of adult humans are unlearned. The important fact about the biological background of war is the inverse correlation between instinct and learning.¹ Toward the bottom of the evolutionary scale are animals possessing a maximum of instinctive or unlearned responses to their environments, and a minimum capacity to learn. At the top of the scale stands man with a minimum number of fixed innate modes of response (such as reflexes), with a maximum power of learning, and with a relatively long period of infancy and parental dependency during which much important education takes place. The general rule seems to be, although there are exceptions, that as one goes up the evolutionary scale there is a decrease in the number of fixed innate modes of response and an increase in learning capacity accompanied by an increase in the length of the period of dependency. Nature has been very kind to man. Instead of giving him an innate equipment of habits of defense and offense that are suited to life in a particular en-

1. The word "learning" is used here and throughout this book not in the narrow sense of "scholarship" but in the broader sense of "experience."

vironment, she has given him a far more precious heritage —a capacity to learn how best to protect himself and to satisfy his needs in any land environment that this planet affords.

The conventional attempts to understand the aggressive behavior of man in terms of the instinctive behavior of lower animals stress only one of the two threads that hold together the evolutionary series. Man is linked to the lower animals not only because he has certain instincts in common with them but also because they have a certain amount of learning capacity in common with him. If man's aggressive behavior seems to resemble that of lower animals, one cannot be sure whether the similarity is due to common instincts or to common products of experience. We know for a fact that most mammals can be taught to fight or not to fight under quite varied conditions. They differ from man mainly in the limits of what they can learn and the speed with which learning takes place. Man's learning ability is so much greater than that of any other animal that it would be surprising if he had not outstripped them in devising techniques for inflicting punishment on others when it suits his needs to do so. Men not only learn when it is best to fight or not to fight, whom to fight and whom to appease, how to fight and how not to, but they also learn whom, when, and how to hate. The roots of aggressive war are more likely to be found by the study of what humans *learn* than by a study of what animals *do*. However, much can be found out concerning the basic principles of learning from studies of the conditions and the extent to which various species of animals *can be taught* to be aggressive or submissive as individuals or in groups.

It is not the purpose here to present a catalogue of social habits and attitudes that are involved in antagonistic and peaceful human relations. As illustrations, four types of

social learning have been selected which seem to figure prominently in war and peace. They are: learning to hate and to fight; to fear and to escape; to love and to defend; and to follow leaders. An effort will be made to show how these social habits and attitudes are acquired under the conditions provided by our society and how they are mobilized in times of war.

War Requires New Learning

Modern total warfare requires not only the assembly and reorganization of existing skills and motives but also the achievement of many new ones. War presents new problems and new dilemmas. It often happens that old ways are unsuited to the problems and new methods must be found. This is partially true of military tactics. It has already been proved that the tactics which won the last war will not win this one. People who can easily throw off old habits and quickly acquire new ones have a great advantage in modern warfare. Modern weapons such as airplanes and tanks require the development of new military skills. These are superimposed on existing skills of driving automobiles and handling machinery but go far beyond to new heights of technical competence.

Civilians as well as soldiers are required to learn new habits and abandon old ones. Workers in defense industries must learn to change their work-play-sleep habits. Most people in our society have acquired habits of work-play-sleep in that order. Social institutions in which these function are organized to maintain this sequence. But in wartime these institutions change so that individuals who are on a shift which runs from 3.00 p.m. to midnight cannot very well play after they have quit work for the reason that the nation is not organized for play between the hours of midnight and 6.00 a.m. This is, of course, but one of many instances in which new learning is required.

Learning Requires Motivation

One of the first conditions of learning is that the individual must want something which he does not have, or want to rid himself of something which he does have. When in want or in need, humans and animals act. Some wants and needs are innate and are called *primary drives*. Among these are hunger, thirst, sex, extreme heat and cold, fatigue, and pain. Others are acquired and are called *secondary drives*. Among these are the appetites and aversions, likes and dislikes, the craving for money, prestige, fame and honor. The secondary drives which figure most prominently in war are hatred, anxiety, love for country, sense of duty, and craving for leadership. These are based on habits which we shall call love-habits, hate-habits, fear-habits, duty-habits, and so on. The strength of an acquired drive depends on the strength of the habits on which it is based. The emotions of patriotism, for example, are based on habits of love for country. The degree of patriotic fervor that an individual is capable of experiencing in a national crisis depends in part on how well he has learned to love his country, and also on how quickly he can acquire such habits in wartime. In like manner, the degree of hatred that an individual is capable of feeling toward the enemy depends on the strength of his existing habits of hatred toward people who are called enemies.

Learning takes place when an individual is acting under the compulsion of a drive and when no one of his existing habits will fulfil his needs or satisfy his wants. He is thus forced to try out new modes of response. If he finds a satisfactory solution to his problem, that act or series of acts is *reinforced*. On future occasions and under similar circumstances he will repeat these acts. They are learned because they were successful and satisfying.

In the chapters which follow, various principles of learning will be introduced as they are needed. The bare essentials of the process are *drive*, *cue*, *response* and *reward*.

Miller and Dollard² have summed it up by saying that in order to learn "one must *want* something, *notice* something, *do* something and *get* something."

Habits of Peace Used in War

Most of the attitudes, skills, and knowledge which are assembled for war were learned for peaceful purposes. Conversely, many of the new habits acquired for fighting a war are useful later in peace pursuits. It would be a mistake to assume that war and peace demand habits that stand in opposition to each other. Many of the habits and attitudes of peace and defense can be used for offense. For example, most people learn to fear and to hate gangsters and criminals. These attitudes stand ready for application to outside enemies who appear in the role of criminals. Were it not for the fact that many of the skills and attitudes acquired for peace may be used for war also, nations which do not deliberately educate for war would be tremendously handicapped in times of national crisis. It is bad enough to be caught without an adequate armed force, but it would be infinitely worse to be wanting in basic skills and social attitudes.

Learning to fight and to hate involves much more than learning to box, to duel, or to participate in other forms of in-group violence. Systematic education for aggressive warfare in ancient Sparta or in modern Germany includes, besides physical education in games and contests, universal compulsory military training; the inculcation of certain attitudes, prejudices, beliefs; and devotion to leaders and ideals. The whole purpose and direction of such education is toward group aggression.

The Habit of Aggression

Aggressive mass movements may be understood in terms of how people with certain habits, attitudes, beliefs, and expectations react to changes in their social environment.

2. Miller and Dollard, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

Individuals who have been accustomed to expect a high standard of living, efficiency from government and its leaders, a measure of economic security and social prestige, are more frustrated when deprived of these things than are those who have never enjoyed them. One of the psychological conditions which favors group aggression is a wide gap between levels of achievement and those of aspiration. A group that has relatively little and wants much will employ aggression as a means to the achievement of its ends provided its members have learned that aggression pays. On the other hand, if a group has learned that aggression does not pay, at least in the type of situation that is confronting it, some other technique for achieving its ends will be employed or the ends will be renounced.

An aggressive social group is not necessarily one whose members are aggressive toward each other. Indeed, the opposite is more likely to be the case. Most groups place a heavy taboo on in-group aggression, whereby assaults on each other are punishable by law. It is quite possible, therefore, for individuals to acquire habits of peaceful living with each other and at the same time be very warlike in their relations with out-groups. It is easier to follow a general rule such as "do not attack any other individual or group unless you are threatened or attacked first." Such a rule applies equally well to behavior between members of a group and between one group and another. It is a rule which most individuals in modern civilized societies have learned. It explains why it is that, in modern times at least, aggressor nations justify their behavior on the ground of self-defense.

Creating Conditions for Learning Peaceful Living

Other illustrations of the relations between social learning and war will be given in the chapters that follow. A word may be added here in anticipation of what will be said later concerning the relations between social experience and peace.

The history of civilization plainly shows that the evolution of peace has been a slow process of social learning. The family is supposed to be the first and oldest peace group. For purposes of defense and for the promotion of other mutual interests two or more families joined and became a clan, clans united into tribes, tribes into nations, and some nations have been forged into empires. The typical modern peace group is, of course, the independent state or nation. States, however, sometimes form alliances and maintain friendly relations for long periods of time, thereby becoming an effective peace group.

In order for a peace group to be created man must first discover that the net gains and mutual benefits from living together in organized groups are greater than those to be derived from a solitary existence. This discovery was made long ago in respect to the family, clan, tribe, city, and nation. It is yet a matter of debate whether the formation of larger international peace groups would result in greater mutual benefits to all who might be included in them.

The development of a peace group requires more than the mere discovery that life in organized society is preferable to that of a hermit. There must be a pattern of social organization and rules of human relations which guarantee in so far as possible that all members of a group may reap the maximum benefits from social interaction with each other and with other groups. By definition a peace group is one in which there is the minimum amount of physical violence among the members. Antagonisms, hostilities and conflicts are held in check by customs, laws, and rules which are enforced in part by duly constituted authorities and in part by inner compulsions of loyalties and the sense of social responsibility. Peace between groups as well as within a group is maintained by the joint action of external authority and social attitudes of tolerance and good will.

The maintenance of peaceful relations by inner authority

is much preferred to that of external force provided, of course, that conscience is on the side of law and order, which is usually the case. The process of socialization of children and the induction of new adult members into a group is mainly a matter of the inculcation of habits, attitudes, and loyalties which reflect the customs, ideals, beliefs, and laws of the group. There is ordinarily a close parallel between the external authority of a group and the inner controls of conduct.

Peace groups expand by natural increases in population, by voluntary combinations of groups, and by conquest. Except in cases of slavery, new recruits may become participant members and gain the status of citizens by observing the rules of conduct and by acquiring a set of habits and attitudes that is consistent with the ways of life of the group. The expansion of a peace group is therefore not merely a matter of adding new members but of educating them in the culture of the group. It is education in the broad sense of social conditioning, which is the central process by means of which a group grows and at the same time maintains a historical continuity.

To those who look forward to the ultimate union of all people in one large peace group it must be said that this goal can be approached only as fast as the conditions are provided for learning loyalties and responsibilities to larger and larger groups. It is, of course, possible for an individual to acquire tolerance, good will, and even a sense of responsibility toward members of other nations. Such education is undoubtedly favorable to the maintenance of peace between groups that are politically and culturally independent of each other. But intercultural education can be carried further and made much more effective *after* the groups concerned have been amalgamated into a single political unit. As each individual becomes aware of membership in a larger group and conscious of the benefits of such membership, he

will tend to identify more and more with other members as friends, comrades, and fellow citizens.

The most effective education for citizenship in a larger political unit cannot occur until the unit has first been created. The initial step by which sovereign states may be united into larger political units is by far the most difficult one. Historically it has been achieved in many ways, one of which is by conquest. There are, however, instances in which groups have voluntarily come together to form a larger and better union. The motives back of such moves are usually the powerful ones of desire for greater security against invasion or the achievement of mutual economic benefits that are obvious to all. Powerful motivations are required to overcome resistances which stem from unwillingness to recognize the possibilities of higher taxes, lower standards of living, or the reluctance to change allegiances and loyalties, and from the ever-present inertia to change. Many people stubbornly refuse to adopt a new invention or to accept a social reform, especially if by so doing they are required to change their habits. The public resistance to the adoption of a calendar better suited to modern life is a case in point. There is considerable concern at the moment as to how the peoples of the earth may be convinced of the importance of creating larger peace groups after this war. It is hoped that the forces of education and enlightenment are working in the direction of persuading people to try as an experiment some plan of international relations that at least holds promise of preventing future wars.

It often happens that people learn to accept and enjoy new arrangements that had previously appeared undesirable. Daylight saving time is an example. When it was instituted as an emergency measure during the first world war there was considerable doubt about it and some outspoken opposition to it. But many people learned to like it, particularly city dwellers who continued it during the sum-

mer months in the years that followed the war. Farmers, however, still opposed it. It remains to be seen whether they, too, will learn to like it during this war. Vaccination against smallpox is another illustration. Gradually and over a considerable period of time people have learned of its benefits and are more and more inclined to accept it voluntarily. Some even demand it for themselves and their children. Once the conditions for learning a new technique or way of life have been created, the force of habit and education can do their work. They may work for or against the new plan depending on the net satisfactions that are derived from it.

This raises a question for those who will plan the peace to follow this war. How much weight should be given to the immediate acceptability of a plan by those who are to live under it and how much to possibilities that a more ideal plan might become acceptable if given a fair trial? There is danger that something less than a plan that might eventually win acceptance for itself will be instituted on the ground that immediate acceptability is the most important consideration. It is hoped that the possibilities of education will be fully considered and that a plan will be adopted that provides for its own improvement as experience with it reveals its strength and weakness. We shall return to this problem and to related ones for fuller discussion at the end of the book after the process of social learning relevant to war and peace has been explored.

CHAPTER III

LEARNING TO HATE AND TO FIGHT

How Fighting Skill Is Acquired

BEFORE one can talk about fighting it is necessary to specify the kind of combat one has in mind. Fighting among animals or small children is usually an affair of biting, clawing, kicking, slugging, and pulling hair. As children grow older, they learn to fight with words and weapons. They also learn to fight in groups. Among adults fighting is a diversified activity varying not only in kinds of weapons used but in duration, number of people involved, extent of their organization, purposes for which they are fighting, and the rules under which the fight is conducted. War is a highly organized form of fighting involving large numbers of people, waged with the most destructive of all weapons, but nonetheless conducted according to rules.

In all fighting there is at least one common element. It is to impair, injure, or destroy the opponent. Even in a friendly fight, such as a boxing match, the loser is weakened at least temporarily, both physically and in reputation. Whatever the motives for combat may be and however rigid the rules governing it may be, it is a form of activity by which an issue is settled, temporarily at least, with one party emerging victorious over the other. Victory may consist in scoring points against the opponent, or in weakening him physically or socially, by destroying his property, depriving him of his weapons, robbing him of his friends and supporters. The basic skills of fighting are simply the abilities to perform whatever acts are appropriate to the particular kind of fight in which one may be engaged.

Let us consider briefly how children acquire these skills. For example, if a young child, who is accustomed to freedom of movement of arms, legs, and body, is physically restricted by an adult, it will cry, squirm, and perhaps claw or bite. If one or all of these activities is followed by the reward of being freed from the restraint, they will become reinforced. If the experience is repeated, these acts will tend to become habits.

Thus far the child may or may not know that biting produces pain in the restrainer or that the verbal response of "ouch" indicates being hurt. If he does not know this, he will soon find it out either by biting himself or being bitten by another person or animal. He will also learn to make an appropriate verbal response. Then by a complex process of learning the child will eventually put two and two together and arrive at the knowledge that biting other people causes pain. By the same process, but under other conditions, he will learn other ways of inflicting pain. For example, after he has grasped the wider meaning of the word "hurt," he may hear his mother say that it hurts her when he is naughty, uses bad words, or refuses to eat his cereal. Having associated the word "hurt" with pain, he will arrive at the conclusion that there are many ways of inflicting pain on his mother. More weapons are then added to his arsenal. His social learning in this regard may carry him to the point of discovering that one very convenient way to satisfy his wants in almost any situation is to annoy his parents and others, especially when they are in a position to aid him.

A technique which works in one situation is apt to be tried in similar situations, even though they are in many respects different. If it still works, it will spread further and further afield. This is the process of generalization. It is checked, however, by the counterprocess of discrimination. The child who has learned to annoy and punish his mother in order to get what he wants may try it on other adults or children.

only to discover that it not only fails to bring satisfactory results but also results in pain to himself. Eventually he will learn to discriminate between persons, times, and places where the hurting technique may be successfully used. He may discover, for example, that it works better with children who are younger and smaller than himself than it does with those who are older and larger; or that it is more successful when he is with his gang than when alone.¹

Aggressive vs. Defensive Fighting

There is one special condition, however, under which the infliction of pain is nearly always a useful technique. It is when an individual is threatened or attacked by another person. This, of course, is the fighting situation. A fight may be defined as a situation in which pain is countered with pain, injury with injury, and destruction with destruction. Fighting occurs when an individual or a group, for one purpose or another, attempts to punish another individual or group, and the party that is attacked seeks to escape the punishment and to prevent its recurrence by counterattack. The party of the first part (to use legal terminology) is called the aggressor; the party of the second part the defender. An aggressive fighter is a person (or group) who has learned that one of the best ways to get what he wants is by annoying or injuring individuals who are in a position to grant his desire or to stand as barriers between him and their realization. The defensive fighter is the one who has learned that the best way to deal with an aggressor is to punish him directly or create a situation in which he will be punished by someone else. Any individual (or group) may be either an aggressive or defensive fighter

1. J. W. M. Whiting has shown that Kwoma children are much more aggressive toward younger and smaller persons than toward older and larger persons. See *Becoming a Kwoma* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1941), pp. 57-58.

or both, depending mainly on social learning and on the demands of the situation. In our culture there is a general taboo on aggression, but defensive fighting is permitted and in many instances rewarded. As we shall later see, there are some circumstances under which aggression is also approved, for example in the arrest and punishment of a criminal. Every society has its own rules concerning aggression between individuals and between groups.

Types of Aggressive Behavior

It has been observed in our society that aggressive behavior occurs quite frequently in situations that are frustrating. This observation has led to the formation of the frustration-aggression hypothesis.² In a modified form this hypothesis states simply that "frustration produces instigation to a number of different types of responses, one of which is an instigation to some form of aggression."³ Frustration, as used here, refers to situations in which an individual is thwarted, hampered, delayed, or otherwise interrupted in his progress toward a goal or in the performance of an activity which to him is satisfying. A typical frustrating situation is one in which a barrier appears between the individual and his goal or in which an accustomed act is thwarted. The infant referred to above, whose free movements were restrained, may be said to have been frustrated.

Aggression may also take many forms. The frustrated individual may assault the frustrator. This is called *direct overt physical aggression*. It may take the form of swearing, bluffing, name-calling, threatening, or hurling of invectives, in which case it is called *direct overt verbal aggression*.

2. Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, Sears, *Frustration and Aggression* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1939).

3. Miller, Sears, Mowrer, Doob, and Dollard, "The Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis," *Psychol. Rev.* (1941), 48, 337-342.

gression. Again the frustrated individual may swear under his breath or wish harm and evil to the frustrator, in which case it is called *non-overt verbal aggression*. There is still another possibility and that is that the frustrated person may manifest either of the above three types of aggression toward the frustrator but do it in a very subtle and indirect way and often without being aware of why he is doing it. This is called *non-overt non-verbal (unconscious) aggression*. These four forms of aggressive behavior are all called *direct aggression*. They may be summarized by saying that an individual can be aggressive toward a frustrator in deed, word, thought, and feeling.

But these do not exhaust the possibilities of aggressive behavior. The frustrated individual may aim his aggression not at the frustrator but at some third party who may be an innocent bystander or even an inanimate object. This is called *displaced or indirect aggression*. It may take any of the four forms of direct aggression.

There is yet one more form to be added and that is *self-aggression*. Instead of taking it out on the frustrator or some third party, the frustrated individual may take it out on himself in any of the four ways mentioned above. This analysis gives us at least twelve types of aggression which are fairly representative of all the varieties that might be recognized as far as individuals are concerned. The individual, however, may be a participant in an aggressive group. A group of individuals acting as a unit may manifest most of the twelve types of aggression just indicated.

Response to Frustration

Aggressive behavior is learned, although some forms of it may be innately connected with certain types of frustrating situations. Such connections are certainly more numerous in lower animals than in man and constitute the fighting in-

stinct. In man this instinct is very much weaker than in animals. His innate connections between environmental situations and aggressive responses are not only fewer in number but also more tenuous. They are indeed so extremely modifiable by interaction with his environment that we are justified in saying that fighting behavior, in adults at least, is almost wholly learned.

The types of frustrating situations that any individual in our society is likely to encounter in a lifetime are numerous. Many of them, however, are quite similar and recur frequently. For each type of situation an individual acquires sooner or later an assortment of responses which tend to appear in a preferential order. Each element in this *response hierarchy*, is called a *response tendency*. Some hierarchies may contain a very large number of response tendencies, whereas others may be numerically few. For example, there may be some situations for which an individual may possess a wealth of knowledge and adaptive skills, others in which he knows how to do only one or two things, still others for which he has no suitable responses at all. When in the presence of a stalled automobile, a good mechanic has at his finger tips a large number of possible things that he can do to diagnose and correct the difficulty; the ordinary driver, however, is very limited in this respect. In his response hierarchy to this kind of situation there are very few well-established adaptive responses. There is one response, however, that he can and does almost invariably make and that is to call for help.

Somewhere in the response hierarchies to most frustrating situations there are likely to be one or more of the types of aggressive responses outlined above. The driver in the stalled car, for example, can and often does swear either verbally or under his breath, blame someone else or himself for the difficulty. If these responses stand high in the list of possible

ones that he can make, they will probably be made first. If they are low on the list, they may not come out until he has first telephoned the garage and found that it is closed, or has otherwise exhausted those responses that stand on the list above the aggressive ones.

The batting order of responses in any hierarchy is determined primarily by previous learning. Those that are most firmly connected with the stimulus situation stand highest and are first to be tried. Theoretically they will appear in the order of their strength. This order is not absolutely stable but is subject to change. If the driver of the stalled car is unable to locate a mechanic and goes to work on the car himself and discovers that he can fix it, he will perhaps on future occasions tinker with the car himself before he calls for help. There are many situations in which aggressive responses are indeed the most successful. As they are practiced with reward they become progressively stronger.

It is easy to understand how some individuals can learn to become quite aggressive in a variety of situations. They are likely to be persons who have discovered that by making direct and determined attacks on all barriers between them and their goals they can usually succeed without suffering too much punishment from counterattacks. If this type of behavior spreads to other but similar situations, the individual may be said to have acquired a trait of ruthlessness. If the habit structure of a ruthless person could be examined in detail, it would be found to contain a large number of aggressive responses standing high on a great many response hierarchies to frustrating situations. It is entirely possible and often true that aggressive behavior will spread to situations that are not particularly frustrating. A spoiled child, for example, is one who manifests aggression with slight provocation.

(The ruthless, fire-eating type of individual who goes

through life riding rough-shod over all opposition, slapping down all who stand in his way, disdaining everyone except himself and perhaps a few obedient henchmen, stands at one extreme of the scale of overt aggressiveness. The other extreme is typified by Caspar Milquetoast, utterly intimidated and completely submissive. In between are the great masses of people, among whom there are wide individual differences in the number and strength of responses in their habit systems. Most of us manifest very little overt physical aggression either against our frustrators, ourselves, or others. Some of us may indulge in considerable verbal aggression in the way of swearing, bluffing, and blowing-off steam. These individual differences may be due in part to innate constitutional factors, but for the most part they are produced by the accident of social learning. An individual who has found that overt aggression is profitable and rewarding will surely be more apt to use it than one who has found it costly and punishing. In the former case, the conditions of social learning have been such as to give responses of overt aggression a high standing in the response hierarchies to many situations, while in the latter they stand further down on the lists.

Individual differences in non-overt aggression are not so easily observed. It is customary to equate overt aggression to fighting and the non-overt forms to hating. The statistical relations between these two general forms of aggression have not been worked out. There is clinical evidence that they may be inversely correlated. The ruthless person may be a good fighter and a poor hater; the Caspar Milquetoast may be a very poor fighter but harbor in his soul a tremendous amount of hatred, both conscious and unconscious. This inverse correlation between the overt and non-overt forms of aggression is by no means universal. There are perhaps many individuals who are both good fighters and good haters and others in whom there is very little fight or hatred.

Learning to Hate

There can be little doubt that hating is far more prevalent in our society than fighting, although there is more fighting than one might suppose. In spite of the fact that overt aggression is commonly tabooed, it is nevertheless sufficiently prevalent to constitute a major social problem. In its most flagrant forms it is called crime and delinquency; in its Sunday clothes it may parade as "good business," human nature, ambition, rivalry, and competition. Later we shall speak of the social values of approved forms of outspoken aggression, but here we need only mention that it often appears as free speech, jokes directed against the government or people in authority, and invectives against minority groups.

Every society has its own rules and techniques for controlling aggression. Some of these rules are very rigid, strictly enforced and often written down as laws. Laws against murder, suicide, and mayhem are examples. In addition to written laws there are a great many unwritten taboos which derive their main support from strong public opinion. Rules concerning aggression, whatever they may be, are commonly known to parents who endeavor to train children to live by them. This results in a certain amount of uniformity in aggressive behavior in any given society. There is always sufficient latitude in the interpretation and application of rules to result in wide individual differences. Uniformities occur mostly in behavior that is controlled by the rules to which the society attaches greatest importance, as for example, murder. When one considers the number of people in a society who hate each other, the incidence of murder is surprisingly low! Our society condemns aggression in all its forms but places a rather severe taboo on those forms of aggression which are designated as crimes.

Let us examine the conditions of learning in our society with a view to discovering why it is that so many individuals acquire strong habits of hatred but do not become

criminals. If children can be taught to be aggressive or non-aggressive in deed, word, thought, and feeling; if they can be taught whom they may or may not attack, malign, curse, damn, or hate; and especially if they can be taught to love everybody, including their enemies, then it follows that aggression could be eliminated by proper child training. This is indeed true in theory and could be realized in fact, if conditions would permit. But learning, it must be remembered, depends on conditions as well as on principles. According to learning principles, children could be brought up to be non-resistant and non-aggressive, as indeed many of them really are; or they could be taught to be far more belligerent, resentful, and bitter. What, then, are the conditions under which children learn to hate and to fight?

The Frustrations of Childhood

We have been stressing the point that in our society the kinds of situations that most readily become connected with aggression are those in which the individual is frustrated. In seeking, therefore, an explanation of an individual's aggressive tendencies and hating capacities, it is well to examine the frustrations that he experiences during his lifetime, and especially those of early childhood when habits are formed with less competition from existing ones.

Life in our society, in fact in most societies, and especially the life of the child, is replete with frustrating situations. There are endless disappointments, obstructions, delays, hamperings, trials, and vicissitudes. A notable array of frustrations appears in Hamlet's soliloquy: "the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune . . . the whips and scorns of time, the oppressor's wrong, the proud man's contumely, the pangs of dispriz'd love, the law's delay, the insolence of office, and the spurns that patient merit of the unworthy takes." Professor Sumner was so impressed with the amount of in-group hostility and selfishness that exists in most so-

cieties that he spoke of social organizations as being based on "antagonistic coöperation." It seems as though it is impossible to organize a society so that individuals will not get in each other's way. It appears equally difficult to socialize an individual in a society without frustrating him. If aggression stems primarily from frustration and if its overt forms of expression are generally prohibited, it is easy to understand in a general way why there is so much hatred in the world. Few people realize how much the social environment of many children is biased in favor of engendering attitudes of hate, envy, and jealousy.

The normal process of growing up, of learning what you can do and can't do, what is expected of you, and what you can't do now that you could do when you were younger, is all bound to produce a certain amount of frustration. Every child has certain basic biological needs which must be met in order to survive. Among these are the needs for air, food, water, elimination, rest, an optimum temperature, and avoidance of injury. Moreover, if the species is to survive, reproduction is needed and this involves the sex drive. The human organism at birth is poorly equipped to meet its survival needs by its own activity and must undergo a long period of dependency on parents and other adults. During this period it is subject to the will and even to the whims of its adult providers and protectors as to how its basic biological needs will be met. These persons (usually parents) have certain ideas, beliefs, and convictions about how all the fundamental survival needs, including reproduction, should be handled. These ideas are fairly uniform in any one society. Eskimos have one idea as to what kind of food is fit for children, how often they should be fed, when cleanliness training should begin, how the sex drive should be handled, whereas the Navajo Indians, the Samoans, and the Hottentots have different notions.

Every society enforces its rules concerning child training

by rewards and punishments of various sorts. Each has, so to speak, its own curriculum for social education, which consists of certain demands or "musts" or "thou-shalts" that are required of children at different age levels, varying somewhat among social classes within some cultures; it also has a list of "thou-shalt-nots" which are roughly graded according to age; and finally, there is a certain leeway or number of permissive acts that children may perform according to their own free will and accord. From the standpoint of education, culture is a curriculum consisting of demands, prohibitions, and permissions. These vary for children of different sexes at different age levels and, in some societies, for children whose parents belong to different castes, classes, or groupings.

The processes of socialization, or the processes by which the child learns this cultural curriculum with certain elective subjects, may be illustrated in the case of food. In order to survive the organism must have nutrition. Biologically the food that is most appropriate for the new-born human infant is milk and usually mother's milk. The infant comes equipped with a sucking and swallowing mechanism, and that is about all as far as mechanisms for obtaining food are concerned. This is a biologically determined fact which lies outside culture. However, the curriculum prescribes the schedule of feeding and the amount of food that the child may have when feeding time comes. As the child grows up, he is required to stop getting his food from sucking either a bottle or breast and must learn to eat from a cup or from a plate with an implement instead of with his fingers. No society denies food to its children, but all societies prescribe when they may eat, how much they may eat, the kinds of food, the eating ritual, and so on. This is seen very clearly in the kinds of meat that are eaten by the peoples of different societies. Our society, for example, which permits eating fish, fowls, cattle, hogs, and sheep, places a taboo on the

meat of horses, dogs, cats, and humans. The result is that children generally learn to like approved foods and to dislike those that are tabooed. Their food preferences and their eating habits eventually come to match roughly the cultural prescriptions.

The process of training a child in the food preferences and eating habits of his society always involves a certain amount of frustration. This comes about primarily when the society requires that habits and preferences of an earlier age be replaced by those that are required at a later age. Thus weaning is likely to be a frustrating and even traumatic experience for most children. When denied a bottle or a breast and offered milk from a cup instead, many children will rebel and stage a hunger strike. In short, when a well-established eating habit, which from the standpoint of the child is perfectly satisfactory, is interfered with because society requires a new one that matches his higher age level, the child reacts with aggressive acts such as biting, kicking, and rebelling. These reactions, however, suffer the same fate as any learned behavior. If they are rewarded they persist; if not rewarded, they disappear.

Society provides for all the biological needs of the individual, including reproduction, but specifies within limits how they shall be met. As the child grows up, the cultural curriculum with its requirements and its electives in respect to the basic biological needs is graded. The child is always permitted to eat, but not to eat everything he wants and when he wants it. He is always permitted to drink milk and water, but not until later in life is he allowed tea, coffee, and whiskey. He is expected to eliminate, but not at just any time or place or when he feels the urge to do so. The sex drive may be gratified only in ways that are socially approved. The process of child training which regulates his behavior to conform with the demands and prohibitions of

his culture is inevitably and to varying degrees frustrating.⁴

On the other hand, there are many respects in which culture is satisfying and indulgent. It would be a mistake to assume that our society manhandles or arbitrarily cracks down on its growing members without rhyme or reason. The truth is, it offers them a limited number of ways in which their basic biological needs may be met with approval and even with reward. At the same time it blacklists other ways in which these needs might be met and if a child insists on selecting behavior from this blacklist, he will inevitably be punished. Moreover, he is admonished not to "think evil," or "feel rebellious" toward his parents. Aggression toward parents and persons in authority is tabooed in thought, word, and deed. The complete psychological act is inhibited all the way from the impulse to the overt act.

Why Emotional Habits Are Hard to Control

But the inner responses of aggressive thoughts and feelings are much harder to extinguish than the overt acts of striking, swearing, and talking back. There are two reasons for this. They are less accessible to punishment because they are private and hard to detect from external signs; and they are frequently reinforced by the satisfactions that come from reducing the tensions of anger and resentment by swearing under one's breath and wishing evil to the frustrator, by attacking inanimate objects, or by indulging in any other form of socially approved aggression. Many of these non-overt aggressive habits are never extinguished but persist throughout life. Some of them are inhibited, however, by another complex but powerful set of habits, called conscience, which operates to produce a "guilt feeling" for thinking evil thoughts, especially about one's parents. But even conscience does not succeed in suppressing

4. Dollard and others, *op. cit.*, chap. v.

them completely, although it does reduce them to a non-verbal level. In the terminology of Freudian psychology, they are driven underground into the unconscious.

One of the great contributions of Freud was the discovery that many of his patients seemed to carry in their unconscious lives an unbelievable load of malice, hostility, and resentment. It was further discovered by psychoanalytic techniques that much of it had been accumulated from early childhood. At first it was thought that only neurotics and other mentally sick patients were so burdened, but later studies showed that normal people also, at least those in occidental cultures, harbor a huge amount of unconscious hatred, much of which is so hidden that its effects are not noticed, but some of which is quite open and easily observed. Moreover, much of it is highly labile, capable of being mobilized and directed against almost any object or person. There are presumably wide individual differences in the amounts of hostility and in the proportions which are conscious and unconscious. These proportions vary from time to time in the same persons.

One psychoanalytic explanation of unconscious hatred⁵ is that it is a direct result of repressed aggressive tendencies. Every individual, in the process of growing up in a social environment, inevitably suffers considerable frustration of his desires which arouses in him feelings of anger and resentment against those who thwart his plans. Most societies forbid acts of violence among members and will not tolerate retaliation toward persons in authority. For reasons that are obvious, society cannot afford to permit excessive in-group aggression. It punishes over-aggression and condemns ill-will, malice, and other forms of inner (non-overt) aggression. The individual is therefore required to inhibit his aggressive acts and to repress his hostile feelings. But according to psychoanalytic theory, no one ever succeeds com-

5. See Chapter I, pp. 4-5.

pletely in ridding himself of aggressive impulses; he merely drives them underground. In the unconscious they are still active and join with other suppressed desires to form complexes. War creates a condition under which this reservoir of unconscious hatred may be freed and directed against the enemy.

In modern psychology these tendencies are viewed as habits. They persist because they are reinforced in many ways that are seldom noticed. They derive some strength perhaps from witnessing football games, prize fights, bull fights, certain movies, and contests of all sorts; also from reading murder stories and tales of cruelty, blood, and thunder. Other reinforcements may come from socially approved forms of overt aggression such as swearing, grumbling, complaining, heckling, threatening, criticizing, ridiculing, snubbing, and voting. Socially approved forms of aggression may be regarded as concessions which society is forced to make because it cannot completely stamp out all forms of aggression. They may, on the other hand, have useful positive social functions. Persons who are rewarded for expressing their aggressive tendencies by complaining, criticizing, blowing-off steam, ridiculing others, may be prevented thereby from engaging in more socially dangerous forms of aggression. Moreover, the various freedoms which are cherished in democratic societies may be utilized for expressing socially approved forms of aggression.

Socially Permitted Aggression

Surprising as it may be, our society seems to foster deliberately certain kinds of aggression. These are in the cultural curriculum of which we have spoken above. It is a well-known fact that some children soon learn many aggressive techniques of overcoming parental discipline. A common one is the temper tantrum; another is excessive crying; others are threats to commit suicide, to run away, or to create an em-

barrassing "scene." In short, children learn that they can punish their parents in subtle ways and by so doing gain a concession or secure a reward. One could go on and cite numerous instances in which overt aggressive responses to frustrating circumstances are rewarded.

But the conditions of life in our society are such that the inner responses that produce hatred are much more heavily rewarded and less punished than are overt aggressive acts. In proportion to the amount of daily interaction among the millions of people in large cities, there is relatively little personal assault and mayhem. But the amount of animosity and antagonism, especially among those who are in more intimate contact with each other, is very much greater. There is plenty of good will too, and it would be entirely misleading to assume that interpersonal hatred is the rule. Yet almost everyone has his own pet aversions and dislikes. There are types of persons whom we find irritating and whose very demeanor arouses our ire. We are likely to be angered by unfairness, bullying, and a whole class of dastardly acts. These persons and acts are viewed as parts of stimulus constellations which elicit subtle responses. These responses may be quite unconscious but evoke the emotional drive of anger or one of its derivatives.

It should be noted that many situations that evoke resentment are those in which someone else is manifesting out-spoken aggression and apparently getting away with it. Some psychologists would explain this on the grounds of jealousy. They would say that we who have been punished for overt aggression do not like to see others enjoy it without being punished also. Our anger is preparatory to administering the deserved punishment. An explanation more consistent with the general view of this book is that society, in order to enforce its written and unwritten laws against assault and cruelty, actually *rewards* anyone who will stop it or report it to the authorities. The resentment, therefore,

that a socialized citizen feels when he sees a bully attacking a weaker person, may be anticipatory to entering the fray against the bully and therefore reaping a reward from conscience or from other persons. Thus it would appear that society can ill afford to dispense with hatred entirely. As long as there are criminals, traitors, and other nonconformers who must be punished by proper authorities, it is to society's advantage to cultivate, in law-abiding citizens, hatred for such persons and their deeds.

It would be a mistake, therefore, to assume that in our culture aggression in all its forms is universally tabooed. Our society and probably every other society is selective in its treatment of aggression, and especially of the non-overt forms. An effort is made to teach children not to hate their parents, their teachers, their schoolbooks, and many other persons and objects; but they are encouraged to hate swindlers, crooks, liars, and "dead-beats" as classes of persons, and to despise injustice, unfairness, and tyranny. Such educational objectives are not always realized because some children may actually learn to hate their parents and to admire gangsters. But whatever the outcome may be, the essential fact for present consideration is that most societies provide ample opportunities for learning to hate. It is, therefore, quite unnecessary to postulate death instincts or unconscious reservoirs of hatred to account for all the feelings of hostility that are needed for national aggression or defense in times of war.

The Driving Power of Hatred

Like all emotions, hatred has drive value. Thus far it has been treated as a response. It belongs to the class of responses, however, which function also as a stimulus and a drive. We have noted that the typical situation which arouses aggression is one in which the activity which leads to the sat-

isfaction of wants and needs is frustrated. It may now be pointed out that frustrating situations also arouse anger. If an animal is very hungry, thirsty, cold, tired, in pain, or sexually aroused, and is engaging in an activity which according to its past experience leads to satisfaction or drive reduction, and if this activity is thwarted, the response is quite likely to be not only aggression but also anger. The function of anger in such situations seems to be that of adding strength to the frustrated drive and thereby keeping the organism sufficiently active to overcome the barrier. Suppose a hungry animal in search of food encounters an obstruction which is either dangerous or formidable; his hunger drive may not be strong enough to overcome the counter-drives of fear and despair which the barrier may arouse. If fear predominates, he will try to escape; if despair predominates, he may give up, lie down and starve. But if the barrier arouses anger as well as fear and despair, the anger may add enough strength to the hunger drive to overcome all counter tendencies. There are, no doubt, many occasions on which anger or hatred, which is one of its derivatives, may add the extra ounce of motivation which is needed to carry the organism over the barrier.

Darwin long ago pointed out the role of anger in the struggle for existence. It is the added motivation that "keeps 'em fighting." When fighting, the animal must mobilize all its energies and direct them against the enemy. It must inhibit all tendencies to turn and run or to surrender. Such tendencies may be powerfully aroused by the pain suffered from bruises and wounds or by the fatigue that comes from strenuous effort. Anger tends to counteract these tendencies and to summate with the thwarted drive. If the fight is over food and the animal is hungry, anger plus hunger will keep it fighting even at the cost of painful effort.

Anger is not, therefore, a drive that corresponds to some specific biological need such as food, rest, or escape from pain; it is rather a kind of "booster" drive that may be thrown in as an aid to any other drive, helping it keep the body in action, especially when an obstacle is encountered. It also acts as a counter-drive against the tendency to stop, retreat, or submit. It functions not only in fighting but in any situation in which the organism needs a boost to keep it active. It is a kind of reserve tank of drive that can be drawn upon in an emergency.

The fact that civilized societies tend to provide relatively easy ways of satisfying the basic needs such as food, clothing, rest, and escape from pain means that the booster drive of anger is not so much needed by their members as it is by animals and primitive people who live closer to nature and whose struggle for existence is more difficult. Anger, therefore, becomes highly modified by learning and ultimately takes the form of hatred, malice, and a variety of feelings of antagonism.

Hatred responses, as we have already seen, may become attached to a wide variety of situations but usually center around those in which the primary or secondary drives are frustrated. The persons, objects, and places that most people learn to hate are those that are associated with the obstructions to the behavior that satisfies needs and wants. We learn to hate those things that mean for us more hunger, more thirst, more pain, more cold, more fatigue, less money, and less prestige. These are all situations which are associated with drive increase or at least with the delays in drive decrease. Hatred is the antithesis of love. As we shall see in a later chapter, most people learn to love those persons, objects, places, and conditions which are associated with less hunger, less thirst, less pain and fatigue or more money and prestige. Hatred is contrasted with love basically be-

cause it is aroused by conditions that tend to increase drive and inhibit satisfaction, while love is aroused by conditions which tend to decrease drive and facilitate satisfaction.

The Mobilization of Hatred

We turn now to the question of how hatred may be mobilized in times of war. There are two main reasons why habits of hatred are more important for group aggression than those of overt fighting. In the first place, hatred is much more labile and less incompatible with other responses than is fighting. While mothers are knitting sweaters for soldiers, they may also be hating the enemy. The same is true of factory workers, in fact, of all people in a population. In a national crisis hatred is highly susceptible to quick and easy mobilization. In the second place, acts of threatening, menacing, coercing, bullying, and attacking which are seen in daily life and are practiced with some reward, both by children and adults, are not particularly relevant to modern warfare. In the old days of hand-to-hand fighting and to-day with bayonets, the techniques of inflicting punishment on an enemy involve quite a different set of skills. A nation of trained prize fighters would not be nearly so effective in modern war as a nation of mechanics. The skills that are required nowadays are obviously those of flying airplanes, hitting targets with bombs, directing artillery, driving tanks, firing cannon mounted on tanks, manipulating flame throwers, as well as the more standard skills of handling a rifle and a hand grenade. Any act performed for the purpose of damaging the enemy may be regarded as aggression even though it is far removed from direct contact with him. It is the motive or intent behind the act which counts. It is recognized that hatred may occupy a relatively minor position in the complex of motives that impel individuals to participate in modern warfare. People are instigated to work and fight for cause and country by a variety of considera-

tions, some of which may be quite unconscious. They are most aware of appeals, social pressure, the determination to win, fear and hatred of the enemy.

Hatred may be mobilized by skilful propaganda which directs public attention to certain aspects of the course of events and places special interpretations on them. The techniques of propaganda for this purpose will be considered later on; here we are interested in the psychological principles that are involved in eliciting the maximum hatred an individual is capable of feeling and directing it against an enemy. Very briefly the procedure is simply to find the stimulus or situation which is most firmly connected with strong responses of hatred and apply the stimulus or put the individual in that situation.

The hate-producing stimuli that are most easily manipulated are words. One way to provoke an individual to anger is by verbal insult, ridicule, and slander. In times of war a common type of verbal stimulation to resentment is the atrocity story. But why should atrocity stories arouse hatred? Because they describe situations to which anger responses have become attached by previous learning. But how do people learn to become angry when they see others tortured? According to learning theory, responses become attached to stimuli only when they are practiced with reward. How is anger rewarded when it occurs while seeing others tortured?

In our society wanton cruelty and torture are strictly tabooed and most people who have attempted either have been severely punished. Those who have been in a position to stop it or prevent it have been handsomely rewarded, at least by public approbation. But anyone who has had such an experience knows that his own anger is quite likely to be aroused sometime during the process, especially if force is required. As everyone knows, one of the most effective procedures for preventing or stopping the outspoken ag-

gression of others is to utter warnings and threats and to follow these with more drastic steps if necessary. But these acts of warning, threatening, or taking more forceful measures are the very ones which by previous learning are likely to arouse anger or one of its derivatives. If one succeeds in preventing or halting an act of cruelty that someone is committing or about to commit, his whole performance gets rewarded, including his anger. The next time a similar situation occurs, it will tend to evoke the responses that are most firmly connected with it, one set of which may be those that arouse anger.

The stimulus that evoked the anger in the first place was not the sight of cruelty but rather the acts of warning and punishing the villain. However, the stimulus of seeing the victim maltreated was present and active at the time when anger was rewarded. By the principle of simple conditioning this stimulus, and all others like it, acquire the power to evoke the anger response. Let the process be repeated a few times and anger will become one of the strongest responses to this kind of situation. But when the same situation or one like it occurs later, it will tend to evoke the strongest responses first. Hence before learning, anger occurred late in the series but now it has moved forward and antedates other responses, such as warning and attacking the villain.

Let us apply this to reports of atrocities. The accounts as we get them are usually very concrete and often detailed. The images aroused by words are fairly good substitutes for actually seeing the atrocities committed. At least the words describing the acts are stimuli which are adequate to arouse in us types of aggressive tendencies for which we have been rewarded, namely, those of punishing or causing to be punished people guilty of cruelty, torture, and other acts that are heavily tabooed. Among these rewarded acts are the complex and ill-observed ones that produce anger.

Indeed the anger responses were among those that came in for the lion's share of the reward because they were in action just before the reward occurred. They therefore tend to move up front, and are the first to bat, as it were, when an atrocity story is told. Hence after this learning has taken place the first reaction to an atrocity story is anger or some secondary feature of it, but only in those persons whose emotional education on this point has reached the place where anger has become an antedating response, and only if the verbal description of the activity produces cue stimuli adequate to elicit the anger responses.

It is difficult to check an analysis such as this by introspecting our own experiences. There are two reasons why introspection in this case is faulty and misleading. One is that we observe the end product of learning to hate and not the process that leads to it. It is most difficult to conjecture by retrospection the details of how we learned even the simplest acts. The other reason is that for all we know certain segments of the learning process may have been quite unconscious all along, and furthermore many of the responses that produce hatred are difficult if not impossible to "catch" in any crude process of self-observation and analysis. There is, however, in spite of these difficulties, certain introspective evidence in favor of our view. The most convincing item is the common feeling of wanting to "lay hands on" or "get at" the person or persons who are reported to have committed the atrocities. People who hear atrocity stories often announce how much they would enjoy the privilege of punishing the offenders. The enjoyment of punishing the offender by some torture appropriate to his crime is certainly an acquired reward.

In the first world war reports of atrocities were used liberally on both sides to arouse hatred of the enemy. After the war was over the fact gradually came out that many atrocity stories had been exaggerated; some were untrue

and "cooked up" for propaganda purposes. Many people no doubt felt somewhat chagrined for having believed them. Chagrin is a form of punishment. The reports in the present war are more likely to be correct. The shooting of hostages by the Nazis in the conquered countries is openly admitted and even advertized.

The tendency to disbelieve atrocity stories illustrates how words can lose their effectiveness as stimuli unless validated by appropriate behavior. The reason is that words are conditioned stimuli and tend to lose their power to evoke responses unless they are reinforced by suitable rewards or by re-presentation with other stimuli that are more firmly connected with the desired responses. An individual who has lost his faith in atrocity stories would renew his belief if he should be an eyewitness to a few atrocities committed by the enemy. Moreover, if the above analysis is correct, the power of the atrocity reports to arouse his hatred would be greatly augmented if he could experience the pleasure of punishing a few culprits.

Situations That Provoke Anger

If it is true that by repetition without reinforcement words lose their power to evoke hatred but may be reinstated as effective stimuli by association with other stimuli which are more firmly connected with the anger responses, what then are some sure-fire stimuli for producing responses that arouse hatred? Among the better ones are those which are aroused by aggressive acts themselves. One way to arouse an individual's anger is to frustrate him. But a frustrating situation just by itself may or may not provoke anger. It is much more likely to do so if it first provokes aggressive responses which, if carried far enough, are almost certain sooner or later to arouse anger or one of its derivatives. For example, two individuals may engage in a friendly debate, contest, or altercation of some sort which at first is carried

on quite coolly but which may, in due course, wax hotter and hotter and finally end up in a fight. Somewhere along the line each party loses his temper. Presumably what happens is that one individual makes a response which produces stimuli that are strong enough to arouse the anger drive directly or indirectly through a longer stimulus-response sequence. But whatever the stimuli may be, it is nevertheless an established fact that aggressive behavior which in the beginning is not accompanied by anger may very easily in the course of events arouse anger. This seems to work in the case of aggression with words as well as with acts. If an individual is frustrated and responds only by uttering aggressive words, he may by this process work himself up into quite a rage even though initially he experienced very little anger.⁶

According to the frustration-aggression hypothesis the strength of aggressive tendencies depends, for one thing, on the importance which the individual attaches to the behavior that is thwarted or to the goal that is temporarily denied. If an individual is doing something which to him is very important because it leads to a desired goal or to some rewarding situation or circumstance and if his progress toward this goal is blocked, or even impeded and delayed, he is quite likely to respond either with overt aggression or with anger or both. The greater the importance he attaches to the activity in which he is engaging or to the goal toward which he is striving, the stronger will be his aggressive tendencies if he is thwarted. The hungrier a dog is the more he is likely to snarl or to bite if his food is taken away. The more important it is for the traveling man to catch his train, the more likely he is to fume and stew at the taxi driver or the traffic policeman or at other drivers on ac-

6. The converse of this may also be true, as illustrated by the well-known fact that aggressive language sometimes serves to reduce rather than to produce anger.

count of delays in reaching the station. Instances of this sort could be multiplied almost without end, confirming the rule that one good way to arouse the anger emotions is to block or thwart an activity which is of great importance to the individual. In national crises thwartings of this sort are quite common and may, therefore, be utilized by the propagandist for working up hatred against the enemy.

A second technique for producing aggression is to introduce severe and prolonged delays of less important activities. The complete blocking of a number of response sequences of minor importance to the individual might be quite as effective in arousing aggression as a slight interruption of a more important activity. In other words, if the individual is hit with a series of minor annoyances, the cumulative effect may be quite as productive of resentment as one break in a major activity. It is not necessary that these minor hindrances occur simultaneously; they may be cumulative over quite a period of time. An individual who has suffered a series of minor irritations is likely to "blow a fuse" on very slight provocation. There is a familiar principle in biology and psychology known as a "summation of stimuli." A stimulus that is too weak to evoke a response may do so if it is repeated at intervals or if it is preceded by a series of other weak stimuli. A national crisis is liable to affect individuals in a great many different ways. Some are hit harder than others, to be sure, but all in one way or another are called upon to make some sacrifice in the way of higher taxes and less freedom of speech. Here again the propagandist whose job it is to work up hatred against the enemy may find material.

There is still a third technique for increasing anger in frustrating situations. It is to restrain or prohibit overt aggressive acts. If an individual is severely frustrated and tries to respond by some overt act of aggression but is restrained or prohibited, he is likely to be even more frus-

trated and quite likely to become angry. In this case the *frustration of aggression* produces more frustration which leads to stronger tendencies to aggression which if restrained produce more frustration and so on in an upward spiral. This pyramiding of aggression may be seen in the case of a child who is thwarted. If he strikes the frustrator for it, he is punished; if he shows resentment he may be punished for that too. If the only acts that he can perform under the circumstances are those that increase the anger drive, it is easy to see how it could mount to great heights of rage and how the acquired drive of hatred could become intense abomination. It seldom happens, however, that an individual will get into a jam like this because there are usually available ways out. One is to attack, not the frustrator, but some convenient bystander, some inanimate object, or simply to take a walk, which has the double effect of removing one from the anger-producing stimuli and of making vigorous muscular responses which presumably reduce the drive.

One way to elicit the maximum amount of hatred of which an individual is capable is to frustrate him severely and at the same time shut off all channels of effective aggressive responses. Something like this happened in Germany prior to the present war.

Focusing Hatred on the Enemy

We have yet to consider the psychological machinery involved in directing hatred against the enemy. We have attempted to show how hate-habits are acquired and how hatred is mobilized; and now we must consider how it is manipulated and especially how it may be deflected from one person to another.

Earlier it was pointed out that an individual can be taught to hate almost anything or anybody. The problem now is to explain how he can be induced to hate persons whom

he has never known or seen, and how he can be induced to fight them. This can be understood in terms of certain cultural and psychological principles. The cultural principle is that each individual is a member of the state; i.e., the political entity that is conducting the war. As a citizen or even as a group member there are certain duties that he has learned to perform and responsibilities that he has learned to accept. He has acquired habits of obedience to law and of coöperation with his government, especially in the event of an emergency. If the government goes to war, he goes with it automatically.

The psychological principles involved in directing hatred against the enemy are *generalization*, *displacement*, and *projection*. Suppose a small boy has learned to hate all other boys with whom he has had fights. Suppose he notices that all of them have red hair or live across the tracks or have some other feature in common. He is likely to single this out and generalize it. The next new boy with red hair will function as an adequate stimulus to arouse responses producing anger or hostility. It is a well-attested fact that humans tend to classify other persons, situations, times, places, and circumstances according to the types of responses that are evoked by them. The type of response to a new stimulus depends in part on how it is classified.

More common, however, is generalization by name or label. Suppose a boy has a fight and his playmates tell him that his opponent is a *bully*. Then let him meet and fight with a few others who are also called bullies. Pretty soon he will come to hate anyone who can be labeled a *bully*. Now suppose that a whole nation of people have been taught to hate all people who can be called arrogant, domineering, sadistic, ritual killers, blasphemers, degenerates, slave drivers, tyrants, dictators, and so on. It is only necessary to pin these labels on the enemy and make them stick to direct all the hatred they can arouse against him. It is difficult to over-

estimate the power of words in mobilizing aggression in time of war.

The Scapegoat Technique

The generalization principle, however, is not sufficient to account for all known facts about the deflection of hatred. There are some persons who cannot easily be placed in a hate-producing category. The classifying and labeling technique does not always work. A second procedure may be employed which makes use of the psychoanalytic mechanism of "displacement." It is illustrated by the common observation that an angry person who is restrained from attacking the frustrator, either by fear, force, or some other consideration, may "take it out" on an innocent bystander who is relatively defenseless, or on a small animal, or an inanimate object. The resentful bookkeeper who dares not talk back to his boss may go home and abuse his wife and children. The angry cook who kicks the stove and the teacher-frustrated schoolboy who attacks little children after school are further examples.

Let it be noted in these examples that the thing that is "displaced" is the aggression and not the anger. The bookkeeper is not angry with his wife but with his boss. But if his wife shows counter-aggression and a fight ensues, he may then become angry with her also. Let this process be repeated a few times and he may learn to hate his wife as well as his boss. Displaced aggression may, however, carry with it displaced hatred in another way. Suppose the bookkeeper by some curious twist of his mind conceives that his wife was really to blame for the reprimand he received from the boss. Perhaps the night before she insisted that he take her to a party which lasted until past midnight so that he did not get a good night's sleep. An individual with even a medium imagination can think of plenty of "reasons" for placing blame for his frustration on any convenient person,

including himself. He could and often does blame his luck, his stars, or his enemies.

This common human tendency to find a victim who can be *blamed* conveniently and safely for all the disappointments and vicissitudes of life plays a very important role in the direction of hatred against the enemy in war. One explanation of this tendency might run as follows: All individuals in our society, except very young children, have learned that it is much safer to be aggressive against a blameworthy person than against one who is blameless. The reason is that our society rewards those who punish, or cause to be punished, people who are blameworthy. If in punishing a blameworthy person the punisher experiences anger, both the anger and the aggressive act of administering the punishment are rewarded. These acts and those that arouse anger become connected with such verbal stimuli as "he is to blame" or "he deserves this punishment." Then by principles already discussed, the words acquire the power to provoke anger.

Suppose an individual has been frustrated by his boss and becomes angry with him but does not dare attack him; he is then in the market for a way to get rid of his anger. For reasons already given this is best accomplished by attacking someone else. But he has learned that if he attacks someone who is innocent, he is liable to punishment from some other source. He must find a blameworthy victim. His problem is solved by deluding himself that a safe and convenient victim is really to blame and that aggression against him is justifiable. If he is blameworthy, he is also hateful.

Groups as well as individuals may be blameworthy. An aggressor nation may by its belligerent policy force other nations to arm. In this sense it is to blame for the costs and sacrifices entailed by a program of defense. The aggressor

is defined as the one who starts the fight in the first place. He is therefore blameworthy and hate-worthy.

There are some people, however, who tend to blame themselves. They have probably been taught to do so. How many times have we heard parents say to their children: "It was your own fault," "You deserved what you got." Let these stimuli be repeated and let the responses they evoke be rewarded and a habit will be formed unless inhibited by an incompatible stronger one. If by accepting the blame for his frustration the child is repeatedly rewarded, he will acquire the habit. But such habits are sure to encounter opposition. The child may also learn that blameworthy people deserve punishment and hatred.⁷ Will he then hate and punish himself? Some people do exactly that—the extreme of it is suicide, the supreme act of self-aggression.

Attributing Our Own Faults to Others

This conflict between habits of self-blame and tendencies to punish people who are blameworthy is at the root of the "need for punishment" which appears prominently in psychoanalytic literature. The dilemma is solved, in part at least, according to psychoanalytic theory by the mechanism of "projection." It is illustrated by the common observation that some people tend to attribute to others traits and impulses of their own which are unacceptable and often unrecognizable (i.e., unconscious). Stingy people are quick to see stinginess in others; those who harbor the most malice and bitterness toward others are most apt to accuse others of hatred.

The individual, therefore, who has strong habits of blaming himself when things go wrong avoids hating himself to the point of mutilating and killing himself, by the simple trick

7. Karl Menninger, *Man Against Himself* (New York, Harcourt Brace & Co., 1938).

of imagining that it is someone else who is blaming him and hating him for the very thing for which he is hating himself. Extreme cases of this are called *paranoia*. Here the patient suffers from delusions of persecution. He imagines that people are plotting against him and planning all manner of punishment for him. He "projects" on others his own tendencies to punish himself. This is indeed convenient because if others are plotting against him *they* are the ones that deserve the punishment, and if they are punished by the authorities, he is relatively safe.

Psychologists have made use of this principle in explaining the displacement of hatred and aggression.

The advantage of this mechanism is again obvious. It reduces anxiety to force the enemy outside the gate of one's soul. It is better to hate other people for meanness and to bear the fear of their ill-will than to hate oneself for being miserly. To see wickedness in others, though terrifying, is better than to be divided against oneself. It avoids the terrible burden of guilt.⁸

The mechanism of projection also aids us to understand why most wars take on a spiritual or sacramental aspect. If all the culturally tabooed and therefore sinful impulses in one group of people can be projected upon the enemy, then it is easy to see how the moral forces that repressed these in the individuals, in the first place, can be brought up as reasons for exterminating the people on whom they have been unloaded. Indeed, it becomes one's moral and religious duty to exterminate such people from the face of the earth. As Hitler becomes the symbol of all that is wicked and mean and more or less repressed in ourselves, in a roundabout and vicarious way we purge our own souls by exterminating him. In this connection it is interesting to note that among the war aims of aggressor nations is that of liberat-

8. Durbin and Bowlby, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

ing or freeing somebody from something. Hitler excused his conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia on the ground of liberating Germans from the oppression of other people. The Japanese say they want to free the Chinese from the oppression of occidental imperialism. Could it be true that this appeal of liberation may reflect their own unconscious need of being liberated from the inner conflicts which they must bear?

It may be true that individuals who have this paranoid streak of projecting on others their own unconscious impulses are those who see in the enemy their own condemned traits. But there are undoubtedly many people who have solved the conflict in other ways. Some may have strong habits of self-blame for the frustrations of life but weak habits of hating blameworthiness. Others may have succeeded in distinguishing between situations and conditions under which blameworthiness is punishable and when it is not. Having established classes and categories of blame in respect to amount of hatred and punishment that is appropriate, they can easily put a good deal of self-blame in some nonpunishable and nonhatatable class. Such persons would have little use for the mechanism of projection but might nevertheless be easily induced to hate the enemy on other grounds.

Thus man learns to hate and to fight, and so is equipped with the habits necessary to wage war against fellow man. But how much should we hate the enemy whom we fight? There are those who believe that it is best in the long run to avoid too much hatred of the enemy in wartime. They would punish him as a judge sentences a criminal, or as a parent punishes a child, in cold blood and for his own good and for that of society. War would be fought then as a matter of duty, and soldiers would act as executors whose assignment is to see that full justice is carried out. If this attitude could be maintained, the winning side would be

better prepared emotionally to exact a just peace which would be more lasting than one that is conceived in hate and nurtured in revenge.

There are others who dissent from this "official administrative" attitude and urge that we fight with all the passion of malice that we can command. The best soldiers, we are told, are not those who enter battle in the spirit of a policeman or even that of a dutiful executioner but rather with a fanatical desire to kill. Their attitude toward the enemy is not that he must be spanked for his misdeeds but that he must be destroyed.

Unfortunately there is no reliable evidence or information concerning the military attitude of hatred toward the enemy. Casual reports from soldiers who have been on the firing line indicate that enemy hating is not the chief motive for fighting. Out there it is kill or be killed, do your duty, obey your officers, do the things that command the respect of your fellows and the admiration of the folks back home. This does not deny that some soldiers do, in fact, bitterly hate the enemy; it only asserts that hatred is one element and in many cases a minor one in the total complex motivation of soldiers.

We hazard the guess that hatred is much more prevalent among civilians than soldiers. In the first place, civilians are more exposed to campaigns for buying bonds, collecting "scrap to kill a Jap," enduring material discomforts, not to mention the constant dread of death of a son or father. In time of war it is important that the blame for high taxes, rationing, longer hours of work, and numerous other deprivations not be placed on the government. If the civilian must blame someone for these conditions, he is advised to blame the enemy. It will be recalled that hatred arises in situations when the path of progress is blocked or when the plans of men are frustrated. Aggression is directed against persons who are believed to be responsible

for these frustrations. Hatred stems from anger and the biological function of anger is that of a booster drive which motivates the individual to keep up the struggle, to exert more effort, and to increase tenacity in the face of adversity. Whatever the after-effects may be of widespread hatred of the enemy among civilian populations, the fact remains that it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to motivate an all-out effort of a war without in some measure at least arousing considerable hatred of the enemy. Whether we like it or not, it appears to be one of the inevitable results of war.

CHAPTER IV

LEARNING TO FEAR AND TO ESCAPE

Habits of Safety and Precaution

SELF-PROTECTION is said to be the first law of nature. Every organism that lives out its normal life span must possess at birth or acquire later an equipment of habits which enable it to cope with the destructive forces in its environment. In humans this equipment is largely acquired. It includes not only habits useful in escaping pain, but also those of caution, safety, avoidance, and prevention. Habits and attitudes of safety and security are involved in many aspects of life and constitute a major portion of man's daily routine. They represent the best adaptation he can make to the demands and hazards of his physical and social environments.

By virtue of his superior learning equipment, man has conquered many of the forces of the physical environment which impair his health and destroy his life and property. Most notable are his achievements in the fields of health and engineering. He still has much to fear from droughts, earthquakes, hurricanes, and climates that are severely hot or cold. But even these forces of nature can be partially avoided. Today man's chief source of danger is other men and microbes. He has made great strides in learning how to defend himself against other men and would long ago have solved this problem were it not for the fact that other men can also learn. His education in aggressiveness keeps pace with his knowledge of the techniques of defense. The history of the technique of war is an elaborate account of the invention of offensive and defensive weapons and maneuvers.

A catalogue of the self-protective habits of any one individual would be exceedingly illuminating. No such list has ever been compiled, although many years ago G. Stanley Hall made elaborate questionnaire studies of fears. Observations of children's fears¹ by child psychologists reveal wide individual variations. Some children are afraid of many things, others of few. All have some fears in common but each has many that are unique. Rather than attempt to list the kinds of things that most people in our society fear, it is more important to consider how human beings learn to distinguish between situations that are dangerous and those that are not.

Learning to Avoid Danger

The psychological machinery by means of which avoidance behavior is learned need not be outlined in detail here.² It is essentially the same as that involved in learning aggressive behavior. Three main habit systems are involved. The first results from learning to distinguish between situations that are dangerous and those that are not; the second from learning to escape, avoid, or defend when confronted by situations that are recognized as dangerous; and the third from learning to be afraid. These three are interrelated and are component parts of one total process, but for the sake of exposition they will be considered separately.

Let us consider first how children learn to recognize dangerous situations. The child learns that fire will burn, pins will prick, sharp knives will cut, doors will pinch fingers, warning words from parents may bring punishment, and so on for hundreds of situations in daily life. He also learns to read the visual and sound symbols of

1. A. J. Jersild and F. B. Holmes, *Children's Fears* (New York, Teachers College Bureau of Publications, 1935).

2. Miller and Dollard, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-60.

danger, such as the air-raid alarm, the honk of a horn, the crack of a pistol, a printed sign, a spoken word, a gesture or even a taste, odor, or high temperature. He learns that the skull-and-crossbones symbol on a bottle means poison; that the sign which reads "10,000 volts" means keep away. More important than these, however, is his ability to read the meanings of subtle symbols such as gestures, grimaces, warnings, threats, insinuations, hints, comments, or expressive movements; even extreme politeness or friendliness in some situations may be a danger signal. When Virgil warned the Romans to "Beware the Greeks when they come bearing gifts," he was pointing to a danger signal.

Danger signals may come from the inside of the body as well as from the outer world. Among these are the ordinary aches and pains which may or may not signal an oncoming illness or the need of medical attention. A toothache almost invariably indicates that the dentist should be seen, but a headache does not necessarily require a visit to the physician. Other internal danger signals which are of considerable psychological importance are impulses, particularly those that urge the individual to commit acts which result in punishment. Freud has made a great deal of this point and has used it as the distinguishing mark between normal and neurotic anxiety.³ His studies of the sex impulse brought out clearly the fact that individuals may learn to fear their sex desires because punishment is likely to follow sex-gratification. This is a form of anxiety clearly seen in connection with the study of frustration and aggression. An individual who loses his temper and in a fit of rage commits an act for which he is punished and for which he is later sorry may after a while fear his aggressive impulses. Feeling irritated or angered is for him a

3. Sigmund Freud, *The Problem of Anxiety* (New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1936), pp. 90-120.

signal of the punishment that may follow if his anger mounts to the point where he is impelled to act on it. An interesting application of this to the war situation will be discussed later.

Any Stimulus May Become a Danger Signal

The process by which any stimulus, internal or external, may become a danger signal is essentially that of conditioning. The principle may be illustrated in many ways. The standard reference experiment is taken from the famous work of the Russian physiologist, Pavlov, who was not the first to discover the principle but who explored its mechanics and demonstrated its wide applications. The story of the dog and the bell and the powdered meat has become almost legendary in psychology. If a hungry dog is placed in a specially constructed apparatus and meat powder is put in its mouth, it will respond first with the flow of saliva and later by swallowing. If, however, a bell or a buzzer is sounded just before the dog is fed and if this performance is repeated a few times, it will be found that the bell has acquired the capacity to elicit the flow of saliva in the absence of the meat powder. The bell has now acquired the properties of a signal which in human language would mean "food coming up."

However, if the sounding of a buzzer is followed immediately by an electric shock applied to one of the dog's front legs, he will respond to the shock by muscle contraction, withdrawing the foot from the floor. If this response is successful (i.e., if it terminates the shock), the buzzer will acquire the power to evoke it even in the absence of the shock. The buzzer has now become a danger signal and in human language means "shock coming." All that is necessary to associate the buzzer with the withdrawing response is to see to it that the buzzer is sounded at the time when the successful avoidance response is made.

of fear responses. Before considering how these responses become connected with stimuli that evoke them, a word should be said about the fear drive.

It will be recalled, from the last chapter, that the main function of the anger drive is to boost other drives, keeping the organism persisting or fighting to overcome obstacles that stand in the way of the satisfaction of needs and wants. The anger drive is therefore aroused most frequently, though not always, in frustrating situations. The biological function of the fear drive is similar to that of anger except that fear functions to stimulate general bodily alertness and activity when in the presence of danger situations. If an organism were not alert to danger and had no incentive to avoid it until actual pain was felt, the result might be disastrous. Fortunately men and some other animals are equipped with a drive mechanism which is aroused when the danger is yet some distance away. This mechanism is the fear drive. It not only functions to impel general bodily activity but also tends to favor avoidance responses. The main function of the fear drive is therefore to motivate activity in danger situations. It operates primarily to prevent the organism from becoming too complacent when its safety is in jeopardy. It functions also to strengthen and maintain the connections between danger signals and avoidance responses. This function enables us to understand why an organism will continue to make avoidance responses to danger signals when no pain or shock is experienced.⁴

Fear as a Response

No attempt will be made here to analyze fear responses except to point out that they are extraordinarily complicated, involving changes in many of the internal organs

^{4.} O. H. Mowrer, "A Stimulus-Response Analysis of Anxiety and Its Role As a Reinforcing Agent," *Psychol. Rev.* (1939), 46, 559-565. (The role of anxiety reduction in learning is described in detail in this article.)

of the body as well as in the nervous system itself. The nature of these responses is a moot point in psychology but it is now generally believed that they are to some extent muscular, glandular, and, to an unknown extent, take place in the nervous system. For our purpose it is enough to know that they vary in strength and in duration. When they are strong but brief the drive is called "panic" or "terror"; when they are weak but persistent the drive is referred to as "worry," "uneasiness," or "apprehension." Our problem is to understand how they are modified by learning and how they are related to avoidance responses.

It is generally agreed among psychologists that most fears, except perhaps a few in very young children, are learned. Learning requires that responses become connected with stimulus situations. How old a child must be before its body is capable of making fear responses no one knows. Infants will wince and cry at loud sounds and sometimes at the loss of support, but no one can be certain that these external manifestations indicate that a fear response is being made on the inside. The fact that these responses are internal means that they are exceedingly difficult to observe and no one-to-one correlation has been found between them and any external manifestation. Yet we know that all children sooner or later are able to make fear responses which become connected with a wide variety of external stimuli. These connections are set up by the principle of learning which requires mainly that the stimulus be present at the time when the response is made, and that the whole process result in a satisfying state of affairs.

The fact that children learn to fear an extraordinarily wide variety of persons, objects, places, and types of situations is revealed in a comprehensive study by Jersild and Holmes.⁵ These authors arranged with parents to

5. A. T. Jersild and F. B. Holmes, *op. cit.*

keep records of fears of their children on specially prepared blanks over a period of twenty-one days. Data were collected on 136 children ranging in age from three to ninety-seven months. In addition they collected reports from 103 adults concerning fears remembered from childhood. One of the most interesting results of this study is the fact that the investigators found at least 355 different situations that seem to evoke fear. Among these the more frequent are: fear of animals, strange objects, places and persons; danger of bodily injury, particularly from falling; being in the dark or alone; noises and events associated with noise; sudden rapid motion, flashes of light, shadows and reflections. The situations feared by younger children are somewhat different from those feared by the older ones, indicating that as children grow older some earlier fears tend to disappear, although many persist, and new ones are added. In general, it may be said that the situations that evoke fear are those in which the child, on previous occasions, experienced either fear, pain, or some form of bodily discomfort. There are evidently special features of these situations that function as danger signals.

Fears that people have in common stem primarily from common experiences rather than from a common source of instincts; fears in which people differ are most likely due to differences in experience. One would therefore expect to find that individuals differ considerably in the things they fear as well as in their ways of protecting themselves. The same stimulus—a mouse, a high place, a wild animal, or an enemy—may arouse different responses in different persons. Some people are easily alarmed by rumors of war, others remain calm and undeterred; some rush into defensive action, others counsel moderation and delay.

Certain situations arouse anxiety in almost everyone, even though in different degrees; for example, a serious

illness, an accident, an earthquake, a famine, or a hurricane. Most people are afraid of snakes, spiders, gorillas, and disease but few are afraid of microbes as such. These common fears are no doubt the product of common learning. Children who are brought up in the same general physical and social environment are bound to learn to fear and avoid the same sort of things in order to escape pain and hardship. These common learning dilemmas are certain to result in a wide band of common habits. Thus, the members of a group or a nation will have some fears in common but others will remain private. The same will be true of avoidance responses.

The Relation Between Fear and Avoidance Responses

It will be recalled from the previous chapter that to every type of situation to which an individual has been repeatedly exposed there are connected a number of possible responses, which vary considerably in strength of connection with that situation. This we call a response hierarchy. Every individual sooner or later acquires a hierarchy of responses to each type of danger situation that he has encountered. Some of the responses in these hierarchies are direct avoidance or escape responses, others are fear responses, and still others may be complacency responses. The behavior of an individual in a danger situation depends primarily on the structure of the hierarchy that is connected with that situation. If the avoidance responses are available and strongly connected with the distinctive cues of the situation, they will be made first and the fear responses may not appear at all. There are hundreds of situations in daily life that would be exceedingly dangerous were it not for the fact that there are so many available well-grooved avoidance responses to them. In crossing a busy street we learn to dodge approaching automobiles; in using a knife or a sharp tool

caution is exercised to avoid self-injury; in taking medicine we are careful to examine the label on the bottle to be sure it is not poison. We have also learned to keep a safe distance from hot stoves and radiators; we have learned to go in and out of the rain, not to sit in a draft, to go to bed when we have a temperature, and to drive a car only when sober. These and many other precautionary measures have become fixed habits which function smoothly, effectively, and almost automatically. They are one and all varieties of anticipatory-avoidance responses and have been learned either by instruction or by bitter experience.

There are some situations, however, to which skilful avoidance responses are attached, but which arouse fear at the same time. Fear responses are not incompatible with a great many avoidance responses unless they happen to be very intense. Fear interferes with avoidance only when it reaches the point of producing temporary paralysis or other responses that inhibit adaptive behavior. But there are many situations in which an individual can be afraid while escaping. Some psychologists are inclined to attach a great deal of importance to these situations, claiming that the escape responses somehow generate more fear.⁶ In some situations of this sort fear may be useful in keeping the organism going until it gets out of danger.

There are other danger situations for which sure-fire avoidance responses are not available. Behavior in these situations is likely to be accompanied by intense fear because the fear responses are the strongest ones in the hierarchy. Illustrations are: being caught in a burning building, trapped in a mine, shipwrecked at sea, caught in the woods during a thunderstorm, involved in a train wreck or automobile accident, being in a community in which an epidemic is raging, or living under the threat of military invasion from another country.

6. This is part of the well-known James-Lange theory of emotion.

There is still another type of relation between fear and avoidance responses. It is seen in situations which are not really dangerous, although they may have been at one time, but are still both feared and avoided. The avoidance is perpetually reinforced because it operates to reduce the anxiety drive. The drive is strong enough to prevent the individual from exploring the situation and finding out by experience that it is no longer really dangerous. Many people go through life fearful of places, objects, persons, and situations that are entirely harmless; for example, fearing mice or worrying about events that never happen.

Conditions Which Usually Arouse Fear

In our society there are four types of situations that may be counted upon to produce fear in most people. Perhaps it would be better to say that there are four main features of any situation which determine its fear-producing power. They are, first, elements or signals which foretell the severity or intensity of the threatened punishment; second, those that indicate its duration; third, those that tell how near the danger is in time and space; and fourth, those that mark possibilities of escape or the signs of certainty that the danger will really come. Most people learn to size up danger situations from the standpoint of these four criteria. When a danger situation arises the questions most likely to be asked about it are: How severe is it? How long will it last? How near is it and what are the possible defenses against it or ways of avoiding it?

It is not always easy to appraise a situation in terms of these four criteria. All danger situations are unique and many of them are very complex. The signals derive their meaning from the context which is often a complicated pattern of events. Fire in the fireplace arouses no fear in normal persons but in the attic, cellar, or some other place

in the house it may provoke panic. An enemy warship along our coast or in one of our harbors provokes only curiosity in time of peace but arouses great public concern in time of war. Most international situations are so tremendous in scope that no two individuals will view them in precisely the same way. Moreover, these situations are changing at such a rapid rate that only the most expert can keep track of all that is happening. It is not surprising, therefore, that such situations arouse different fears and degrees of fear in different individuals. By shifting attention from one aspect to another it is quite easy to shift one's fears. The propagandist who wants to arouse more fear may call attention to the signals which indicate that the danger is imminent, severe, and difficult to escape. On the other hand, there is always a brighter and more hopeful view of even the blackest situation. There are always a few safety signals which may occupy the center of attention. How are each of these four types of danger signals learned?

1. How severe is the threatened danger?

All adults have learned to discriminate dangers that are trivial and minor from those that are serious and severe. For example, pin pricks, bruises, and small burns are painful but less dangerous as a rule than gunshot wounds or fractured skulls; kittens are less to be feared than big dogs; sneak thieves less than bank robbers; and street fights less than wars. These are only a few of the thousands of lessons that are learned in daily life about the severity of the punishment that can be expected from different classes of objects, animals, and other persons, and from various types of environmental situations. From these firsthand experiences and from the teachings of others, there emerges gradually in our minds a kind of order of dangers scaled according to the magnitude of the punish-

ment they are believed to produce. The amount of fear or anxiety they arouse is proportional to the severity of the anticipated punishment.

2. How long will it last?

Burns are more dreaded than pin pricks because the pain lasts longer. Indeed, most individuals would prefer a more severe but short pain to a lesser but more enduring one. When a new danger appears, such as a threatened invasion, an effort is made to place it on a scale by comparison with items that have already been placed. The amount of fear that it will arouse will depend, among other things to be mentioned later, on the amount habitually aroused by items with which it is classed. If a new danger falls in a class with old ones that were lasting, it will arouse more anxiety than it would if similar to old ones that were brief.

As a further illustration of how this works, consider an individual who has never experienced an electric shock. He can anticipate the pain it causes only by *being told* what it is *like* in comparison with some experience he has had. Few people have had a firsthand experience of battle in war; few have ever been involved in civilian gun fights. Yet all know that war is a dreadful experience. As Sherman said, "War is hell," and fear of hell is a good illustration of the point. The hell of the Christian religion was once pictured as a huge furnace of brimstone into which sinners are cast to burn throughout eternity. It is perhaps no accident that fire was chosen as the punishing agent. Most people have experienced the excruciating pain of burns. The pain is not only acute but lasting. Also suffocation in some form is a common experience. Now add suffocation to burning and multiply the sum by eternity and the result is indeed a sizable punishment. This vivid conception of hell served well the purpose for

which it was invented, namely, that of keeping the wayward on the straight and narrow path.⁷

It is quite easy for the masses of people to imagine all the hardships and deprivations that an aggressor nation *could* inflict on them. They could be taken captives, as in olden times, and be used for slaves. Their homes and property could be confiscated or destroyed. Their fathers and sons could be killed in battle or crippled for life. Their nation could lose its prestige and its honor. All these things and more too *could* happen. But the degree of anxiety aroused by these considerations will depend upon how firmly they are bound with stimuli that already have fear-producing power, and on how much resistance they encounter from other stimuli which arouse thoughts such as "why worry about the remote things that could happen when there are other things to worry about that are much more immediate?"

3. How near is it?

This brings us to the third type of danger signals, those that indicate how *near* the danger is. The interval of time between the appearance of a danger signal and the experience of pain or punishment is an important factor in the formation of fear habits. It is easy to see that the nearer the danger in time and space the less the chances are of escaping it. If it is far off, there is time to prepare for it, to defend against it, or to find a way around it. But if the danger is close at hand, immediate action is more

7. One of the most vivid memories of my childhood is of a sermon preached by an evangelist on the following text: "The day of the Lord will come as a thief in the night in which the heavens shall pass away with great noise, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat, the earth and all the works that are therein shall be burned up. Seeing then that all these things shall be dissolved, what manner of person ought ye to be." (II Peter 3:10-11) Before hearing the sermon I had heard how stealthily the thief comes in the night; I had heard the "great noise" of exploding dynamite in a rock quarry, and two weeks previously I had witnessed the burning of a neighbor's barn "with fervent heat." That night I gave serious thought to "what manner of person I ought to be."

urgent. If a successful avoidance or protective response is not on tap but has to be found, then anticipatory organic responses occur which arouse fear. It is not just the nearness and the presumed severity of the danger that produce strong fears, but these plus the absence of any sure-fire avoidance or defensive response. Mild anxiety or tension, however, does arise as the time of punishment threatens, even though the individual has at hand a perfectly good escape response.

Considerable experimental data, especially on animals, confirm the belief that fear responses do become conditioned to time intervals.⁸ There is built up, apparently, a second kind of danger-fear scale on which fears are proportional to the nearness of the danger. The rule seems to be: *The nearer the danger in time and space, the greater the fear, provided the time and place where the shock is expected to occur are known.* As the zero hour approached, the soldier in the trenches (in the first world war) became increasingly anxious. Indeed, his anxiety mounted, in many cases, to the point where it was so intolerable that "going over" was a welcome relief. But if he did not know that a zero hour was approaching, i.e., if the danger were creeping up on him unawares, he would manifest no fear. Daily life is filled with similar experiences in which the anxiety is less intense than that of the soldier in the above situation. As the hour set for the examination, the operation, or even the wedding, approaches, those most concerned and who have the most at stake grow progressively more anxious, even though they may maintain an outward mask of calm.

The anticipation of severe punishment without knowing when it will come and without being too sure of how to

8. O. H. Mowrer, "Preparatory Set (expectancy)—A Determinant in Motivation and Learning," *Psychol. Rev.* (1938), 45, 62-91 and J. S. Brown, "A Note on a Temporal Gradient of Reinforcement," *J. exper. Psychol.* (1939), 25, 221-227.

deal with it when it comes, is part of the "war of nerves." In July, 1940, the people of England were fairly certain that they would be invaded by Germany but how soon they did not know. They were prepared to defend themselves physically but their problem was to prevent a psychological let-down. They were constantly warned not to relax their vigilance. To live in a perpetual state of tension, is, to say the least, unpleasant. There is a constant temptation to avoid it.

4. How may it be avoided or conquered?

Everyone who is alive to tell the story has at sometime in his life faced danger in one form or another and has managed to escape either unscathed or bearing the scars. The arsenal of habits which we all acquire for defense against the hazards of life is not always adequate to protect us from pain, injury, and deprivation. Again we learn to classify danger situations, this time not by the severity or nearness of the danger but by the adequacy of our ability to cope with it. So a correlation between fear and confidence becomes established. The less confident we are that we can successfully defend ourselves against a danger or somehow avoid it, the greater will be the fear that is aroused.

In extreme cases when the situation appears utterly hopeless, the defenses completely inadequate, and the avenues of escape all closed, there is a tendency to give up in despair, to take a fatalistic attitude and "come to terms" with it, so that all anxiety seems to disappear. It is said that this attitude is often characteristic of people who know they are doomed to die shortly. It is an attitude to be guarded against in a defensive national emergency.

How We React to Unknown Dangers

Thus far we have been considering how fear-habits work in situations when the danger situation can be classified

in respect to its severity, duration, nearness, and the adequacy of defense against the threatened punishment. Our hypothesis is that, when a new situation appears, individuals are wont to associate it with others like it, with the result that it tends to evoke the same degree of fear as would be evoked by those with which it is classified. The fact that there are wide individual differences between the classification schemes that are used by individuals for fear-provoking situations means that a war situation may very easily get pigeon-holed in different compartments in the minds of different individuals. The result is that some people are far more excited, afraid, and anxious about a threat to the group from the outside than are others. One of the advantages that comes from wide discussion and debate concerning the nature and possibilities of such danger is that it may be more uniformly classified in the minds of people, with the result that their fear responses will be more nearly the same. This does not guarantee, however, that these responses will match the realities of the danger. It would be surprising if they did, for the reason that there are so many unknown factors in complex danger situations.

There are even wider individual differences in how people react to unknown dangers. Some people, notably cases in psychopathic institutions, experience frequent and terrific seizures of anxiety and literally tremble with fear but do not as a rule know what they are afraid of. Sometimes they will report that they fear someone is plotting against them, trying to poison them, or to use some malevolent hypnotic influence on them. At the other extreme there are individuals who take the attitude that the world is full of unknown dangers, most of which never materialize. Such individuals tend to be quite indifferent, if not extremely complacent when told that they are in the presence of dangers which cannot be easily sensed. Again it appears that individuals tend to set up a category of

danger situations under the general head of "unknowns." The extent to which this category will arouse fear will depend upon previous learning. Some individuals have, in fact, been plotted against more than others, some have experienced sudden attacks and seizures from unseen hands, while others have escaped these experiences. Another type of experience is that of having enemies who are known to be hostile and who, without due notice or warning, are likely to inflict some form of punishment. One would expect, therefore, that individuals would vary considerably in their reactions to the unknown factors in any danger situation in accordance with their previous experience.

The foregoing account is by no means an adequate description of the complexities of the fear-habits in a population and how they may come into play in a national emergency. It illustrates, rather, a way of thinking about the problem and a manner of approaching it. The principles enunciated could be used and, indeed, are used, as we shall see later, by individuals in positions of governmental authority as well as by those who have control over the media of communication, including the press, the radio, and the movies, in an attempt to persuade the masses that their view of the danger situation is the one which should be adopted and that their fears should be shared by all.

How Fear Is Dispersed

We turn now to a consideration of the problem of over-motivation in critical situations.⁹ According to the analysis given above, it is quite easy to see how a danger situation can arouse fears that are far in excess of those necessary to motivate a coördinated program of defensive action. In-

9. Many of the techniques for anxiety reduction described in the following pages are taken from an unpublished report of the staff of the Institute of Human Relations. Papers by O. H. Mowrer and Earl Zinn have been especially helpful.

deed one of the most difficult problems in an extremely critical situation is that of calming the fears of the people. Excessive anxiety easily leads to panic in which there is little organized or coördinated behavior and in which the strength derived from the unity of the group is dissipated. When a city is being bombed the people are likely to do foolish things. Some may want to run away; others may advise appeasement of the enemy; and others may go to church and pray.

One of the reasons why intense anxiety leads to panic is that it is so utterly intolerable. Small doses are often stimulating and relatively pleasant, especially when the anxiety is the lesser of two evils. Some people enjoy taking a chance and living dangerously, but let anxiety mount to high levels and it becomes intolerably painful. When this happens, individuals are likely to indulge in the kinds of behavior which, by previous learning, have been found to be effective in dissipating fear. Let us examine some of these.

The fear-anxiety drive is usually aroused by danger signals coming from the outside or from the inside of the body. Presumably the strength of the drive is determined by the strength of the fear responses. If this is the case, then it would follow that in order to reduce the fear drive it is necessary to reduce the strength of the fear responses. This may be done in two ways: first, by removing or modifying the stimuli that evoke them; and second, by substituting for them competing responses that are incompatible with them. By the use of the latter it is possible to dispel fear without changing the realities of the danger situation.

Techniques for Modifying the Danger Signals

A common technique for dispelling fear without affecting the danger is the well-known ostrich act. Friends of

this maligned bird tell us that he does not hide his head in the sand when danger approaches. But humans, when afraid, do similar things. They may turn off the radio when the news is too terrifying to bear, or refuse to read the newspaper accounts of the smashing victories of the enemy, and some will avoid even talking about the war when it is going against them.¹⁰ But closing the eyes, turning the head, or otherwise trying to avoid the sensory impact of danger signals does not always eliminate their effects, although it may weaken them. The reason is that once the danger situation has been seen, heard, or otherwise sensed, it may persist in the form of visual, auditory, or verbal images which are usually weaker stimuli than sensations and produce weaker responses.

The stimulus value of the danger situation may be modified by placing different interpretations on it. This may be done by responding to it with "comforting words." We may tell ourselves that it really is not as bad as it looks, that people tend to overestimate the possibilities of danger to insure adequate precautions, that more people are killed in automobile accidents than in wars and we do not fear automobiles. Anything that belittles or minimizes the danger or calls attention to features of the situation which look encouraging tends to reduce the fear. Apparently what happens here is that the individual himself or someone else gives a word stimulus which arouses responses that compete with those that arouse the fear-anxiety drive.

Another example of self-stimulation in competition with the facts of the danger situation is that of *phantasy*. In times of war people indulge in an unusual amount of wishful thinking. They invent, in their imagination, all kinds of powerful and devastating weapons that could be used against the enemy. They overestimate the importance of

10. Hadley Cantril, *The Invasion from Mars* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1940).

the victories of their side and talk down those of the enemy. They anticipate and talk about the weak spots in the enemy's armies and plan the strategy of his defense. Wishful thinking, however wild it may be, does have in it an element of rationality. People have learned by experience that their past successes in defending against and avoiding some kinds of danger have been preceded by a certain amount of planning. Indeed, planned action is usually more successful than random, hit-or-miss behavior. It has therefore been well rewarded and tends to move forward in the stimulus-response series and to occur in some form as one of the first responses to a danger situation. But the reason that it reduces fear is that it cues off responses which compete with those that arouse the fear-anxiety drive, or inhibits them in some other way.

Techniques for Reducing Fear Responses

One of the oldest methods of dispelling fear is the use of magic, ceremonial, and *ritual*. When in extreme danger some people are likely to perform some ritual that is calculated to aid in protection and defense. Primitive people apparently make more use of magic and ceremonial than do civilized societies. Most tribes have very elaborate rituals and systems of gods, spirits, and supernatural forces who are believed to be accessible through prayer and greatly influenced by ceremonials. Civilized people who believe in a personal God and the efficacy of prayer also derive much comfort from religion in times of distress. Those who believe a guardian angel will protect and care for them, seeing them safely through great dangers, undoubtedly have less fear than unbelievers, unless of course the unbeliever has found other more effective means for holding anxiety in check. Calling for help and getting it from an older, wiser, and more powerful person is a very strong habit, established early in life. It never disappears

because it is perpetually reinforced by an ancient and powerful institution—the church—and because the relatively few experiences of direct answer to prayer are quite sufficient to offset thousands of failures. Like phantasy, it becomes anticipatory in the series of responses to danger, and when it occurs it produces stimuli which in one way or another inhibit the responses that produce the fear-anxiety drive.

Another technique for reducing anxiety is to engage in almost any vigorous behavior. In a tense situation someone is likely to cry out, "Why doesn't somebody do something?" Doing anything is more likely to relieve anxiety than doing nothing. The student who is about to take an important examination will often pace the floor, walk around the block, go to the movies, or do something that will get his mind off the impending events. Anxious relatives pace the corridors of hospitals, and wives of sailors try to keep busy. In wartime people are often given "busy work" to do. Some may collect old metal for armaments, others will make bandages, knit sweaters, and participate in many other phases of volunteer work. The performance of acts that are continuous and engaging will reduce anxiety for at least two reasons: First, it takes the mind off the danger situation so that the fear-producing stimuli do not have as great a chance to operate; and second, it introduces responses which in the past may have been anticipatory to other responses which did deal effectively with the danger itself. Individuals who have not acquired successful avoidance responses to a danger situation have at least learned that it is a good plan to *do something* on the chance that an effective response will be found. If random action at the beginning leads to successful responses in the end, then by the principle of the gradient of reinforcement they are strengthened. Later and on other occasions when successful responses cannot be made, the ran-

dom ones, being the strongest of those possible, will appear.

If it is true, and it seems to be, that the fear-anxiety drive is produced by a complicated pattern of internal responses, then any incompatible pattern should reduce fear. There is some evidence that the organic responses involved in mirth and the tendency to burst with laughter are incompatible with those of fear and anxiety. At least, it is a common observation that fear and laughter do not go together. Situations that are fearfully dangerous are just not funny, yet whistling, singing, joking, and laughing are well-known techniques for keeping up courage and keeping down fear in such situations. One explanation of this paradox might be that joking and singing are forms of self-stimulation and intersocial stimulation which somehow arouse responses that are incompatible with those of anxiety. Another explanation might be that joking is simply a denial of the danger and robs the situation of its power to produce anxiety responses.

At this point a word may be said about the relations between sleep, drugs, and anxiety. There are certain sedatives or sleep-producing drugs which will relieve anxiety temporarily. Indeed one of the symptoms of extreme "anxiety states" in clinical cases is the inability to sleep, interrupted sleep, and nightmares. All normal people know how hard it is to sleep when frightened or worried. Sleep is something of a psychological mystery, but we do know that it requires relaxation of the muscles. We also know that a typical response to pain is tensing the muscles. When the dentist is drilling in a sensitive tooth, it is very difficult to keep from tensing the skeletal muscles. Tensing also occurs with the anticipation of pain, which is one form of anxiety. The relations of muscular tensions and relaxation to fear and anxiety are not clear, but it would seem that there is a rough correlation between relaxation and decrease in anxiety.

There are certain intoxicating drugs such as alcohol, cocaine, and hashish which seem to depress anxiety. Any drug that tends to depress or slow down the action of the fear response will reduce the anxiety drive. Drugs that paralyze the sensory nerves, especially those leading from the sense organs inside the body, have a similar effect.

More Rational Methods of Coping with Danger

Thus far we have been speaking of how anxiety may be reduced without materially affecting the danger situation. One of the greatest achievements of man is his ability to manipulate his environment to prevent dangers from arising and to cope with them when they occur. His life, health, and happiness depend to no small extent on his knowledge and skill in protecting and defending himself. If he feels ill or suffers pain, he has many techniques for getting relief; if in advance of illness he recognizes danger signals, he may avoid pain and inconvenience by taking certain precautionary measures. He may go still further and safeguard his health even though there are no danger signals on the horizon. These three activities may be called escape, avoidance, and prevention. The prevention step requires the most foresight and planning but is the most difficult to motivate for the reason that the most suitable drive, namely, anxiety, is not present. Man's skills in preventing dangers are thus far less developed than his ability to escape and avoid. Here the reinforcements are much more immediate and tangible.

When man finds himself in a danger situation which is serious enough to arouse his fears, he goes immediately to work to find some way of escape from it or of avoiding its threatened consequences by defending against it. His social education has provided him with an arsenal of responses from which he may draw the ones that seem most useful for dealing with the situation at hand. Among these are

some that will effectively reduce his fear-anxiety drive but will not change the realities of the danger. Of these we have already described a few that are most typical. There are others which do change the danger situation quite materially. We shall describe briefly a few that are most common.

The first response tendency evoked by most danger situations is that of dodging, "ducking," side-stepping, avoiding, or running away. This accomplishes two things: first, it gets the individual out of range of the danger signals and hence reduces anxiety; and second, it reduces the chances of punishment by increasing the distance between him and the danger. Running away from danger has become a strong habit in most people because ordinarily it is successful. By continued reinforcement it becomes one of the strongest habits in the response hierarchy to many danger situations. It also appears to have an instinctive basis in the unlearned withdrawal-from-pain responses which are the basis of most avoidance responses.

There are many types of danger situations that cannot be avoided by running away. From some there is no safe place to run, in which case running would not be rewarding, but perhaps punishing, if a worse danger were encountered; from others running may be inhibited by fear. The soldier who has the impulse to run is constrained from so doing by images of court-martial or by ridicule of his fellows. But the *tendency to run* from danger is a powerful one and is probably first on the list for most situations.

One of the most effective ways of dealing with some menacing situations is to attack and destroy. If the threatening object is a person or an animal, a simple and adequate avoidance response is to kill it or, at least, to maim it and thereby put it out of action. This technique has the advantage of getting rid not only of the danger

signals but of the danger itself. Moreover, it has the added advantage that the danger will not be repeated from that particular source. But attacking runs the risk of even greater punishment, especially if it is unsuccessful. Ordinarily an individual will not attack the threatening object unless the anxiety that is aroused by it is greater than that anticipated from attack and unless there is no better way out. This technique for dealing with most danger situations that involve other persons is not a favorite one except under very unusual circumstances. Whether it is used or not depends mainly on how the user estimates his chances of success.

If the chances of success by single-handed attack are not favorable, the individual can and often does seek help from others. Help is most likely to come from others who are menaced by the same threat or who stand to gain in some other way. Most people are much braver and more likely to attack when in a group than when standing alone. The stimulus situation that elicits attacking responses is made up both of the threatening object and the group itself. It is as though many individuals had by some psychological process converted themselves into one giant. This change in the context of the total situation reduces the power of the threatening object to elicit fear and increases the bravery of each of the members of the group.

But even group attacks may not be feasible, as is often the case in international affairs, and certainly running away is not in order. Hence, two common alternative techniques of dealing with menacing neighbors are appeasement and defense. The technique of appeasement can be given short treatment. It often works as a temporary measure and is sufficiently rewarding to keep it alive. In reality it is a form of bribery or paying blackmail. Its psychological disadvantages are obvious. If the aggressor is rewarded for his menacing behavior by offering him bribes or by

meeting his demands, he is rewarded and will, of course, in due season come again.

The various techniques of defense, such as building protective walls or arming oneself with appropriate weapons, have the multiple psychological effect of discouraging the aggressor, raising his anxiety, and of introducing safety signals into the danger situation. The loaded rifle in the hands of the hunter is a stimulus which tends to neutralize the fear-producing effects of the sight of a tiger. When the safety signals of a situation exceed the danger signals in stimulus power, the responses that are elicited either inhibit or antedate those that provoke the anxiety drive. An elaborate display of thousands of tanks, battleships, bombers, and guns of all descriptions does much to dispel fear in the people and to arouse fear in the enemy. The sense of national security that comes from naval bases, a formidable fleet, a large air force, a big army, separation from the enemy by natural barriers is understood psychologically in terms of the net balance of safety signals over any future combinations of dangers.

When all other plans for dispelling fear fail there is a final one that usually succeeds. It is to submit to the punishment and get it over with. Anxiety has been defined as anticipated punishment. When the punishment comes and is over, the fear should and does disappear. Everyone who has had to face a surgical operation, a critical examination, a "showdown" with the boss, or any other crisis, knows the conflict between the desire to postpone it indefinitely and the urge to get it over with quickly. If a painful experience must be endured, and if the anxiety of suspense is more intolerable than the expected pain, then the individual will choose to suffer the pain now rather than endure the anxiety of anticipating it. A nation that is threatened by an aggressor and knows that war is inevitable may become the technical aggressor by attacking first even

though quite unprepared. When this happens, it may be said that the dread of war is worse than war itself.

Thus far we have been talking about how the fear-anxiety drive may be increased to maximum heights of terror and panic or how it may be decreased to mild states of apprehension or alertness or disappear entirely. Technically this is done by manipulating the environment so that fear responses will be increased or decreased in number and vigor. This depends in turn on the extent to which these responses have been set up as habits and the number and kinds of stimuli that will elicit them; in short, on the individual's stock of fear-habits.

The Great Strength of Fear-Habits

Fear-habits, like hate-habits and all other habits, are not stable but are in a constant state of flux. As life goes on and interactions with environments continue, some habits grow weaker, others stronger, some old ones drop out and new ones come in. The rate and extent of such changes depend mainly on the changing demands of the environment. Once an organism has achieved a fairly adequate adjustment to its environment, it will not change its habits except as demanded by changes in the environment.

In most societies as children grow up they abandon or overcome many (not all) of their old fears and take on new ones. Fears of goblins, ghosts, giants, bogey men, and other mythical creatures are left behind, but fears of death, unemployment, and old-age dependency creep up as life moves on. The process by which old fears, especially the irrational ones, are overcome illustrates that most human fears are learned and unlearned according to the principles of habit formation. One of these is the principle of extinction which simply states that an act when practiced without reward or with punishment will eventually be abandoned. Theoretically, all fears can be overcome pro-

vided the learning conditions for getting rid of them are favorable. A man who earns good wages as a riveter on steel bridges or high buildings as a rule soon overcomes any fears he may have had of high places. Many soldiers by a process of education known as discipline overcome their fears of being a target for the riflemen of the enemy. They can and do learn to face bullets and other grave dangers with a surprising degree of calm and courage. There are, of course, many individuals whose fears of guns, bullets, airplanes, tanks, and cannon are so deep-seated that even the most rigid military discipline will not eradicate or suppress them. Such individuals if inducted into the military service are likely to find an escape in a war neurosis.

Habits of fear are among the most difficult to extinguish. One of the reasons is that they are so easily and readily reinforced. The woman who shrieks and runs from the mouse is rewarded because she escapes the "dreadful thing." She never gives herself a chance to learn how harmless the mouse really is. If she were forced to earn her living by breeding mice for sale to a laboratory, she would without doubt soon overcome her fear. Fear arouses tendencies to escape, defend, or protect oneself. Any act that accomplishes this is automatically rewarded. As long as the act is successful there is little incentive to try anything else. It will be given up eventually, however, provided it no longer works or provided it requires so much effort and time that individuals would rather risk the danger than go through with it.

- An illustration of how defense habits persist is found in the military tactics of two nations that have fought a previous war. The nation that won the last war will, so it is reported, tend to use over again the same tactics, especially the defensive ones, while the nation that lost the previous war will abolish the old tactics and invent new

ones. In the first world war France defended herself successfully against the German attack by trenches, pill boxes, and solid lines. After the war she built a super-defense system called the Maginot Line. But Germany meanwhile invented a new offensive technique with which she won over France in 1940. This may be one explanation of why two nations or tribes that have fought many wars with each other have alternately won and lost. The development in military techniques has been stimulated primarily by nations that have lost wars through the use of old or standard strategy. They felt forced to learn new devices. Most learning occurs when an individual is in a dilemma where he is forced to learn. The history of war and peace is mainly an account of how political groups have learned to get along with each other. They learn not only the techniques of war but also the conditions of peace.'

CHAPTER V

LEARNING TO LOVE AND TO DEFEND

IN the preceding chapters we have seen how individuals learn to hate, to fight, to fear, and to escape in a selfish way. Now we turn to how they will do these things not only for themselves but for others. In the previous chapter we were talking about the *organism* and not about the *self*. When we spoke of safety, we meant safety to one's own skin. The notion of self was narrowly conceived. In this chapter it is broadly conceived to include what has been called "the extended self" or the social self and even the material self, to use James's distinction. It is the self that has been built up by processes of social learning. Its limits are seen in the use of the first person singular possessive pronouns—*my* and *mine*. We know that most humans are angered and will fight not only to protect themselves, but also to protect others, especially members of their families, relatives, friends, and fellow countrymen. Likewise, they are fearful of threats and menaces not only to their own person but also to those whom they love, with whom they are identified, or to whom they are somehow obligated. This extended self not only takes in other persons but also animals, particularly pets and domestic animals, material objects, social position, etc.

The motives that impel an individual to fight for his home, church, lodge, school, or country are no doubt complex and varied. Some are obvious and easily located; others are more subtle and hard to find. Among the more prominent ones are: (1) fear of some immediate punishment, such as ridicule, ostracism, fine, and imprisonment,

(2) hatred of an enemy of the group and a desire to destroy him, (3) expectation of some immediate reward, such as prestige in the group, honor, money, a share in the loot of conquest, and the like, (4) love for country, its symbols, and leaders, (5) sense of identity with other members of the group, and (6) sense of duty. The German soldier who endures the mental and physical hardships of war, risking his life daily, may do so because he fears to do otherwise; genuinely hates the Russians and English; expects immediate rewards and actually receives some; loves Hitler and Germany and expects no material reward; feels that an attack on other Germans is equivalent to a personal affront to himself; feels it is his duty to fight for his country and his conscience would not permit him to do otherwise. These main factors operate in various combinations and different degrees of strength constituting an endless variety of patterns each of which is perhaps unique for each individual. Moreover, each individual pattern may change from time to time although its main outlines may remain relatively constant. Fear and hatred as motives, having been discussed in the two previous chapters, will be omitted here except insofar as they are involved in the types of motivation with which this chapter is concerned. These are (1) love for country, (2) identification with other members of a group, and (3) sense of duty. These three are interrelated and do not function independently, but for the sake of exposition they may be separated.

How Love for Persons and Places Is Acquired

Our first problem is to understand as well as we can how love for country is acquired. No psychologist, however strongly he may believe in instincts, has ever gone so far as to list patriotism among the instincts. Efforts have been made, however, to show how love for country is a development of certain alleged basic instincts, such as love for

parents, emphasizing that such phrases as "mother country" and "fatherland" are not accidental designations. Whatever the truth may be about the biological basis of love for country, the important fact here is that no individual is born with a love for the land in which he first saw the light of day. Love for country is undoubtedly an acquired sentiment and the problem is to discover how it is learned.

In the first place, let it be noted that the word "love" is used in a variety of contexts. We speak of loving other people, which is the most common usage, but we also speak of loving certain foods and beverages; or we may simply say that we love to eat when we are hungry, drink when thirsty, or to play bridge, golf, chess, and so on. The word "love" is used in the context of satisfactions. In general, things that are satisfying and rewarding are loved; whereas things that are annoying and punishing are hated and avoided.

If we want to know what an individual loves most, the thing to do is to notice where he goes, whom he seeks, and how he behaves when he is tired, hungry, thirsty, ill, in pain, excited sexually, or when he is in the need of money, protection, or safety. When under the compulsion of any drive, primary or secondary, the individual seeks places, persons, and circumstances which in the past have been closely associated with drive reduction; i.e., with the fulfilment of wants, needs, and desires. This may be demonstrated by experiments with animals. Feed an animal in the same place for a few days and he will always go to that place when hungry, as every farmer and zoo keeper knows. Let an animal once discover that there is a place of refuge where he is safe from attack and punishment, and he can be counted upon to head for that place when he is alarmed. If a house cat, when being punished or chased, finds refuge under the sofa, he will thereafter run for the sofa whenever

he is threatened. Children behave in the same way. They soon learn the persons and places to whom they should go when in pain or in danger. These will invariably turn out to be the places and persons that on previous occasions have given relief and protection.

By the time a child is three or four years old he has probably been fed two or three thousand times by his mother. He has been made warm when he was cold, put to bed when he was tired, has received relief from pains of colic, pricks, and burns, has been comforted and protected from the threats of other children and adults many hundreds of times. When we consider the amount of practice with reward which is associated with home and mother, it is quite easy to understand the tremendous power of love for them. There is nothing here that is biologically mysterious or instinctive; it is simply that the culturally defined relations between mothers and children, between home and children are such as to provide a tremendous amount of rewarded practice of many of the activities that take place in that environment.

It is clear, therefore, that learning to love is simply learning the places, things, and circumstances that can be *counted upon* always to satisfy some want, felt need, or desire; in short, to reduce some primary or secondary drive. The greater the number of rewarded trials and the fewer the disappointments, the stronger these habits become. The old proverb "A friend in need is a friend indeed" carries the essential meaning and reveals the peculiar nature of learning to love. A friend is a person who can be counted upon, looked to for help in times of need.

The process of learning to love is plainly revealed in legendary and scientific literature. By relieving the lion of the pain from a thorn Androcles became his life-long friend. Yerkes has given an interesting account of how security, confidence, and understanding are achieved by the

chimpanzee. The first lesson in security, learned by the infant chimpanzee, is that its mother is its best protection. During the first few weeks it becomes completely dependent on her, clings tenaciously to her, and distrusts all other aspects of its environment. Gradually and partly through its trust in its mother, its "security range" extends to other segments of its environment. By taking infants from their mothers shortly after birth and bringing them up in a human family it has been demonstrated that they become dependent upon their human protectors and thereafter in life are far more coöperative for experimental work.

Yerkes regards fear, timidity, or anxiety as standing at one extreme against perfect trust and confidence at the other. But to dispel fear does not guarantee confidence. When the animal learns not to fear the human, he may become merely indifferent. He no longer avoids men, runs away, screams, or shows fears at their approach. The sign of confidence is much more positive. The animal seeks, welcomes, and solicits human presence and attention. This relation can be achieved best by becoming identified with some important rewarding situation. "Therefore if one wishes promptly and with minimal effort to win the devotion, dependence, complete trust, and lasting appreciation or affection of a chimpanzee, he can have no better luck than opportunity to rescue it from some dangerous or painful predicament or to render obviously important medical, surgical, or nursing service. Even to happen upon and to be able to lend support to an individual which is greatly stirred emotionally by fear or anger may win its appreciative allegiance. I have had a sick and miserable little chimpanzee pat me on the shoulder gently in return for the kindness of considerate handling."¹

¹ R. M. Yerkes, "Primate Coöperation and Intelligence," *Amer. J. Psychol.* (1937), 50, 254-270.

"A good dog bravely defends his master" says the Binet test. This we can understand because the master is the source of protection, food, and comfort which the dog enjoys. It is easy to understand why the dog should be devoted to his master, but why should the master defend the dog? The dog is a willing and obedient servant because he is rewarded for so doing and punished if he rebels. But why are some people more quick in defense of an animal than they are in defense of themselves? What human desires, needs, or wants are fulfilled by dogs and cats? They are for the most part the secondary drives such as the desire for mastery and superiority. Animals become attached to humans and humans become attached to animals by the same process of learning.

The term "my dog" can be translated into psychological language as follows: "My dog is a particular canine whom I have learned to love because I have found in him satisfactions for certain secondary cravings, wants, and desires which he provides with a maximum of convenience and a minimum of cost and obligation." The felt need which the animal supplies is a craving for companionship without the cost and bother entailed in seeking human companionship. The dog also provides for the unconscious need for mastery which is difficult to secure over humans. There are many secondary drives in the lives of human beings which are admirably satisfied by a pet.

Another reason why we love animals is that they never insist that we conform to the moral codes of society. An individual by indiscriminate sinning is liable to lose a good many of his human companions on the ground that they feel that they cannot afford to be identified with a reprobate. But not the dog. Your dog never punishes you for your sins. It makes little difference to him whether you are a drunkard, philanderer, coward, spendthrift or even a criminal, he loves you just the same. His love for you is

not conditioned on your social conduct. It is conditioned only on how you treat him, not on how you treat others. Fortunately for you he has no way of knowing whether you are honest or dishonest in your relations with your fellow men.

"My home" may be translated psychologically into the following: "My home is a place where I can always *count on* being fed when hungry, made warm when cold, rested when tired, protected when threatened; it is a place where I can borrow money when I need it, if there is any, where I can enjoy social status, where I count for something, and where I can always get a certain amount of deference and recognition. Truly there is no other place like it. If, on the other hand, home is a place where I am constantly berated, nagged, punished, and where I can never count on reward but can always count on an unpleasant time, I can truly say 'this is no place for me.' " Under these conditions home becomes disassociated from the ego of the individual. A home associated with strife, hunger, cold, fatigue, and lack of status is precisely the kind of place which all organisms, both animal and human, will try to avoid. Such individuals are likely to say "I have no home."

How Love for Country Is Learned'

It is accomplished by the same general procedure involved in learning to love one's home. It is somewhat more difficult, however, for the reason that the child has many more firsthand contacts and experiences with his home than he has with his country as a whole. Love-habits are for the most part responses that are conditioned to stimulus situations that are present and active at the time when the child is being most rewarded with food, drink, rest, parental protection, and relief from pain. Love for country is accomplished basically by getting the symbols that stand for it connected as stimuli to responses which

reduce pain, relieve anxiety, and otherwise satisfy the needs, wants, appetites, and desires of the child. This is achieved primarily by verbal and written instruction and by travel.

We are reminded at this point of the distinction between *nation* and *state*. A nation is a cultural entity; the state a political organization. The phrase "love for country" does not reveal whether the object of devotion is its way of life (nation), its institutions, its material advantages, its form of government, or the political regime that is in power. In reality all are fused into a single functional whole. There is undoubtedly an enormous variation in the places, objects, persons, institutions, activities, and symbols to which people are attached emotionally. A man may love his culture, its material aspects, system of values and its people but despise his government. He may admire his form of government but hate the party in power.

One of the problems of any government is to win and hold the allegiance of the people. This is accomplished in many ways, one of which is emotional conditioning to the symbols of the state. In our country the stimuli which evoke the sentiments of patriotism are such things as the flag, the national anthem, the mythical figure of Uncle Sam, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and national monuments and buildings—the most important of which are the Statue of Liberty and the monuments to George Washington and Abraham Lincoln. It may be asked then what kind of satisfactions are associated with the responses that these symbols arouse? They are, no doubt, for the most part those of protection from outside enemies, assurances of internal security represented by such governmental utterances as "no one shall starve," "people in their old age will be taken care of," and "no one will be punished for speaking his mind (within limits, of course)." The intensity of patriotism and love for country depends

primarily on the strength of the connections between a wide assortment of stimuli, such as described above, and responses which in the past have been associated with the satisfaction of a great many human needs and desires.

How are these connections established? First, by conditioning the child's love responses to national symbols. If the flag, the name of the country, the mythical figure (e.g., Uncle Sam) are constantly associated with experiences in which the child's needs are met, wants are satisfied, and desires are fulfilled, they will soon acquire the power to evoke the kinds of responses that reduce drives. In Germany a part of the program of education in patriotism is to teach children to repeat the phrase "for this we thank our Fuhrer," in connection with all satisfying experiences; but not to repeat it in connection with painful or annoying experiences. The introduction of the salutation "Heil Hitler" was intended to provide a common conditioned stimulus that would arouse in everyone responses of patriotic devotion. One of the reasons why national history, especially military history, is believed to develop sentiments of patriotism is that it provides proof of the fact that the people are protected and freed by their government and are fed and clothed by the efforts of their fellow countrymen.

In addition to emotional conditioning to national symbols, love for country may be acquired by generalization. A child who has learned to love his home and his community may extend this love to the whole country because he has learned that his country somehow makes possible the things that he enjoys at home and in the community. An illustration of this may be drawn from an experience common to many people who have come to like a particular city primarily because they have had so many pleasant experiences in one very restricted place in it. A person who says he likes San Francisco usually means that he has had

a good time in a few homes, restaurants, theaters, or other places in that city. There is generalization from home to community to city to state and to the nation. But as the circle widens the sentiment weakens.

The essential features involved in love for country are seen most clearly when we consider how a child becomes emotionally conditioned to the flag and the national anthem. These symbols produce thrills. Thrilling experiences usually involve an element of suspense as illustrated by mystery stories, novels, and dramas. Psychologically, working up to a climax means increasing the drive, which in many instances becomes so strong that the reader cannot wait but turns to the end of the book to find out how it comes out. The best thrills seem to come from flirting with danger. Any dangerous-looking contraption arouses a certain amount of anxiety. But the knowledge that after all it is safe enables one to enjoy the anxiety; the fun is not in the danger or the anxiety but rather in the escape from it. It is not difficult to explain why a dangerous-looking performance, such as parachute jumping or riding in an airplane, should produce anxiety. The situation contains cue stimuli which evoke in the organism anxiety responses that occur automatically with very little voluntary control. One of the best examples is viewing a rattlesnake inside a glass cage. Even though the observer is fully aware of the fact that the snake cannot harm him, he is nevertheless unable to prevent himself from experiencing fear. The verbal stimuli such as "it is safe enough," "no real danger here," "no need to be afraid" are too weak to evoke responses which will inhibit fear. Yet these verbal reassurances, strengthened by seeing others do these things and observing that no harm comes to them, are strong enough to induce people to come up close to the glass cage where the snake is, or to go on the roller coaster, or to attempt a parachute jump. But in spite of all this, the anxiety

responses are still going on inside the organism. When the individual actually gets on the roller coaster, takes the parachute jump, and discovers for himself that it is quite safe, he experiences then the thrill that comes from the reduction of anxiety.

Examples of thrills are also found in the testimony of individuals who have been abroad for several months and upon returning to the United States experience considerable exhilaration at the sight of the Statue of Liberty and the New York City skyline. Homecoming is always more or less exciting when one has been away for some time. But the excitement wears off and dies out after the first few hours at home. Such experiences may be understood, in part at least, by the theory that the appearance of "home" elicits certain relaxing responses. When away most people have some mild worries about things back home which are relieved upon return. Furthermore, when in strange places and among strange people one is apt to be more or less on the alert as indicated by the fact that travel is unusually tiring in proportion to the amount of walking and other overt physical exertion. Also there are all kinds of minor risks involved—social and otherwise. The result is that the traveler is always "keyed up" to a greater extent than he is at home. Home is one place where one can afford to relax and "take it easy." The thrill of homecoming, the feeling that "it is so good to be back" is equated to the drop in tension. After the drop has occurred the thrill disappears.

But what about the thrill when the flag goes by? The flag itself does not always produce a thrill. Seeing it pictured in books or floating from a pole above the school-house or the village green does not as a rule elicit thrills. The thrill comes after an elaborate build-up. What is this build-up? Usually it is a parade with martial music. But what responses are evoked by the martial music and by soldiers marching in a parade? They are, no doubt, mixed

feelings involving a certain amount of anxiety, perhaps more than we would ordinarily suppose. The context of the situation of a military parade smacks of war, and war suggests fear, dread, and hatred. Then comes the flag, the symbol of safety and security. It arouses responses which in the past were associated with anxiety-reduction, prestige, honor, and a host of secondary rewards. In the movies the flag gets the biggest applause when the build-up is one of desperate danger and the army comes to the rescue with soldiers marching and the flag flying.

The strength of habits of love for home and for country may be tested in several ways. One that has already been mentioned is the thrill that one experiences when returning home after a prolonged absence. Another is the amount of anger and anxiety that is experienced when home and country are threatened. A true and tried test of one's love for a person or object is how uncomfortable one is without it; what risks would be taken and sacrifices made to retain it. The danger of losing a loved person or object arouses anxiety. The strength of this anxiety is a measure of the love. If the defense is successful and the danger removed, then the person or object is loved all the more; i.e., the love-habits are strengthened.

It is a common observation that one loves most that which costs most both to secure and to defend. He who does most for his home and country loves them best. The reason is that the work involved strengthens the love-habits, provided it is work that is satisfying; i.e., drive-reducing. Prizes won in competition with others are valued primarily because the success in winning them reduces the anxiety over missing them. In general it may be said that any object, place, or person that is associated strongly with behavior that is satisfying tends to become valued and loved.

Once love-habits are established they function quite au-

tomatically and are maintained by secondary reinforcement.² Like all other habits they will tend in time to disappear (i.e., be extinguished) unless reinforced, but it is not necessary that one experience drive-reduction every time a love response is made. Indeed the individual may be under strong drives that the love responses will not reduce. For example, when Pearl Harbor was bombed both the anger and the anxiety of most citizens of the United States were greatly increased. This situation also evoked love for country. But love-for-country habits were powerless to reduce the hatred and anger toward the Japanese; on the contrary, the stronger these love-habits were, the greater the anger and fear. If fighting in defense of country reduces fear and anger, it will automatically strengthen love for country.

Homesickness

The extreme power of love for home as a motivating force is well illustrated by homesickness. The technical name for this condition is *nostalgia*, which comes from two Greek words: *nostos*—return and *algos*—pain. Except in extreme cases it is not actually painful but may, indeed, make one feel very miserable. In its milder forms the individual experiences a longing to go home with feelings of dejection and depression, but in the more acute stages it may entail loss of appetite, profound feelings of dread and foreboding, melancholia, fainting spells, prolonged weeping, and even delusions and hallucinations. Often the victim is physically ill with symptoms of increased blood pressure, palpitation of the heart, shortness of breath, loss of appetite, vomiting, diarrhea, constipation, fever, or convulsions. Whether these physical symptoms are the cause or the effect of homesickness is not clear. It is certain,

2. Secondary reinforcement is the strength that a habit gains from practice under conditions which were formerly rewarding.

however, that nostalgia is a very powerful drive. Cases have been reported in which the victims were so desperately miserable as to commit crimes of murder, arson, and suicide, presumably to find relief. A German by the name of Jaspers writing on this problem reports that thousands of Scottish soldiers once died from homesickness. These extreme claims have been somewhat tempered by modern studies.

Although much has been written about nostalgia, there remain wide differences of opinion concerning the kinds of people who are susceptible to it and the types of conditions which arouse it.³ No one knows what proportion of a population is susceptible for the reason that there are always so many people who have never been away from home for a prolonged period. Claims and counterclaims have been made as to whether women are more susceptible than men, the young more than the old, the sane more than the insane, or the criminal more than the law-abiding. In a study of college students, McCann found that nostalgia is associated with emotional instability, lack of self-sufficiency, dislike for solitude, strong feelings of inferiority, and tendencies toward introversion.

Among the conditions that seem to favor the appearance of homesickness are, first, situations in which the individual experiences discouragement, defeat, illness, and monotony, especially on days that are unusually hot or cold, dark and dreary, and also when news is bad and things go wrong in general. But these frustrating, discouraging, and depressing conditions alone are not sufficient to arouse homesickness. A second set of factors which seem important are stimuli that remind one of home. Among these are such things as a letter from home, a photograph, the presence of a person who is a reminder of a member of the family,

3. The psychological literature has been summarized by W. H. McCann in the *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 38, No. 3.

or the coming of a holiday, especially Christmas. In addition to these have been reported stimuli such as the patter of the rain on the roof, a familiar song, the chirping of crickets, and the singing of katydids.

The various theories that have been proposed to explain homesickness need not be reviewed here. A plausible explanation of the strength of this drive might run somewhat as follows: First, the discouraging and frustrating elements in the situation arouse strong drives of anxiety, anger, and its derivatives of irritation and resentment. Other factors such as hunger, fatigue, bodily discomfort, and despair may add further strength to the drive. Second, when under the compulsion of a strong drive or combination of drives, especially one that is complicated, individuals try to make responses which will reduce these drives. Prominent among such responses are the habits of love for home which were originally set up because they proved to be so effective as drive reducers. These habits are evoked primarily by "home" stimuli. Any element in the "away-from-home" situation which is similar to those of the home situation will tend to arouse the love-for-home responses. But these responses cannot be fully and satisfactorily made for the simple reason that the individual is away from home. Some of them can be made, however, in a kind of fractional or vicarious manner. Those that cannot be made tend to add to the frustration and therefore to increase the drive all the more. The individual may be irritated or slightly angered at the feeling that if he could only get home, confound it, he would feel better. But those fractions of the love-for-home responses that can be made, whatever they may be, are not sufficient to reduce the drive; on the contrary they may increase it because they serve to arouse the appetite for home. When all of these components are added together the total is a sizable drive which might very well account for the miserable feeling of nos-

talgia. The stronger the love-for-home habits, the greater is the appetite for home aroused by stimuli that remind one of home, but the greater also is the frustration produced by the fact that the full and complete home responses cannot be made.

A condition opposite to that of homesickness and far more common is the pleasant reverie of home. Dreams of home both in the sleeping and waking states are common experiences to everyone who has been away from home.

“The scenes of our childhood.

The orchard, the meadow and the deep-tangled wildwood”

have acquired reward value and the stimulus of the fond memory brings them pleasantly back into view. The old home town occupies a romantic spot in the hearts of people even though they know that they cannot now count on it to help them out or to give them any further rewards. It thus appears that the anticipatory responses of love may actually be aroused by strong stimuli even though the reward which they once anticipated is not now there. If I am away from home for a good many years and go back again, the place will appear changed and will have lost much of its original charm. Its memory, however—the image that I have carried in my mind of what it looked like then—is the stimulus that arouses the pleasant responses. Hence my love for country can be a romantic remnant of a kind of love which carries a certain amount of respect, but the drive is weak because the image for evoking anticipatory responses has become weakened. It is a sentiment rather than a dynamic love. People will defend things over which they are sentimental for this very reason.

How people learn to love their homes and their countries as well as innumerable objects, places, and persons may be summarized by saying that all responses which in the past

have been associated with decreases in pain, hunger, cold, or fatigue arouse the emotions of love; but the behavior that has been associated with more pain, more fatigue, more hunger, more cold, or more of any primary or secondary drive, tends to produce emotions of anxiety, hatred, dread, and unpleasant feelings in general. Hate and fear are associated with increases in drive; love and joy with decreases. Home is therefore a place where one can let down, relax, take it easy, be comfortable; in short, a place where the whole drive machinery of the organism runs at a low ebb. Home can thus soon become boring because boredom is probably conflict between very low drives. The person who is bored does not want to do that which he is doing and does not want to do anything else.⁴ It should be remembered, therefore, that the fact that people appear to take home and country for granted does not mean a lack of love.

Identification With a Group

Let us turn now to a somewhat different motive for fighting in defense of country.⁵ It is the sense of *belonging* to a group or of being strongly identified with it. In sociology and social psychology the tie that binds members of groups together is referred to as "social nearness," "group solidarity," "consciousness of kind," "the group mind" and other similar expressions. In psychology it is more often called "identification," sometimes "the social self." Illustrations are found in college fraternities, classes of graduates of a particular college, fraternal orders such as the Free Masons and Knights of Columbus, churches, political parties, and nationalities. There is great

4. I am indebted to my colleague, Earl Zinn, for this suggested explanation of boredom.

5. It may be true that learning to love has little to do with learning to defend. One does not always defend that which one loves, and often defends that which one does not love.

variation among groups in respect to the degree of solidarity. There are some groups in which membership makes little difference in the relationships between members; in other groups members are so heavily identified with each other that an insult to one is an insult to all, a threat to one arouses defensive tendencies in all, and an honor to one is regarded as an honor to all. This is especially true if the one who is insulted, threatened, or honored is the leader or a prominent person in the group. The more firmly the members of a group are bound together, the stronger is the tendency for each to fight in defense of the others.

The extent to which any individual is identified with a group may be tested by determining the sacrifices he will make for his group, the risks he will take in its defense, the degree to which he is angered by insults to other members, especially to a leader or to the emblem of the group, the degree of pride that he takes in its successes and honors, and the extent to which he is chagrined and humiliated by its losses and failures. The loyal alumnus is jubilant when his college wins but downhearted when it loses; he is angry when his alma mater is maligned and proud when she is honored.

It is important that we understand how these relationships are established and maintained in order to proceed more intelligently in the practical problem of strengthening national solidarity. Several explanations of group solidarity have been advanced. A common one is the herd instinct;⁶ another is the psychoanalytic theory of identification; the one used here is social learning. The evidence in favor of this view is considerable but will not be reviewed here. The space will be devoted to a brief description of some of the principles and conditions under which indi-

6. W. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in War and Peace* (New York, Macmillan, 1917).

viduals learn to become so strongly identified with a group that they are motivated to fight in its defense.

How does it come about that an insult to one member of a group is an affront to all or that a threat to one arouses defensive tendencies in all? What is the nature of this relationship and how was it established? In the first place, it will be recalled from an earlier discussion of atrocity stories that individuals are often well rewarded for defending other members of groups to which they belong. When a big bully attacks a small child, the child's older brother is praised for counterattacking the bully. If he stands by and allows his little brother to be beaten up, he is likely to be put to shame by his parents and by other children. Many parents, in bringing up their children, emphasize the importance of defending the family and its honor and the necessity for members of the family to stand by each other in times of trouble. Individual differences in the tendencies to defend a fellow member of a group depend to a considerable degree on the number of times that behavior of this sort has been rewarded. Like any other habit, it is strengthened by reward and weakened by punishment. The conditions of social learning, however, are such that this particular kind of behavior is on the whole rewarded more than it is punished.

There are still other lessons that are learned as a member of a group. The child finds many occasions when his fortunes and misfortunes are dependent upon those of his group. If the father gets a raise in salary, all members of the family profit somewhat by it. But if the father or another member of the family becomes ill, all members of the family are discomfited by it. There are no doubt many situations in which children are rewarded together and punished together. At Christmas time all are rewarded together. When things go wrong in the home, all may suffer a certain amount of punishment. The accidents of social

education may be such that when one child sees his brother or sister punished or threatened he may respond with anxiety, feeling that his turn may be next, or he may respond with empathy, experiencing the emotions expressed by the other child.

If one member of a group is insulted or threatened by an outsider, other members come to his defense for the reason that if something is not done to nip the situation in the bud, their turn may come next. If a Japanese can attack one American and get away with it, he can also attack other Americans with impunity. Hence, one of the best ways to protect oneself against aggression from an outsider is to see to it that aggression against any member of the group will not be tolerated. The enemy may therefore come to the conclusion that it is dangerous to attack any member of that group. If an outsider attacks a member of the group and is allowed to get away with it, his aggressive habits toward that member are strengthened. Then by the principle of generalization his aggressive tendencies toward all people who are like his victim are also strengthened. All other members of a group to which the victim belongs are like him, at least in one respect, and that is that they bear the same group label. This group label may be the point of similarity noted by the aggressor who may arrive at the conclusion that if it is safe to attack one member of the group it is safe to attack any other member of that group. On the other hand, if his aggression toward one member is roundly punished and he is beaten off, he may come to the conclusion that it is dangerous not only to attack that man but any member of the group to which he belongs. Those who have defended their fellow members are, therefore, rewarded for their efforts by being thereafter freed from the menace, and the bonds of group solidarity are strengthened.

Sources of Group Solidarity

Group solidarity is built up in so many different ways that it is impossible here to give a complete account of all of them. One of the prime conditions, however, which must always be met is that helping, defending, and protecting others must somehow be rewarding. In order for this to happen, members of the group must reward each other. One of the most important lessons to be learned by everyone is how to get satisfaction from giving pleasure to others even at a cost to oneself. If group solidarity depends upon receiving rewards and if these rewards must be given by another member of the group, then in order to get members of a group to reward each other they must learn to find their reward in rewarding each other. If one member of a group rewards other members at some cost and sacrifice to himself, he will not continue it unless he finds the experience rewarding either immediately or in the future. His reward can take any one of a number of forms. It can be immediate pay in kind, as illustrated by the old saying, "If you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours." It may, however, be a delayed reward, as we shall see a little later on when the question of conscience is discussed.

A word may be said here about the role of the leader in group solidarity in anticipation of a fuller discussion of leadership in the next chapter. A leader functions, in part at least, as an intermediate agent facilitating mutual rewards between members of a group. He may, by virtue of his position of authority and influence, encourage members of the group to aid and defend each other by rewarding them when they do and punishing them when they do not. This is seen clearly in the relation between parents and children. Most parents praise their children for helping and for standing by each other in times of need. They also disapprove and often punish selfish behavior.

The leader of a group may facilitate mutual helpfulness in indirect ways. Members may identify with the leader in the sense that they want to be like him, to please him and to follow his example. If he loves all members of the group equally and rewards good deeds and punishes evil ones, anyone who would be like him must also have equal love for all members and must also reward the good behavior and punish the bad. If he wants to reward his leader for rewarding him, one of the best ways to do it is to reward other members of the group. There is no better illustration than that given by Christ in His talk to His followers about the last judgment. He told them that on that day the Judge of all nations would separate the sheep from the goats placing the sheep on his right hand and the goats on his left.

Then shall the King say unto them on his right hand, Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world: For I was a hungered, and ye gave me meat: I was thirsty, and ye gave me drink: I was a stranger, and ye took me in: Naked, and ye clothed me: I was sick, and ye visited me: I was in prison, and ye came unto me. Then shall the righteous answer him, saying, Lord, when saw we thee a hungered, and fed thee? or thirsty, and gave thee drink? When saw we thee a stranger, and took thee in? or naked, and clothed thee? Or when saw we thee sick, or in prison, and came unto thee? And the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily I say unto you, Inasmuch as ye have done *it* unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done *it* unto me.⁷

One of the cardinal doctrines of the church is that of identification with Christ. His life provides a model which all Christians are admonished to copy. But Christ loves the whole world with equal love for everyone. The person who is completely identified with Him is like Him in all respects

7. Matt. 25: 34-40.

and especially in that of having equal love for all men.⁸ The tie that binds men together is therefore identical with the one that binds them to their leader.

Applying these principles to national psychology, some of the conditions which must be fulfilled in order to secure and maintain national solidarity may be specified. In the first place, we have just seen that this process is facilitated by the identification of citizens with national leaders, living or dead, especially those whose lives serve as models for all citizens. In our country George Washington and Abraham Lincoln are two such leaders. We also have the mythical figure of Uncle Sam who is a composite embodiment of all the traits that make up an ideal American.⁹ In addition we have documents such as the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. But these documents, valuable as they are, do not serve the purpose of a guide-book of behavior that is distinctly American.

A second technique for developing national solidarity is that of rigid training in behavior that can be labeled American as distinguished from that which is un-American. At the present moment, for example, it is understood that it is un-American to hoard sugar but it is American to buy Defense Stamps and Bonds. In order for a child to learn to be a good American it is necessary for him to be able to distinguish between behavior that is befitting an American citizen and that which is unworthy of one. Parents and teachers could do more than they now do to aid children in identifying behavior that is American. One reason why this technique has not been more widely used is

8. Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (London, The International Psycho-Analytical Press, 1922), p. 111.

9. It has occurred to the writer that if someone would write up the life history of Uncle Sam showing what he did as a boy and how he achieved the traits of manhood that he is believed to possess, such an account might serve as an excellent model for the behavior of all American boys and girls. Many other countries have much fuller accounts of the life histories of mythical persons who embody national ideals.

that special interest groups have attempted to use it for their own advantage. For example, the XYZ Soap Company might advertise that it is American to buy its particular brand of soap. Such advertising would certainly be confusing to an individual who has not yet learned to distinguish between that which is truly American and that which is un-American.

All the educational procedures whereby a citizen learns to love his country are useful for the development of national solidarity. These have already been described and need not be repeated here. They may be summarized in the observation that national solidarity is promoted by anything that makes citizens more aware of all that they have in common and of their mutual interdependence on each other.

The Sense of Duty

One very important result of identification with persons in authority is conscience. In times of national distress many citizens are motivated to serve their country by a sense of duty. They do not expect immediate rewards either from the government or from fellow citizens, nor do they anticipate punishments from these sources for failure to serve. Their reward is their own peace of mind and comfort of soul, and their punishment for shirking duty is a reproaching conscience. On the other hand, conscience may operate to restrain the individual from enlisting in the armed services of his country. This is illustrated by the case of the conscientious objector who feels that it is a sacred duty not to injure or kill any person, friend or enemy. He may feel that it is also his duty to serve his country and is willing to do so in any way save one, that of killing. To avoid joining the ranks of fighting men he may suffer ridicule, physical assault or imprisonment, not

because he is a coward but because his conscience will not permit him to kill.

Conscience is not a part of the biological equipment of man or of animals. It is entirely learned. Freud and his followers are the only psychologists who have attempted to show how it is achieved. They say that it results from the identification of the child with a parent and later with other persons of authority. When this happens, the external authority has become internalized. Once authority is on the inside of the individual, he is then capable of rewarding and punishing himself and of directing his behavior along lines approved by his society. As conscience develops there is less need for the control of behavior by the prospect of immediate rewards or punishments.

Conscience is both a guiding and motivating force. Its directive qualities are expressed by such phrases as "let your conscience be your guide"; its driving qualities by such statements as "I feel that I must not do this" or "I feel that I must do that." Let us examine the nature of this drive. In the first place, it is most acute in situations involving a choice between the discharge of social responsibility, on the one hand, and the desire for selfish pleasure, on the other. It arises at the point where the tendency toward impulse gratification runs counter to the demands of society. The soldier on guard duty, tired and sleepy, is strongly motivated to lie down and sleep; but this tendency is countered by fear of the consequences and by his sense of duty. The tired citizen who prefers to remain at home by a comfortable fireside may go out in the cold to attend a town meeting if his sense of civic responsibility (plus other considerations) is strong enough to overcome his selfish feelings. In these and in numerous other situations there is a conflict between social responsibility and selfish pleasure. In each case conscience is on the side of

social responsibility and is often the ounce of motivation that tips the balance in favor of compelling one to do his duty.

When we examine the motivating force of conscience more carefully it appears to be closely related to anxiety. The man who fails to discharge his social responsibility or who behaves in a reprehensible manner is likely to suffer the remorse of conscience. The sense of guilt is an uncomfortable feeling and usually is avoided. The sense of duty well done, on the other hand, is pleasant and comforting. After one has discharged his social responsibility, he feels that he can relax and take life easy for a while. He may even sleep better. This suggests that doing one's duty reduces anxiety and failure to do so increases it. But anxiety is a response to a danger situation. What is the nature of the danger in situations involving social responsibilities?

Every situation in which an individual is tempted to behave in a manner that is socially condemned and therefore punishable is for him potentially dangerous. One element common to these situations is a conflict between tendencies to behave selfishly and those to behave altruistically. This conflict is commonly known as temptation. Temptation stimulates anxiety. A boy who has been punished for stealing cookies may experience anxiety when he is hungry and in the presence of the cooky jar. A committee member who has been ridiculed and rebuked for cutting a meeting may begin to feel anxious when the time for the next meeting comes around. If he is tired and has other things he would rather do, his anxiety may be even greater. The mechanism by which temptation acquires the power to evoke anxiety is the same as that which reinforces the connections between any danger situation and fear responses.

There are, of course, many situations in which one may act selfishly and fail to do his duty without suffering any immediate punishment from others and without the expec-

tation of reward. These situations may nevertheless arouse anxiety, especially if one is tempted to behave sinfully or shamefully. But if the situation is not really dangerous, why then should anxiety be aroused? The answer is that such situations are dangerous to the individual's own peace of mind and misbehavior in them is liable to punishment not from others but from one's own self. When an individual says to himself "I ought (or ought not) to do this" it is equivalent to saying "I am afraid of my conscience." Yet most of us are not aware of being afraid of ourselves. This suggests that conscience may operate, in part at least, unconsciously as the psychoanalysts have long claimed. There are many situations in which we discharge our social responsibilities quite automatically and almost mechanically. Duty is done unhesitatingly and as a matter of course. The individual thinks neither of rewards nor of punishments, self-imposed or otherwise administered. Here conscience is either operating unconsciously or not at all. The mechanism is not unlike that of making well-established avoidance responses to frequently recurring situations which are potentially dangerous.

How Conscience is Acquired

An institutional illustration is found in the Production Code Administration of the motion picture industry. Constantly under fire from churches, the Parent-Teacher Association, and other civic groups for producing too many pictures in which crime is made attractive, sex overstressed, standards of decency distorted, and which in one way or another offended the tastes and moral sentiments of many people, the industry was finally forced to impose self-censorship or suffer boycotts and be hampered by state laws of censorship. It is interesting that the first attempt failed. The first code that was agreed upon by the major producers had no teeth in it and there was no official ma-

chinery for its enforcement. Meanwhile storms of public protest against the movies grew more frequent and violent. Finally, in 1935, the Production Code Administration, known as the "Hays office censorship board," was set up and endowed with authority to enforce the code on all producers.

During the first years of its existence the Authority fought many battles with some of the largest and most influential Hollywood producers. Standing its ground firmly and administering punishments when needed and rewards when merited, it won the confidence and respect of the industry. As the outside critical groups became convinced that the movies had really reformed, they relaxed their pressure, their hostile attitudes changed, and some of them went so far as to praise the Authority for its excellent public service. The anxieties of the producing companies concerning legal restraints and boycotts were reduced and their respect for their own censorship board was increased. By being repeatedly rewarded for conformity to the code and severely punished for attempting to circumvent it, producers gradually acquired the habit of looking to the Authority for guidance in matters pertaining to public approval or disapproval of a picture. The stronger these habits became, the less was the tendency to violate the code and the greater was their fear of its authority. Many Hollywood producers are today more afraid of their own Production Code Administration than they are of women's groups or the League for Decency. But their anxiety is of a different sort. The recalcitrant producer knows that the Production Code Administration will not wreck the industry and hence destroy itself. It is a benevolent authority bearing no malice, no intent to destroy, but keeping producers in line for their own good. It punishes in the same spirit in which parents punish their children.

The parallel between this official conscience of the motion

picture industry and conscience within the individual is striking. Both are results of habits formed to meet a need. The society in which every child is destined to live has certain rules of conduct to which everyone must conform, within limits. These rules are designed primarily to promote the public good and to safeguard the interests of the community against the selfish impulses of individuals. No industry is allowed to violate the moral code in order to make money and no individual is allowed to destroy it for his own selfish ends. It is important, therefore, that an individual set up within himself some machinery by which he becomes familiar with the demands and prohibitions of society, and by which his conduct is regulated. Conscience meets this need by enabling each citizen to be his own prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner, all in one. It is a complex structure of habits that function to enable him to discharge his social responsibilities without fear of external punishment or expectation of material rewards.

These habits are established by the same principles as those which govern all social learning, but the conditions under which they are developed are in certain respects unique. A condition of crucial significance is the relation between the individual and those in authority over him, especially his parents. The psychoanalysts have stressed the point that the still small voice of conscience is really a faint echo of the admonitions and exhortations of parents. The internalization of authority takes place, as we have already noted, by the identification of the individual with those in authority. But such identification occurs only when the individual finds it rewarding. If persons in authority must administer punishments as well as rewards, why would a child want to be like a person who punishes him?

One answer to this paradox has already been suggested by our analysis of the Production Code Administration.

The Hollywood producers found that it was very rewarding to accept punishment from their own censorship board because it spared them from suffering more severe punishment from hostile groups. It is better to punish oneself than to risk greater punishments from others. In the case of the child, mild punishments such as those usually administered by parents are rewarding provided it can be demonstrated to the child that it will spare him greater suffering later on. It may take the child a long time to learn this lesson, even longer than it took the Hollywood producers. But once it has been learned, the child will gladly accept the punishment of love *now* in order to avoid the dreadful curse of destructive hate later on.

There are undoubtedly many techniques for teaching this lesson to children. Most mothers when they punish their children take pains to assure them that it is done for their own good. If a child commits an offense against his little brother and is spanked by his mother, she may explain to him that if he is permitted to bully and insult others until it becomes a habit, he will, in later life, find himself in many embarrassing and distressing situations. The world outside the home does not tolerate that type of behavior and punishes it even more severely than does the mother. Moreover, the punishments administered by outsiders are far more likely to be destructive than those administered in the home. If the mother is wise, she will stress another important point and that is that after she has punished the child, she holds no grudge against him and will not punish him again for that particular offense unless he clearly deserves it. But in the outside world it is different. There people do hold grudges and do continue to punish each other even after the occasion for it is passed. The result of this is that the individual is more or less in constant danger and, therefore, in the state of anxiety.

The reward in punishment is the reduction of anxiety.

This occurs when the individual is assured that he will not be further punished for that particular deed. Many of us can remember some of the spankings that we received from our parents when we were children. It often happened that when the punishment was over we immediately felt better. This is due not only to the cessation of pain (and a great deal of parental punishment does not involve physical pain) but mainly to the reduction in anxiety. The dread of punishment often seems more intolerable than the punishment itself. If, therefore, the acceptance of punishment now dispels the anxiety of punishment in the future, it is rewarding. This explains the need for punishment that is often felt.

When a child is naughty and realizes it or when he commits any punishable deed and knows it is punishable, his anxiety will be aroused. There are many ways of dispelling it. A common one is to keep the act secret, but this does not always work because there are so many ways that it can leak out. Moreover, some children believe that parents have mysterious ways of knowing everything. We have been taught that nothing is hidden from the eyes of God and that sooner or later our sins will surely find us out. One of the surest ways of dispelling these fears is to make a clean breast of it all, confess and take the consequences. After that we feel better.

Another habit essential to the development of conscience is that of self-punishment. How children learn to punish themselves is not clear, but the motivations behind it are. If an individual can demonstrate to parents, teachers, policemen, and others in authority that he is capable of controlling his own antisocial impulses, he is freed from their watchful eye. He is rewarded for being a dependable, upright, and conscientious citizen. As long as he can and will punish himself for wrong-doing, he is absolved from discipline and given more freedom. Moreover, the child who

does his duty and refuses to do wrong is usually rewarded on the spot by approval of parents, teachers, and others. If his deed is heroic he may even get a medal. Conscience pays off in a good many other ways which need not be mentioned here.

One of the techniques by means of which a child learns to punish himself is by disassociating from himself that part of his body which committed the punishable act. For example, if a child swears or uses bad language, the mother sometimes adopts the technique of washing his mouth out with soap and water. The idea behind this is that it was not the child that sinned but his tongue and mouth. It would seem appropriate that the punishment be applied to the part of the body that committed the act. Children have been observed to slap their own hands or to pinch themselves after they have committed a punishable act. Such behavior serves notice on the parent that the child is capable of punishing himself. Self-punishment to the point of the infliction of severe pain is not uncommon among adults.

The mechanism of self-inflicted slapping, pinching, and biting is fairly well understood. Evidently the pain stimulus has become conditioned to the anxiety-reducing responses. Pavlov long ago demonstrated that pain can be conditioned to food-seeking responses. In one experiment a dog was given an electric shock just before eating. At first the shock evoked the expected escape response but after several trials these disappeared and the dog responded with the flow of saliva as well as turning his head in the direction from which his food came. In like manner, being rebuked, scolded, or spanked serves as a stimulus that can become conditioned to the responses that dispel fear. If a child's punishment consists only in hearing his mother say "you have been naughty," "you ought to be ashamed of yourself," "a child of your age should know better," these

words are followed by a reduction in his anxiety. Then, by simple stimulus generalization, hearing himself say the same words should produce similar responses. Once more the still small voice of conscience is the child's imitation of the voice of the parent. As the habit grows stronger it is not necessary that he repeat the words orally, silently, or even that he fancy hearing the voice of his mother. The mechanism may operate quite unconsciously.

If the foregoing view is correct, it would follow that one way to aid children in the achievement of conscience is to teach them the value of undergoing mild punishments in order to avoid greater ones. This training may also take the form of accepting small rewards or even foregoing rewards in order to receive greater ones later. An ingenious test of the strength of these habits was devised by Washburne.¹⁰ The test consisted in asking the child to perform some simple task with the understanding that at its completion he would be paid for his services with a single piece of candy. After the job was done the examiner would tell the child that the supply of candy was low but if he was willing to wait two or three days for his pay he would receive not one but several pieces as accumulated interest. Washburne found that delinquent boys showed a much greater tendency to collect then and there; whereas non-delinquent boys were more disposed to wait for the larger reward. This test proved to be one of the best simple devices for distinguishing children with delinquent tendencies from others.

The principle of delayed reward is of extreme importance both in psychology and in sociology. It lies at the root of all discipline; it is an essential element both in our economic credit system and in the Christian religion. Here on earth some of us cheerfully bear our burdens of toil,

10. John N. Washburne, "An Experiment in Character Measurement," *J. Juvenile Res.*, XIII (Jan., 1929).

sweat, and hardship in the hope of coming into our full rewards later. In our economic system we accept token payments, promissory notes, I O U's, or even verbal understandings that value received will be in due time forthcoming. In all our social relations we constantly incur debts and obligations which are usually paid in one way or another. In a great many ways we learn that hard work, sacrifice, and altruistic behavior are in the long run rewarding.

One final word concerning individual differences in conscience. Like any habit system, conscience may be strong or weak and may vary in strength from one type of situation to another. Some individuals possess a very strong conscience in all matters pertaining to money and property but weak in matters pertaining to aggression or sex. Some may have a keen sense of responsibility for members of the immediate family, friends, and the local community but may feel little if any responsibility in national affairs. Such persons may experience remorseful feelings of guilt for not giving to the Community Chest but at the same time be perfectly comfortable in not buying Defense Bonds. The conscience of the conscientious objector is highly developed in respect to aggressive behavior but may be relatively weak in the sense of national responsibility. In all of these illustrations the stronger habits of conscience are built up around types of social situations. Individuals vary in conscience in the same way that they vary in skills.

Motives for Fighting Are Mixed

The motives for fighting in defense of one's country are, therefore, mixed and varied. The main ingredients are (1) fear of disapproval, ridicule, and ostracism by one's friends and fellow citizens; (2) promise of immediate rewards of social approval, approbation, honor, money, prestige, a share in the loot of conquest, and the like; (3)

escape from the responsibilities of home, family, work, from social entanglements, and from the necessity of making decisions; (4) hatred of the enemy and desire to destroy him; (5) love for country, its symbols and leaders; (6) sense of identity with other citizens; (7) sense of duty. Over against these are certain countermotives, prominent among which may be (1) dread of physical hardship; (2) fear of loss of life or permanent disability; (3) sense of responsibility for dependents; (4) prospect of unemployment upon return; (5) aversion to killing others—even enemies; (6) hatred of prominent leaders in charge of running the war; and (7) secret sympathy for the enemy and his cause. This list is by no means exhaustive. It merely illustrates the types of incentives that determine behavior in periods of national distress. Some of them may operate quite unconsciously, in which case the individual is not aware of all that is influencing his decisions.

Suppose a young man is trying to decide whether to volunteer for one of the armed services of his country in time of war. Let us assume that he is not subject to the draft and that he is physically fit and has no dependents. In order to get the situation clearly before him he writes down the reasons pro and con in some such fashion as the following:

IF I GO IN:

1. My family and friends will be honored and my community will be proud of me.
2. I will get many material rewards and a bonus and pension later.
3. I will have adventure and excitement and escape from the monotony of my daily grind.

IF I STAY OUT:

1. My family and friends will be spared anxiety concerning my safety.
2. I will earn more money at home on my job.
3. I will be safer and more comfortable at home.

4. I will have the satisfaction of helping to destroy the enemy.	4. I will be spared that sense of guilt from having killed another man.
5. My girl will love and respect me more.	5. I can get married.

BUT IF I GO IN:

1. I will earn little money.
2. I may lose my job and be unemployed when I return.
3. My girl may marry another man.
4. I will suffer many physical hardships.
5. I may be crippled or maimed for life.
6. I may be killed.

BUT IF I STAY OUT:

1. The extra money I earn may benefit me little.
2. I will not get a pension or share in the rewards of veterans.
3. My girl will not respect me.
4. I will miss a lot of excitement.
5. I will lose many friends.
6. I will have to go through life explaining why I did not go in.

After the considerations for going are balanced against those for staying out, will the net result determine the decision? Usually it does not, as everyone who has tried this technique knows. There are at least two reasons why this is true. First, in compiling a list such as this one, the individual puts down only the items he can think of; i.e., only those of which he is aware. Those that are nonverbal (i.e., unconscious) are not included. Second, the weights that are attached to each item are determined largely by the unconscious aspects of love for country, identification with the group, and conscience. Suppose the individual has a very keen sense of patriotic duty and a strong love for country. Some of the items on the above list may not even occur to him. The others will be heavily weighted on the side of going in. But if he is a person whose conscience is weak at the point of patriotic duty but strong on home responsibility, he will be able to think of more reasons for

staying out than for going in and will give each of them greater weight. The conscientious objector will give more weight to the feelings of guilt which he anticipates will come from going in than to those which would result from staying out.

Love for country; sense of identity with other citizens, with leaders, and national heroes; and sense of duty all run counter to selfish impulses and tendencies. They are all on the side of society and function to boost the motivation of the individual to serve his country even at personally great cost and effort. Their strength is determined largely by the kind of social education that is received from infancy to adulthood.

CHAPTER VI

LEARNING TO FOLLOW LEADERS

ALL group action requires foresight, planning, and direction by "leaders" and execution by "followers."

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that any population is divided into two groups—leaders and followers—for the reason that all individuals, except young children, are sometimes leaders and at other times followers. An individual functions as a leader usually in situations where his knowledge and skills are of recognized superiority to those of others. This same individual may function as a follower in other situations where some other person is superior to him in position, knowledge, and skill. This is one of the essential differences between leading and following, but it does not completely cover all the aspects of the relationship. These additional features will come out as the discussion proceeds.

Learning to be a leader involves primarily the acquisition of superior knowledge concerning the social and physical environments and expert skill in manipulating them or adapting to them. The environment, however, is so complicated that no one individual can achieve superiority in respect to all its manifestations. In most civilized societies are groups of specialists who have expert knowledge and skills within their narrow fields. Meteorologists are leaders in forecasting the weather; physicians in questions of disease and health; politicians in matters of voting and law making; and so on for hundreds of specialized groups. In addition to technical leaders, there are others who are older and wiser or who by birth or accident occupy superior positions in society. Miller

and Dollard¹ list four classes of persons in our society who are imitated and followed by others: those superior (1) in the age-grade hierarchy, (2) in the hierarchy of social status, (3) in intelligence, (4) in technical or expert skill. Our society is organized in such a way that most of us receive a tremendous amount of rewarded practice in following the advice and example of these four categories of individuals.

Learning to select individuals who are worthy of being followed and learning to match one's behavior to theirs involve the acquisition of a complicated system of social habits. For purposes of discussion these may be analyzed into four sub-groups: learning to obey commands, to imitate or to copy the behavior of others, to seek advice from others, and to fit into an organization and play an assigned role under an assigned leader. Let us consider how each of these sets of habits is acquired and how all are interrelated.

Learning to Obey Commands

Learning to obey commands need not detain us long although the psychological machinery involved is a bit complicated. For example, in training a pup to obey the command "come," the procedure is to put him on a leash, give the command clearly and distinctly in a way that will make it stand out from other stimuli, and at the same time to pull on the leash and compel the animal to go through the motions of coming. When the correct act is performed, he is rewarded immediately, usually by feeding. The trick in teaching is first to get the animal to make the desired response; second, to connect a specific, distinct stimulus with this response by rewarding it only when made in response to this stimulus.

The capacity of children to obey commands is far greater than that of animals due to their superior ability to learn a language, but the process of learning in the two cases is essentially the same. Children learn to stop at the command

1. Miller and Dollard, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

"stop" or to go at the word "go"; to stand, to sit, to go to bed, to get up, to dress, to wash, to eat and to perform many hundred acts of daily life in response to commands and suggestions uttered by parents and others. When one considers the amount of rewarded practice that children have in obeying the commands of some individuals and not those of others, in obeying some commands of their parents and not others, it is easy to understand how complicated such habits can become. Some of them persist throughout life; others drop out either because they result in constant punishment or because they fail to bring the former rewards. Like all other habit systems, this particular one is constantly changing with changing conditions of the social environment. In most cases, however, there remains throughout life a central core of quick and efficient responses to commands uttered in specific types of situations. Many of these habits are extremely useful in group emergencies.

Learning to Imitate

Learning to imitate and to copy the behavior of others has been studied in great detail by Miller and Dollard who have shown by a series of ingenious experiments how these habits are acquired. They begin with an analysis of the principles of social learning and suggest that the process can be analyzed into four major factors called *drive*, *cue*, *response*, and *reward*.² An illustration of how these four factors operate in learning to imitate may be seen in the following example: Two boys, Jim and Bobby, aged six and three respectively, were accustomed to receiving candy from their father when he came home at night. On one particular occasion they were playing in a bedroom near the kitchen. Both possessed at this time an appetite for candy (*drive*). Jim, the older, heard his father's footfalls on the stairs (*cue* to Jim but not to Bobby). Jim responded to this cue by running to meet his

2. *Idem*, p. 2.

father. Bobby, who had not yet learned the cue, happened for some other reason to run in the same direction as Jim; both met their father and received candy (reward). After this and many other rewarded instances Bobby caught on to the fact that it paid to follow Jim, especially when he ran. Even though Bobby could not yet distinguish his father's footfalls, he could distinguish the difference between Jim running and standing still. The situation can be analyzed as follows: Both boys wanted candy; i.e., they had the same drive, but Jim knew more environmental cues that meant candy coming than Bobby did. However, Bobby had learned to take his cue from Jim and to make the same responses that Jim made. Both received the reward. The only difference in the behavior of the two boys was the cue to which they were responding. This simple illustration contains most of the essential factors involved in learning to imitate. Here, as elsewhere, the leader is the one who knows his way around, who is "on to the ropes," as it were, who knows how to find reward and to avoid pain and punishment. At least he knows more about it than the follower does. The follower learns that it is more rewarding and less punishing for him to take his cue from the leader than to try to read the signs in the rest of the environment. This leaves him, of course, dependent upon the leader and he may never learn for himself how to read the environment unless he finds it necessary to behave in the absence of the leader. An important part of education is learning to fend for oneself without too much dependence upon others.

As Bobby grows older and wiser he will undoubtedly become less dependent upon Jim for his cues. He will learn for himself how to distinguish the footfalls of his father from those of the grocer and the ice man. He will learn to tell time by the clock, to get lollipops by begging and cajoling his parents or by being a good boy, and to make adaptive responses to many hundred cues in his environment. As he be-

comes more self-sufficient, he will be less and less dependent on his brother. But as he grows older he will encounter new situations in which he finds himself dependent upon others to supply the cues for the most adaptive responses.

Miller and Dollard have demonstrated that animals can be taught to imitate or not to imitate by setting up experimental conditions under which the principles of learning may operate. For example, they found that, without training, white rats will not follow each other through a maze to a food box. But almost any white rat can be trained to follow a leader or not to follow him by arranging the situation so that he is always rewarded for following or not following as the case may be, and always not rewarded or punished for doing the opposite.

Miller constructed a simple T-maze in which a group of white leader rats were trained to go to a corner and to turn to the right or to the left depending on whether they saw before them a black card or a white card. The black card signalled food ahead, the white card no food. These rats soon learned to go to the corner and turn in the direction of the black card. Then a group of follower rats were placed, one at a time, directly behind the leader and always rewarded for taking the same turn that the leader took. A control group were rewarded for taking the opposite turn; i.e., for not following the leader at the corner. The first group soon learned to follow the leader and the control group learned not to follow.

Once the follower group had been trained to follow a white leader they would also follow a black leader. Moreover, when the drive was changed from hunger to thirst, those that had been trained to follow to get food would follow to get water and those that had been trained not to follow to get food would not follow any kind of rat either for food or for water. Next, the maze was changed so that a different problem was presented; the following or non-following tendencies per-

sisted but were not nearly so marked. It thus appears that in imitation, as in all learning, there is a tendency to generalize or to transfer the behavior learned in one situation to other similar situations. These experiments were repeated with children using a different test situation, but the results were even more convincing that imitation is a habit acquired according to the laws of learning. In another series of experiments with children it was found that they will soon learn to copy one leader and not to copy another, depending on reward. One group of children was rewarded for copying the behavior of an adult leader but not rewarded for copying that of a child leader. In a control group the situation was reversed. In both cases the experiment showed that if a child is rewarded for copying an adult but not a child, he will copy other adults in the same situation and not other children. The children who were rewarded for copying the behavior of another child would, in other similar situations, continue to copy the behavior of another child and not that of an adult. It appears that if a leader acquires prestige for success in one situation, he is likely to be copied in other situations. Conversely, if he proves to be a bad model leading to failure and no reward, he will not be followed in any situation.³

Although Miller and Dollard did not carry their experiments to the point of testing the acquired reward value of a leader, there is evidence to believe that some leaders acquire so much prestige that their very presence is comforting. When an individual is in a new and difficult situation to which he does not know how to respond adaptively, he may experience a craving for a leader and begin to look around for one. If he sees one that he thinks he can follow, he immediately feels better even before his new Moses leads him out of the wilderness. Thus an individual may acquire love for

3. It is recognized, of course, by these investigators that leadership among men involves many complexities that are not present in experiments with animals. But their purpose was to discern the mechanisms of learning and not its products.

a leader in precisely the same way that he learns to love his home, his parents, or his country, as described in Chapter IV.

Seeking Advice From Others

A third group of habits involved in the general pattern of following leaders is that of seeking the advice and help of others even though their behavior is not duplicated. This involves a form of behavior which Miller and Dollard have called "copying." It is differentiated from the type of imitation described above which is labeled by them "matched-dependent" behavior. In copying, the leader functions mainly as a critic and guide to aid the follower in getting it right. It often happens that the follower is not capable of doing precisely what the leader does. This is illustrated by learning to sing on key. The leader sounds the right note and the follower is instructed to do likewise, but the follower may miss it and not know that he has missed. His task is to develop criteria of his own by means of which he can tell for himself when he is on or off the key. The follower is still dependent on the leader but in a different way. In copying, the leader not only sets the model but also gives instructions as to how it can be matched and provides the follower with criteria for knowing when he has achieved a satisfactory matching.

In seeking advice the individual usually wants to know how to solve some problem, avoid a difficulty, or get to a desired goal. The drive aspect of the situation is present, but an appropriate response is missing. The adviser may call attention to some aspect of the environment that had been overlooked (thereby providing a signal cue) or he may suggest some way of responding to cues which the person seeking advice had overlooked. If the suggestions made by the adviser are successful and lead to reward, the habit of returning to the same source for advice on future occasions is strengthened.

One of the best illustrations of how an adviser may become

a leader is found in the case of medicine. Here the drive is likely to be very strong—that of fear of physical suffering and death. So universal is this fear that all societies, both primitive and civilized, have selected and trained specialists who are expert both in the cure and in the prevention of disease. In primitive societies they are known as medicine men, shamans, and conjurers; in civilized societies they are physicians and health officers. Their advice is followed and their orders are obeyed mainly because they have demonstrated their abilities to alleviate suffering, extend life, and most of all to reduce human anxieties. Moreover, they constitute an important segment of the traditions of most societies and become accepted automatically along with other patterns of the culture. They are expert readers of danger signals threatening the health both of individuals and of whole communities, with superior knowledge of how to prevent illness (i.e., how to make the most adaptive avoidance responses) and how to cure disease (i.e., how to make the most adaptive escape responses). Moreover, they are trained not to make promises they cannot fulfil, not to lead patients to expect too much or too little, and most important of all, not to communicate their own anxieties to their patients except in cases where it is clearly for their own good. Finally, they are trained not to permit patients to rely on them for expert advice and aid in matters outside the field of health.

Playing an Assigned Role

A fourth group of habits involved in following a leader consists of those of accepting and playing an assigned role in a social organization. Most societies are organized so that there are fixed positions of leadership and followership. The army is an example. The top-ranking officers are the leaders, by definition, and the privates are followers. In between are officers of various grades who are subordinate to those above and superordinate to those below. They follow the leadership

of their superiors but are the leaders of their inferiors. Most of the institutions of our society are organized as hierarchies. The church, the schools, local and national governments, factories, banks, stores, clubs, and scientific and political associations are all structured with a hierarchy of positions. In addition, our society has an age-grade system in which privilege, freedom, responsibility, and authority are apportioned according to the age status of the individual. Society is an elaborate network of positions, many of which are coördinate with each other, arranged on *levels* of status.

An important part of social education is the achievement of habits, skills, and attitudes required by the various roles that the individual may play in his society. Wherever he may stand in the various organizations of which he is a part, he must learn how to behave in respect to those who are above, below, and coördinate with him. Moreover, it is important to learn the requirements of the position next above, especially if one expects to move up. In the age-grade hierarchy each child moves up automatically as he grows older. He is therefore rewarded by parents and others for imitating the behavior of those above him because in so doing he is getting practice in skills that he will soon need. The persons who occupy these higher positions are *models* for those who are in training for them.

Our society is so organized that almost everyone receives a certain amount of training in leading and in following. This goes on both in school and outside, and is in large measure quite unnoticed. Children learn to do the things they are expected to do and not to do things that are forbidden. As they move up the age scale they acquire new habits and drop certain old ones.

In an emergency when a new form of organization is needed in which every person has his assigned role, each begins with most of the necessary skills already formed. He

may experience some initial difficulty in "fitting in" and learning what he is supposed to do and to whom he is responsible, but shortly he learns what is required of him.

The Leader-Follower Relationship

The importance of intelligent and skilful leadership in a crisis cannot be doubted. Equally important is the training of the population to select and follow the types of leaders required by the situation. However good the leaders may be, their leadership is useless unless it is followed. As we have already seen, people prefer the types of leaders by whom they have been most rewarded and least punished for following. The reason is that at an early period in life all of us acquire certain habits of obedience to parents, teachers, and others in authority. We also develop certain general ideas concerning the kind of people we can afford to trust and to whom obedience is rewarding. They are discriminated from those whose advice leads to trouble. In the majority of cases the most trusted people are parents. It follows, therefore, that one qualification of a leader is that he should be a composite picture of all the parents, teachers, and advisers whom the masses have in the past been most rewarded for following.

There are many parallels between the leader-follower relation and the parent-child relation—unquestioning obedience, no back talk, no aggressiveness or sign of lack of respect, demand for deference and veneration, the sense of security or of being protected, the sense of great magical powers. The political leader must love little children because the followers are now little children again; he must tolerate no great familiarity or intimacy, yet he must foster a psychological nearness; he must theoretically be accessible and appeasable; he must maintain strict discipline but reward the faithful; followers must work without pay as they did when they were children and turn their earnings over to the

family purse (the state) in return for food, clothing, and protection. Children can use their leader-parents to boss and exploit others not members of the family. The political leader must show no partiality; his love must be spread evenly over the whole population. Freud has stressed the point that the tie that binds a group together in a unified psychological whole is the feeling that all share and share alike in the love that the leader bestows upon them.⁴ The whole nation is then bound together as one family by precisely the same feeling of love and brotherhood that prevails in a family. In most religions there is mutual love among those who belong but intolerance and hate of those who are outside.

One of the most difficult problems in the transition from childhood to adulthood is that of weaning from the protector. It is sometimes accomplished by the substitution of a husband or wife, a staunch friend, or political leader, or even a guardian angel. It is best accomplished by acquiring habits of independence and resourcefulness. An emancipated individual has learned to stand on his own feet, fight his own battles, and find security in his own resources. Such an equipment is good for most situations of life. But in an emergency or crisis, when grave danger is at hand and when man doubts his own strength, there is a strong tendency to revert to childhood and seek a protector. Recalling that this relationship once paid great dividends in happiness, he is willing to return to it, provided he can do so without encountering the forces of culture that drove him out of it. He gave it up to avoid social disapproval and ridicule and other punishment. In returning he must somehow dodge the forces that shamed him for infantile behavior. The easiest way to do this is to discredit them. This can be done by following an approved leader but by denying that he is a parent substitute.

4. Sigmund Freud, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

Qualities of Good Leaders

The important thing about a leader is not so much that he should be a parent substitute as that he should be the kind of social stimulus which will evoke responses of deference, imitation, obedience, and enthusiastic devotion in the masses of followers. It is a mistake to assume that a leader puts something inside his followers that was not already there. What actually happens is that habits formed earlier in life are aroused by the stimuli produced by the leader. These need not be the same for all followers. Different individuals may follow the same leader but for various reasons and in quite different ways. There is nevertheless a common core of behavior, manifested mainly by obedience and deference. Without some common learning it is doubtful if the leadership-followership relation could be maintained. In psychological language, a leader is a stimulus or produces stimuli which arouse the same or similar responses in a large number of other individuals.

Most political leaders, at least in the beginning of their careers, are native sons. It has sometimes been said that a good leader must first learn to be a follower. This is not necessarily true, but it is true that the leader should be a fair specimen of the culture of his followers. It is doubtful if a Negro could ever become a leader of a white social movement in the United States for the reason that almost all white children have no deference habits toward Negroes. These habits are usually evoked by persons whom children have been taught to look up to, to listen to, and even to obey. One would, therefore, expect that leaders would be individuals who embody or who can produce the stimuli that evoke these responses.

Going back to Miller and Dollard's experiment with children in which one group was trained to follow adult and another to follow child leaders, let us suppose that the social environments of these two groups of children were organized

so that one group would always be rewarded for imitating people who are older than they and always punished for imitating those younger than themselves. Suppose conditions were the opposite for a control group trained to follow leaders of their own age or younger. After hundreds of rewarded trials it is quite likely that the first group would never be comfortable with younger leaders, or the control group with the older leaders. Unfortunately an experiment of this sort cannot be made for the reason that scientists cannot control the social environment to this extent. There is, however, a certain consistency in the environment in our society which enables us to observe that children are more rewarded for following leaders who are intelligent, strong, determined, technically competent, and self-confident than they are for following leaders who are weak, timid, uncertain, and stupid. There is therefore no mystery about the unique traits and qualities that are supposed to characterize a good leader. These traits undoubtedly vary in different societies but in all cases they probably turn out to be related to ability to get results.

Education for Followership

In our society a definite effort is made by parents and teachers to instruct children in how to select leaders who are technically competent to deal with the problem at hand. All children learn, for example, that when they are ill they should seek the advice of a doctor and not that of the milkman, the ice man, or a playmate. The training is even more specific. Children learn that the experts in the prevention and cure of a toothache are dentists; in eye trouble, oculists; and so on in other specialized ailments. Children are also taught to respect and obey their elders; to believe wisdom goes with experience; and that people who occupy high offices should be respected. A neglected area of training for leadership is in the political field. Children in our society

receive very poor training in how to select political leaders. They receive absolutely no training in how to select leaders in military affairs, economics, international relations, and in other arenas of public welfare. This lack of specific education leaves the way open for the rise of "crack-pot" leaders.

It is a mistake to assume that political leaders rise to power suddenly and without previous educational preparation for their advent. Hitler's rise to power, for example, was not sudden. His active public career began immediately after the first world war and ten years elapsed before he had gained sufficient following to seize the government. The great political bosses in the United States did not spring full blown into power over night. Certainly the great religious and political leaders of the world acquired their followings gradually over a period of years. The importance of this fact for education in followership is quite plain. When people are not already trained to follow a specific leader or specific type of leader, the leader himself, if he is wise, will train them. A political or religious leader can gain power and prestige only as fast as he himself and his disciples can "educate" the people to follow him. The most essential quality for a great leader is his teaching ability. The instruction consists not only in getting people to accept the message, the philosophy or the plan of the leader, but in getting them to accept him as a person who can do wonderful things. This is seen clearly in great political and religious movements. The followers of Buddha, Confucius, Mahomet, Jesus, and other great religious leaders have not only learned the teachings of these men but have become devoted to them as personal leaders. It is clear that the success of all of them is due primarily to the fact that they were truly great teachers.

Once a wise leader gains a small following, he will teach them how to teach others to follow him. The great religious and social movements of the world have spread mainly by

this technique. As the movement gains momentum and fewer and fewer followers come in direct contact with the leader, there is a tendency to exaggerate his power and to magnify his prestige. This is a great advantage to the leader because it gives him more power for rewarding and punishing his followers. As this power is accumulated, his educational position is better established.

It will be recalled that teaching is primarily a matter of rewarding the correct or desired behavior and punishing that which is incorrect or undesired. The more rewarding and punishing power there is in the hands of the leader, the more control he has over the kinds of things that his followers may learn. Once he gets a monopoly on the rewarding and punishing power of a group, he is in absolute control of education. From that point on he may determine what people may or may not learn to do, to think, or to feel. It is true that political bosses and demagogues are not often thought of as teachers. Some of the most important social teaching is done by individuals who do not occupy teaching positions in society.

Role of Leaders in a Crisis

A word remains to be said about leaders in great crises. There are at least two reasons why leaders emerge from social crises. First, when people are disturbed, alarmed, or driven by any strong emotion, when the situation is confused and perplexing and when no clear way out is perceived, they usually think back to earlier but similar experiences and discover that they were liberated by following a strong, determined, and courageous leader. This arouses the public appetite for a leader; usually someone volunteers, but if not, a leader is drafted. The second reason is that when emotional tension is high, when people are uneasy, restless, and discontented, when they are faced with difficult problems of public welfare, almost anyone who comes forward with a

simple plan and a firm conviction that it will succeed is practically certain to get a hearing. If the plan looks so promising that fears are reduced and hopes are raised, the leader becomes associated with this satisfying state of affairs and the connections between him and his words as stimuli and following him as response become greatly strengthened. We have already seen that habits are reinforced by the reduction of drives. If the drive runs high, as it usually does in the case of a crisis, any response that will reduce it becomes more firmly attached to the stimuli that produced it. In such a situation the leader quickly acquires the reputation of being a good drive reducer.

The psychological advantages of a leader in a crisis are numerous. He dispels anxiety because of his strength and wisdom; anyone who can do this readily acquires the reputation of possessing magical if not supernatural power. He becomes the protector and the shield against menace and molestation. Moreover, by following him the people are relieved of responsibility. If the enterprise fails, it is not their fault but that of the leader. Devotion to him enables them to escape the anxiety of punishment for failure. Knowing that if they fail they will not be punished, they are less inhibited and less cautious than they would be if they believed that failure would bring personal punishment to them. The leader also symbolizes their love for home and country. He is the embodiment and the personal representative of much that they have already learned to love and to defend. It is for this reason that great political leaders become enshrined in the memories of nations and great monuments are erected to them as perpetual reminders of their great strength and of the blessings which the people have received from their hands.

CHAPTER VII

AGGRESSIVE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

THE foregoing account of some kinds of social learning is by no means a complete catalogue of all social attitudes and skills involved in national aggression or defense. In a large mass movement such as a modern war each individual member of a competing group will sooner or later find some use for almost everything he has learned to do. Moreover, when he goes into battle he does not take only his fighting and hating habits, leaving everything else behind, but goes as an integrated whole. Habits of hating and fighting, fearing and defending are singled out for special treatment partly because they seem particularly relevant to war and partly to illustrate the point that mass movements cannot be understood without giving due consideration to the habit structures of the individual participants.

It does not follow that individuals who have acquired strong habits of hating and fighting will necessarily flock together in aggressive groups. The most warlike tribe or nation need not be the one whose citizens are most skilful in fighting among themselves or most deadly in their hatred of each other. The contrary is more likely to be the case. Habits of hating and fighting, like many others, may be very specific and operate only under conditions similar to those in which they were learned. Individuals may easily learn to detest and abhor all outsiders, or some special group or race, and at the same time love and admire their fellow countrymen. As a member of an aggressive group an individual may be an eager, willing, and skilful fighter with whatever weapons are appropriate or in whatever role he

may be assigned; but as a private citizen he may be very poor at boxing, dueling, and quarreling, and may have a general dislike for all kinds of interpersonal conflicts. He may, on the other hand, be a person whose fighting habits and attitudes are much more general. There are individuals who say they "love a good fight." There are also those whose lives are filled with bitterness and hatred not only toward their fellow citizens but toward everyone else, including all potential enemies. Such individuals, whose personalities are essentially destructive in type, are most easily led to aggressive warfare.

In order to understand the aggressiveness of a nation it is necessary from the outset to know what kinds of people comprise it and especially how their personalities are structured in regard to hatred and fear. But knowledge of hating and fighting potentialities alone is not enough. It is also necessary to understand the social and physical environment of the present and immediate past. This includes not only geographic location, climate, relation to land and water, but also social, economic, and political conditions, both at home and abroad. The number of factors that must be taken into account in attempting to understand why a particular nation is aggressive at some periods in its history and not in others are so numerous and complicated that one can easily get lost in a maze of their interrelations. There are, however, a limited number of factors the presence or absence of which seems always to make some difference in the aggressive tendencies of tribes and nations. What are these factors and what combinations or patterns are most favorable to national aggression?

Factors in National Aggressiveness

In the vast literature on national aggression we find a wide assortment of views concerning the circumstances under

which one tribe, state or nation will attack another. These conditions may be classified as geographical, biological, economic, social, political, and religious.

Among the *geographical* are such factors as climate, location, topography, and relation of land to water, particularly to the ocean. For example, it has been said that people who live in temperate zones are more active and, therefore, more aggressive than people who live in the frigid or torrid zones. It has also been noted that tribes who live in mountains or on deserts or other places where food is scarce and the physical environment severe are more likely to be ferocious than individuals who live where food is more plentiful, the land more fertile, and the struggle for existence less severe.

Some of the *biological* conditions are rate of increase or decrease in population, especially in relation to food supply, and the type of "herd instinct" of a particular tribe or population. In a popular book called *Instincts of the Herd in War and Peace* published during the first world war, Trotter advanced the view that there are three main biological types of herd instincts. The first is illustrated by wolves who go in packs for predatory purposes; the second by sheep which presumably herd together for defensive purposes; the third by bees which live in colonies primarily for mutual benefit through the division of labor. Trotter suggested that in the Teutonic races there is a disproportionately heavy strain of the wolf instinct and that the Anglo-Saxons are more endowed with bee-like gregarious tendencies.¹ In support of this view it is noted that in almost every society there are a number of individuals who seem particularly aggressive and even savage in their natures. There is presumed to be a hereditary streak of biological determiners which predispose individuals or groups toward

1. The absurdity of this view was revealed by Trotter himself when he identified the Germans with wolves, the French with sheep, and the British with bees.

aggressive behavior. It follows, therefore, that when a nation is so unfortunate as to be composed of a majority or even a powerful minority of this breed, it is bound to be aggressive.

Economic conditions favorable to national aggression include such factors as the relation of the food supply to the size of the population, the need for raw materials and natural resources, and the need for more living room, a greater and cheaper supply of labor, and more favorable trade relations with other nations. It is quite generally held by economists that the relative status of nations in respect to standard of living and general economic conditions is a prominent factor among the causes of war. Aggressor nations are usually the "have-nots" while the more peaceful countries are the "haves." A nation that has within its borders and within its control the resources and markets necessary to maintain its national economy has every reason to be peaceful. It can afford to be satisfied with the *status quo* and will endeavor to maintain its favorable position. If it is cramped for territory, for natural resources and markets, and has a relatively low standard of living, it is ripe for aggression. In addition to all this, it has been claimed that the internal economic structure of a nation is related to its aggressiveness. A capitalistic nation which stresses private property and develops a stratified population in respect to wealth is more likely to be imperialistic and therefore aggressive than one which operates its economy on more socialistic principles.

An obvious but important economic factor in group aggression is the possession of weapons and equipment for waging war. Aggressor states do not as a rule threaten or menace other states until they are fully armed. One argument in favor of disarmament in peacetime is that the mere possession of weapons is in itself a temptation to use them.

Among the *political* factors usually mentioned as favorable to national aggression are aggressive leadership, domi-

nation of a government by a military clique, political power of munitions makers and those who stand to profit from war, secret diplomacy, and international intrigue.

Prominent among the *social* conditions for aggression are national honor and prestige. Studies of competition among individuals and groups show that the two things for which human beings will compete most keenly are possessions and prestige.² To most nations their own "standing" or position in the family of nations is of greatest importance. Every citizen would like to feel that his nation is a first-class power. Indeed, competition for possessions is often motivated more by the desire for the prestige which they symbolize than by the biological needs that they satisfy.

This point is rather well illustrated by the ambition of Mussolini to reestablish the Roman Empire. For many years the greatest powers of the earth, especially of Europe, have been not merely nations but empires. To be an empire would add much to the prestige of Italy. The attack and conquest of Abyssinia may have been more motivated by this desire than by the economic gains from another African colony. In one of his triumphal speeches Mussolini referred to Great Britain as "another" empire.

To what extent the recent aggression of Germany and Japan may be due to desire for more power and prestige is difficult to judge. There can be little doubt, however, that such considerations play an important role. The first world war left Germany, Italy, and Russia as second- and third-rate powers. In the hierarchy of world powers England, France, and the United States were at the top. It is humiliating for a nation that was once a first-rate power to occupy a second or third rank. Indeed, it is more frustrating to be a second-rate nation than to be a third- or fourth-rate one. Switzerland, for example, knows she can never be in the

2. May and Doob, *Competition and Coöperation*. Social Science Research Council Bulletin No. 25 (New York).

"big league" and has no such ambition. But a nation that is just short of the "first team" and sees the possibility of becoming a first-class world power by exploiting and assimilating her weaker neighbors is under greater temptation to make the attempt.

Another set of conditions which tends to favor group aggression may be *religious*, *moral* or *ideological*. Nearly all aggressive groups, particularly those of modern times, have some kind of message, mission, or destiny which is expressed in a national philosophy and crystallized in slogans and catch phrases. This national ideology dominates the education, art, literature, and even the science of the nation. But not all nations that have an ideology are aggressive. It is rather those whose ideology gives them a mission to perform or sets for them a destiny in the world which involves the conquest of other groups. When these ideologies become tied up with a militant religion the result is often military campaigns such as the Crusades and the Holy Wars of the Mohammedans.

In books about wars, historical and modern, we find various combinations of the above factors selected and presented as of crucial importance. Our view is that they represent the conditions under which nations have in the past been belligerent or peaceful rather than basic causes of organized group aggression. If one were to select periods in history during which wars have been most frequent and ask a group of experts to rate each nation of that period on a scale of aggressiveness and also to give ratings on such items as the severity of its climate, density of its population, military strength, economic self-sufficiency, ambition of its leaders, and so on for other factors from the list above, the resulting data could be treated statistically, by the use of the technique of correlation. If this process were repeated for various periods in history, one might discover, first, the factors that are most highly correlated with aggressiveness at

given periods in world history, and second, the consistency of these correlations from one period to another. As far as I know, this type of study has never been made. It may be impossible either because the necessary data are not available or because there are few, if any, experts who have them sufficiently in command to do the rating. The advantages of such a study, however, are obvious. It would throw much-needed light on the relative importance of a long list of factors which appear to figure in one way or another in national aggression.

In order to understand an aggressive social movement, it is necessary to know not only the relevant facts and factors but also their dynamic inter-relation over periods of time. Viewed from the vantage point of historical perspective, aggressive groups come and go. States seem to pass through characteristic cycles of expansion, consolidation, decline, and disappearance. One could cite, as historical examples, the empires of Babylon, Persia, Athens, Carthage, Rome, and France. On a much smaller scale are revolutions, labor movements, and interclass conflicts of many kinds. Aggressive mass movements seem to follow a general pattern, for there is usually a period of growth, a time of maximum power, then decline and decay.⁸

Characteristics of Aggressive Mass Movements

Our best psychological insights into the life cycle of mass aggressive movements come from the study not of whole nations but of smaller groups within a nation. I refer to such militant movements as the Abolitionist prior to the Civil War, the Anti-Saloon League of the late nineteenth century, labor organizations, the Communist party, the I.W.W., and

8. It is doubtful if nations rise and fall according to immutable cyclical laws. This is a moot point in social theory. Evidence that such laws may exist is found in Spaengler's *Decline of the West*, Sorokin's *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, and Stuart Chapin's *Cultural Changes*.

the like. Aggressive mass movements like these appear to have characteristic life cycles and certain common features among which are the following: (1) There is usually a pre-determining background of social unrest and discontent. Various combinations of social, political, and economic conditions operate to bring upon certain groups or classes of people unusual hardships and more than average amounts of frustration. (2) It seldom happens that an aggressive social movement will appeal to all members of a society. Not even the Nazi party has engaged the full support of all Germans, certainly not before the war. The people who are most likely to join such movements are those whose hopes and plans are most frustrated by the social and economic conditions of the time. (3) Nearly all successful aggressive movements have aggressive leaders. (4) All have goals that are quite specific and usually stated in terms of "demands." (5) All have some plan of action for reaching these goals, one aspect of which is the recruitment of members. (6) As the movement gets under way an "ideology" is formulated which functions mainly to hold the group together. (7) As aggressive action is successful and rewarding, it becomes more and more of a habit and gathers more members and more momentum. (8) It finally comes to an end when all goals are realized, or when thwarted by a countermovement. Let us examine each of these characteristics in more detail.

Motivating Conditions

First, what are the typical predetermining conditions out of which aggressive social movements arise? They are usually described by such terms of social unrest, discontent, disgruntlement, and the like. These terms refer to a social state of affairs which might be described psychologically by saying that when a number of individuals experience an unusually severe run of bad luck, deprivation and hardship,

and are forced to reduce their standards of living, to abandon their hopes and cherished plans, they react by grumbling, complaining, criticizing, and even by uttering threats and warnings to whatever persons, groups, institutions, or agencies are believed at the time to be responsible for the frustrating conditions. The general frustrating situation may be economic, social, political, religious, or all. Usually it is a complex pattern composed of many factors.

Among the economic factors are unemployment, inflation, high taxes, reduced savings, poor crops, increased costs of living and greater demands for money with less and less income. Important also is economic insecurity for both the immediate present and distant future. The general relations between economic conditions and mass aggressive tendencies are shown by facts such as the following. There is a close parallel, over a period of years, between the farm price of cotton in the southern states and the yearly number of lynchings of Negroes. The higher the price of cotton, the fewer the lynchings.⁴ A comparative study of counties in which Negro lynchings occurred in 1930 with those counties in the same states when there were no lynchings in that year, showed that the frequency of lynchings is associated with such economic factors as bank deposits, per capita tax evaluation, per capita income, tenant farmers, and ownership of automobiles. In each case where the frequency of lynching is relatively high, the economic indices are relatively low.⁵

Similar economic factors can be found in the background of almost all aggressive movements. During the depression of the 1930's when there was a strong tendency for industries to "retire" workers over forty, and when young people were

4. Hoyland and Sears, "Correlation of Lynching with Economic Indices," *J. Psychol.*, (1940), 9, 301-310. (The correlation between farm value of cotton and number of lynchings is -.72.)

5. Southern Commission on the Study of Lynching.

finding it harder to support their parents and older relatives, the Townsend Plan became a popular solution. At its peak it claimed 20,000,000 supporters. It was a mildly aggressive movement demanding from the Government pensions of \$200. a month for all people over sixty years of age.

The economic background of strikes, labor movements, and the Communist party reveals similar conditions of discontent. Strikes and revolutions are most likely to occur when large segments of a population suffer extreme hardship and especially when laborers make plans for themselves and their families which cannot be realized without more money and more leisure. It is a well-established fact that there is a close relation between the frequency of strikes and gains in membership of trade unions at times when costs of living are rising faster than wages.

The political and social factors that precipitate aggressive movements are of the greatest significance and may or may not be related to economic factors. In some strikes the laborers do not want higher wages, shorter hours, or improved working conditions, but *status*. They want to improve their *position* in respect to bargaining, participation in management, and security of employment. Aggressive social movements almost invariably arise among classes of people who occupy subordinate positions in the scheme of things. This may be seen most clearly in the strong resentment that almost invariably comes from wounded pride, from being snubbed or demoted to a lower position. The aggressiveness of the Nazi party can be traced directly to the deep humiliation suffered by the Germans from the defeat in 1918 and from the insult which the Treaty of Versailles added to the existing injury. The anti-Japanese immigration laws passed in the United States created a wave of deep resentment in Japan and many Japanese have not forgotten it to this day. Widespread feelings of inferiority

coupled with a craving for superiority, or at least equality, are important in the background of all aggressive movements.

Lasswell⁶ has suggested that the terms, *income*, *deference*, and *safety* sum up most of the acquired rewards which are sought by people in our society. They are, therefore, points at which frustrations are most severe. Frustration of economic plans, by which income falls below the level expected or counted on, can occur in many ways; deference is frustrated when the prestige position is lowered, when the individual is required to accept a lower rank or play an inferior role from that which he has been accustomed to or led to expect is rightfully his; safety is frustrated when one finds that he is more vulnerable than he had supposed, more open to exploitation by others, and when the defenses and protections which he has so carefully built up are torn down. This is frustration by exposure. The foregoing statements may be summarized by saying that when the accustomed ways of life of a group of people are severely hampered by conditions over which as individuals they have no control but which they are led to believe could be remedied by mass action, the psychological stage is set for an aggressive social movement.

Who Are the Members of Aggressive Movements?

The kinds of people who enlist in aggressive movements are two: those whose plans and cherished goals are most interfered with by the conditions of the times, and those who have the best habit equipment for hating and fighting. Most aggressive social movements find their chief supporters among lower-middle social and economic classes. The reason is that as a rule these are the people who are hardest hit by adverse economic conditions. They are also among those

6. H. D. Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1935).

who are struggling hardest to get ahead, to find a higher place in the social and economic structure, to get better education for their children, better homes to live in, and so on. They have more goal responses that are capable of being frustrated by "hard times." At the very bottom of the economic scale are those people who have never in their lives been accustomed to three square meals a day, to decent living quarters, or to any but minimum standards of living. They have no special ambitions, no social and economic goals, and no particular plans. They are not easily frustrated because no matter how hard the times may be it matters little to them since they have never known anything better. They have relatively few secondary social drives and are motivated mainly by the basic biological drives of hunger, cold, fatigue, and sex. Conditions which frustrate only the secondary cravings for deference, safety, and income leave this group almost untouched.

In general it may be said that the people who are most frustrated by adverse conditions, depressions, inflations, unemployment, low incomes, and high costs of living are those people who have some but not much income, deference, and safety, and are struggling desperately to improve their *statuses*. They have the maximum wants to be met, goals to be reached, and plans to be realized. They are therefore most vulnerable to the frustration of secondary drives.

In almost all aggressive mass movements there are a few individuals who by all conventional standards appear out of place. A college professor, let us say, whose retirement is already provided for by a Carnegie pension joins the Townsendites, or a well-to-do capitalist becomes a Communist, or a member of the employer class leads a strike. It appears that in our society there are always some individuals who are well fixed, have security, deference, and income, but who cannot stay out of aggressive movements. Among them are idealists and reformers as well as scoundrels and racketeers.

who are out for exploitation and personal profit. There are still others who join aggressive movements not because they are frustrated or because they are interested in the goals of the movement but simply because they enjoy being members of a militant group.

It is scarcely necessary to cite statistical evidence in support of the above assertion that aggressive movements stem mainly from persons who occupy subordinate positions and who at the moment are suffering an unusually bad run of frustrating circumstances with no relief in sight. The Townsend Plan was supported largely by disproportionate numbers from the lower social and economic levels.⁷ The most aggressive labor movement in the United States today is the C.I.O. composed mainly of unskilled wage earners who are close to the bottom of the economic scale. The less aggressive and more conservative labor organizations are the craft unions which have already achieved a better position in the economic and social scheme of things in the United States. The Nazi movement in Germany recruited its main support initially from the lower-middle class, but was at that time less radical than the communistic or Marxist movement that bitterly opposed it.

Not all social unrest results in aggressive movements. Those who are most affected by it may express their aggressive feelings by complaining, criticizing, swearing, voting against the government, writing letters to the editor, beating their wives and children; in short, they react by employing the techniques that they have learned are most effective

⁷. In January, 1939, the Gallup Poll put the question: "Have you heard of the Townsend Plan?" Ninety-five per cent said "yes." Answers to the question, "Are you in favor of this plan?" were distributed by income groups as follows:

	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No Opinion</i>
Above average	17	76	7
Average	28	59	13
Poor people	49	42	9
On relief	69	26	5

for reducing annoyance and irritation. Some of them may attempt to start a movement because they have learned that a united front will succeed where scattered individual efforts fail; others may resist joining a movement partly because they have experienced punishment in the past for aggressive group action and partly because they fear it will cost them too much in time, money, and effort. In short, their aggressive habits do not fit a group pattern. It is rare for aggressive group movements to emerge spontaneously from widespread social unrest. Many such periods come and go and no movement of any consequence emerges, although unsuccessful attempts may be made. The history of the labor movement in the United States reveals an amazing number of movements that have started and failed.

Whether effective social movements spontaneously arise from conditions of social discontent and unrest appears to depend on several factors, among which are: (1) leadership, of which we shall speak in a moment, (2) habits of hatred and aggression that the individuals possess. If individuals have learned by past experience that the most effective way of overcoming barriers between them and their goals (especially when many are in the same predicament) is by organizing a solid front against the persons, institutions, or conditions responsible for the obstruction, they will on future occasions be disposed to repeat this procedure in new but similar situations. But if they happen to be folks who have been rewarded for fighting their own battles, for standing on their own feet, for meeting their own difficulties single-handed, and have been less rewarded or even punished for calling for help or trying to organize, they will on future occasions tend to employ more individual techniques first. If these fail, they must then search for other solutions.

Enter the leader. The successful leader of an aggressive movement is most likely to be the kind of person whom the frustrated, bewildered individuals have been rewarded more

than punished for following. If a program of action advocated by a leader seems to square reasonably well with the followers' own experiences and appears to promise some chance of success, he is almost certain to get a hearing. His first task is to make people aware of the fact that there are many others who are suffering the same hardship, deprivation, and thwarting. This at once gives a sense of *already belonging* to a group, of being in the same boat with others. Second, he must offer a program and purpose stated in terms of concrete goals and a plan of action for reaching them. He must also convince his hearers that by acting as a group they have "what it takes" to put this plan of action into effective operation either now or later. The plan must be presented as the *only solution* and not open to debate or modification. The leader must also dispel all fears of punishment that may come from joining the movement and participating in its program, or at least he must convince his followers that the rewards to be gained will be great enough to offset by some safe margin all the costs in time, labor, money, ridicule, and punishment from others. Moreover, the leader must be the kind of person whose appearance, words, and actions will arouse in the frustrated masses strong aggressive tendencies toward those on whom the demands are made, by whose action the problem will be solved, or who are causing the frustrating conditions and must therefore be eliminated.

The leader presents the stimuli which evoke these responses. If he is the kind of person who looks and acts the part, who utters the kinds of words, makes the kinds of gestures, performs the kinds of acts which are suitable stimuli for arousing the maximum aggressive behavior that the people are capable of expressing, he is at once a great success. But these stimuli will fall on deaf ears and blind eyes unless the people already possess the habits they are calculated to arouse. No greater volume of fight talk has ever been uttered than has come from the lips of Hitler and

Mussolini during the past ten years. But the persons to whom these word stimuli are addressed must have acquired, earlier in life, a stock of aggressive habits, or the stimuli would not be effective. The people must also possess certain habits of listening to, obeying, and following leaders. A leader can mobilize hatred and aggression only when there is aggression already there to be mobilized and when the people have been rewarded for heeding and following the commands of leaders and punished for not doing so.

Successful aggressive movements are nearly always led by aggressive persons. Unfortunately we do not have detailed life histories of the great and notorious ones. Biographies we have, but they seldom tell us all we want to know. They lack adequate accounts of the basic habit structures of the leaders' personalities, especially in respect to the habits of hating and fighting, fearing, and defending that were described in the two preceding chapters. We suspect that the childhood and adolescence of men like Napoleon, Hitler, and Stalin were filled with experiences by which they acquired unusually strong arsenals of habits of hatred and anxiety. Hitler certainly acquired at some time in his life a very large vocabulary of aggressive words and an extraordinary facility for putting them together in ways that arouse aggressive tendencies in his listeners.

All Aggressive Movements Have Specific Goals

Next to the personality of the leader a most important condition for the success of an aggressive movement is the statement of the leader's goals and the purposes of the movement. The goals vary greatly depending on the nature of the frustrating circumstances, the needs which the movement is supposed to meet, the persons who are responsible for the conditions, and the nature and amount of expected opposition. But in one respect they are all alike. Their goals are stated in terms of "demands" on some person, govern-

ment, or institution. These demands may represent the immediate or remote goals or both. Sometimes they are stated vaguely but more often clearly and specifically. The demands which labor unions make on management before a strike are the familiar ones of higher wages, shorter hours, better working conditions, recognition of the union, closed shop, "check off," and so on. Before the war the demands of the Nazi party were:

We demand the inclusion of all Germans in a Great Germany on the ground of the right of self-determination. We demand the recognition of the right to equality of the German nation with all other nations; the cancelation of the Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain. We demand land and soil (colonies) for the nutrition of our people and for the settlement of our surplus population.⁸

The demands of the Townsend Movement were very simple: (1) \$200. a month per person for all over sixty who need it, (2) that this sum must all be spent within thirty days, (3) that it all be paid for by a 2 per cent business transaction tax. The demands of Father Divine's Kingdom are:

His "righteous government" platform demands legislation in every state, "making it a crime to discriminate in any public place against any individual on account of race, creed, or color, abolishing all segregated neighborhoods in Cities and Towns, making it a crime for landlords or hotels to refuse tenants on such grounds; abolishing all segregated schools and colleges, and all segregated areas in Churches, Theatres, public conveyances, and other public places." It further demands "legislation making it a crime for any newspaper, magazine, or other publication to use segregated or slang words referring to race, creed, or color."⁹

8. Hadley Cantril, *The Psychology of Social Movements* (New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1941), p. 242.

9. *Idem*, p. 141.

The statement of goals or sub-goals in terms of demands has the double psychological effect of focusing aggression on the persons, institutions, or agencies on whom the demands are made, and of mobilizing hatred against whatever may appear as an obstruction in the paths of action. One of the demands of the Nazi party was the cancellation of the Treaty of Versailles. In order to enforce this demand race purity was necessary. Race purity required the elimination of the Jews. But already there existed a considerable amount of anti-Semitic feeling in Germany. Many people were ready to believe that the Jews and the Communists were really responsible for the collapse of Germany in 1918. They were, therefore, a stumbling block and a menace to future rise to power. They were represented as a barrier between the Germans and their goals. Moreover, they were a type of barrier that is relatively defenseless and which could therefore be safely attacked. It was the rich Jews who were fancied as the greatest menace to Germany's future. This wealth was confiscated, said the Nazis, not because the party needed money but because their economic influence needed to be destroyed.

The liquidation of the Jews was, therefore, a part of the Nazi plan of aggressive action. It was justified by digging up the theory of race purity and superiority which served as a pretext for aggressive action not only against the Jews but also against non-Germans everywhere. The thinness of the pretext was revealed when the tripartite pact was signed with Italy and Japan. Some Nazi "scientist" announced shortly thereafter that his researches had revealed that Japanese are Aryans.

We are not interested in passing value judgments on the tactics of any aggressive group but only in calling attention to the drives for keeping it going. When a movement of this sort has defined its goals and set its purposes, it is required to show tangible progress or be deserted by many of its supporters. It is forced to begin overt aggressive action far in

advance of the *grand coup* by which it hopes to achieve its program. It must therefore set for itself subgoals which its leaders know can be achieved quite easily by appropriate offensive action. It thus provides for its members *rewarded practice* in aggression and hatred.

How Members Are Recruited

One of the most useful subgoals is that of recruitment of members or followers in numbers adequate for the ultimate purposes of the movement. A labor union is not effective until it has enough members to enforce its demands by striking. The Nazi party could not achieve its goal until it got in control of the government. This could be accomplished in two ways—one by voting its way in and the other by a *coup d'état*, fighting its way in. Members and followers are recruited mainly by propaganda. After a sufficient number have been recruited, the demands of the group may also be advanced by propaganda. The context of the propaganda put out by the aggressive group consists mainly of "fight talk." Labor leaders select words like "unfair" because they are calculated to arouse feelings of resentment in the followers and feelings of shame in those against whom they are directed. But the nature and volume of the fight talk are determined in part by how sure the leaders are of their ground and how secure the group is against strong counter-aggression. A weak aggressive group does not dare be too belligerent, at least not publicly. But after it has become a dominant group in the nation it can let forth a mighty volume of vituperation, threat, warning, and condemnation.

But recruiting new members for a movement requires something more than emotional outbursts. Fight talk may be quite sufficient to incite a mob to lynch or to riot, but it is not enough to induce some people to cast their lot with a revolutionary movement. In the early days of the Nazi move-

ment it had no program but relied on emotional outbursts against the government, the Communists, and other parties. It was not until Hitler was sent to jail and wrote *Mein Kampf* that the movement emerged with a program. According to the testimony gathered by Abel,¹⁰ most of the Nazi members who joined the party in the late 'twenties did so because the program appealed to them.

The aggressive behavior of all such movements is more or less circumscribed by the fear of punishment from counter-aggression. This accounts for the fact that in the early stages, when the group is still relatively weak, its expressions of aggression are mainly verbal, but interspersed with occasional acts of violence. As the movement grows in strength and as the restraining influence of fear is lessened it becomes bolder and bolder until finally when in command it rules by terror and intimidation. At any given stage in its development the limits to action are determined in large part by fear of counteraggression. The stronger the movement and the more boldness that it has "gotten away with," the less the fear. This mechanism is seen clearly in lynching mobs. No one individual would be willing to accept the responsibility of single-handed assault on the victim, however angry and outraged he might feel. But when the crowd begins to gather and it is noticed that some of the "best people" of the community are in it, also perhaps the sheriff and the judge, fears of assault and battery tend to disappear. Even the presence of the police or state troopers will not arouse restraining fears, especially if it is rumored that they are instructed not to shoot into the crowd. Moreover, as the angry fury of the crowd mounts higher and higher, due to interpersonal circular stimulation, more and more powerful fear stimuli are required to inhibit violence. Nothing short of

10. T. Abel, *Why Hitler Came to Power* (New York, Prentice-Hall, 1938).

the State Militia which plainly out-numbers a lynching mob and has superior arms can disperse and quiet it.¹¹

There are other factors besides fear which tend to inhibit or interfere with aggression. One is the presence of conflicting habits which call for solutions of problems by more peaceful procedures. We saw in Chapter III that individuals differ widely in the number and strength of their habits of hatred and aggression. Individuals who have been repeatedly rewarded for compromise, for peaceful settlements, and always punished for making aggressive demands are likely to be less disposed to support aggressive movements that require participation in violence. Individuals who have been rewarded for blaming themselves for their misfortunes, disappointments, and failures are not easily led to blame others. There is another set of inhibiting habits—those of conscience. An individual who has been trained to oppose all violence on moral grounds is not apt to be found in aggressive movements unless he has been rewarded for righteous indignation, which is often the case. It is not probable, therefore, that a program which calls for violent physical attack on others will succeed unless it can recruit individuals who, by earlier conditioning, have already been prepared for action of this sort. In general, they must be individuals with great capacities to hate and to fight, in order to follow a leader with worshipful obedience, and with weak habits of fear, of self-aggression, of conscience, and indeed of all things that tend to inhibit or preclude hatred and aggression.

The techniques by which hatred is mobilized and by which the skills required for the program of action are assembled

11. In situations like this violent aggressive action is facilitated by the drives of anger and hatred but inhibited by those of fear and anxiety. The resulting behavior is determined by the relative strength of competing drives. This is a basic principle in psychology. It asserts that when an organism is engaged in any action that is satisfying (i.e., drive reducing) it will continue until either the drive producing it plays out and disappears or it is checked by a counterdrive.

and further developed vary greatly from movement to movement. They are known as the techniques of propaganda. Underlying them are certain basic principles of group behavior which call attention to requirements that must be met. One is that the group must function as a unified whole presenting a solid front in action. It can tolerate no internal strife and dissension. There are several ways in which unity may be achieved. First, it must be well organized. The most solid and foolproof form of organization is that of an army. The essential thing about such a piece of machinery is responsibility from the bottom up and authority from the top down. Every individual has an assigned position in the hierarchy and is responsible to his immediate superior, except, of course, the top man, and he is responsible ultimately to the group. But the down flow of authority is equally important to the upward movement of responsibility.

In psychological terms authority means control over rewards and punishments. Everyone in the system can be rewarded or punished by those above him, but not by those below him except indirectly by reporting punishable misdemeanors, in which case the punishment is still administered from above. Rewards, too, can be handed down as well as punishments. An individual in the lower ranks can be rewarded by promotion, more prestige, increase in income, promise of greater security, and by words of commendation. By exercising rigid control over important rewards and punishments it is possible to develop new habits that fit the members for various assigned roles in the system.

The Importance of an Ideology

Another means of group unification is by the development of an ideology. An ideology is really a series of statements that make the goals and the program of action of the movement sound just and reasonable. Granted the premises, the conclusions follow with logical consistency. Even the premises

may appear sound. Back of them, however, may be certain unformulated and hence unnoticed basic assumptions which are quite unsound. According to Abel, the Nazi ideology is built around the concept of *Gemeinschaft*.¹² This untranslatable word conveys a richness of meaning to a literate German, one center of which is the notion of the nation as one big strong happy family. It is expressed in the slogans "*Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Führer*," and "*Gemeinnutz vor Eigennutz*."

In the family all share in the income, the love of parents, the protection of the home, and all contribute something to the common good. There are no special privileges except those designated by age and sex status, no favorites, no partiality, and equal love. In order for the nation-family to be a strong, united, unconquerable, powerful in-group it must be, say the Nazis, of one blood. Hence the Jews who are of a different blood must be eliminated. Moreover, if the members are to work for the common good of the whole group, there must be someone who determines what that common good is. The members cannot decide it among themselves. They must have a wise and powerful father-leader who will decide. So the leader principle follows from the premise as do other principles of group action.

We are not interested here in any particular ideology but rather in the functions that are served by them, and in how they are developed. One function is justification of purposes, goals, and plans of action. These are formulated first and later rationalized by "cooking up" or resurrecting a social philosophy which is consistent with them. It is an easy step then to turn around and show how plans of action follow logically from the ideology. This makes policies seem just and reasonable, fits them into earlier habits of justice and reason, and makes them much more palatable. A second function of an ideology is that it supplies an immense amount

12. T. Abel, *op. cit.*

of verbal self-stimulation and social stimulation calculated to arouse the desired reaction tendencies. Father Divine is said to urge his "children" always to keep their minds on him and on his purposes.

The Group Habit of Aggressiveness

As an aggressive group reaches its goals and approaches the full realization of its purposes, will it settle down and conserve its gains by taking a defensive attitude or will it formulate new goals, make new demands, and push on to further conquests? This question has an obvious bearing on the present world conflict. If and when the aggressive nations of the world reach their present goals, will they consolidate their gains, settle down, and adopt a foreign policy that is strictly defensive? Let us examine some of the psychological factors involved in this question.

In the first place, let it be remembered that aggressive conduct, like all other behavior, is primarily a function of two factors—*habit* and *motive*. Strong habits will operate with weak motives, but weak habits require strong motives to overcome the competition of other habits. Whether an aggressive group will continue its aggressive policy depends on the strength of the habit in relation to competing habits and the strength of the drive in relation to competing drives. Consider first the habits of group aggression.

If a group realizes its demands, reaches its goals, and gets what it wants by threatening and attacking others, and if the costs and losses entailed are considered worth the effort because of the greater gains, then according to the law of effect group aggressive behavior is reinforced and the habit is strengthened. Recent world history contains two or three examples of national aggressiveness that have paid rather good dividends to the aggressors. One was the attack on Ethiopia by Italy, another was the conquest of Manchukuo by Japan, and still another was the annexation of Austria,

and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia by Germany. In all these cases the gains were substantial and the losses small. The aggressions were disapproved and protested by other countries, but the aggressors got off with very light punishment.

The best examples of habitual group aggression are found in the warlikeness of certain primitive people. Anthropologists tell of tribes who regularly and as a matter of policy get their living by raiding and robbing their neighbors. Nomadic tribes, for example, wander from place to place, attacking, robbing, and stealing from the more peaceful agricultural tribes.¹³ Are these tribes more warlike because they are nomads or are they nomads because they are warlike? A good guess is that they have found by trial and error that it is easier and hence more rewarding to get their food by the quick and easy technique of raiding and plundering than by the more laborious and delayed method of cultivation of crops, tending of herds, and hunting of game. Even though they may experience some punishments on raiding parties, these are minor compared with the rewards. Once such habits are established, a great deal of non-reward and punishment is required to extinguish them. It would appear, therefore, that the law of effect operates to reinforce group aggression.

The law of effect may also operate to favor peaceful attitudes and habits by rewarding them and by punishing group aggression. The native Greenlanders are reported to be a very peaceful people. They are said to quarrel seldom, never to fight amongst themselves, and to maintain peaceful relations with their neighbors. They apparently have no strong aggressive habits either as individuals or in groups.

Primitive tribes, like modern nations, tend to organize their social, economic, political, and religious life in ways

13. Maurice Davie, *The Evolution of War* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1929).

that are consistent with their foreign policies. It is reported that peaceful tribes tend to disparage war and to scoff at military glory.¹⁴ They satisfy the human biological needs and the acquired social cravings in other ways. Social education is organized in such a way as not to develop aggressive habits but on the contrary to build habits of friendship and coöperation. On the other hand, if a group tastes the benefits of raid and plunder without experiencing too much punishment, it is likely to shape its internal affairs to a policy of external aggression. It seeks better weapons and more skilled users of them. It invents an ideology and even a religion that reinforces its policies; it develops a moral code, a system of education, a political organization, all designed to implement the type of group conduct which has been found to be most profitable.

The Aggressiveness of the Nazi Party

Members of an aggressive group support its policies and participate in its affairs for various reasons. Some may be in it for selfish gain, others for relief from frustration, and many may be afraid to stay out. The strength of the Nazi movement is not to be attributed entirely to the promises that it offers. Many support it because they fear the Gestapo and the concentration camps. It has been said that the secret of Nazi power is flattery and fear.¹⁵ The fear that made Germans aggressive and that motivated them to support Hitler's war against the Jews at home and neighbors abroad was that of the Gestapo. During the period of Nazi ascendancy much use was made by them of the word *Gleichschaltung*, which may be translated "smoothing into line." Part of the program was aggression against all who appeared to stand in the way of the "new order" now, as well as against those who

14. *Ibid.*

15. Editors of *Fortune*, *Background of War* (New York, A. A. Knopf, 1937), p. 148.

were held responsible for former defeats and hardships. Their aggression was more a matter of overcoming barriers that stood between the Nazis and their goal than a matter of evening up old scores. Every citizen of the Reich was "smoothed into line" with this program. Some fell in line because they stood to profit; others because they believed the propaganda and actually hated the Jews, Bolsheviks, and English; but a great many more, we suspect, because they feared the Gestapo.

The flattery was the widespread feeling of "being on the march" again—of rejuvenation. The masters of propaganda dramatized this theme in hundreds of ways. It aroused the sentiment that Germans would show the world the kind of superior stuff they are made of. A super-race cannot behave like cowards or underlings. It must drive ruthlessly toward its destiny, and woe unto any nation that stands in its way. Why should such a people forever be content to eat the economic crumbs that fall from England's table or put up with the impudence of the Poles and Czechs? This line of argument made a great impression on the younger generation who did not know the full story of the first world war and who had no firsthand experience of its horrors. They were proud to be cogs in the Nazi machine. They were no longer frustrated but were filled with exuberance and with admiration for their Führer and his satellites. They were willing and ready to follow him wherever he would lead and to make any sacrifice that he might demand. Their motivation was neither fear nor frustration but a familial devotion to a cause and to its leader.

A third source of motivation for continued support of the Nazi party and its aggressive policies was renewed frustrations. Once the regime was solidly in power it imposed on the population demands for sacrifices that were even more frustrating to many than the conditions from which they were relieved. The whole nation was tightly regimented. Jobs

were provided, but taxes were levied, contributions of all sorts were required, and workers were deprived of the right to strike or even to complain. They were required to work long hours, not at jobs of their choosing but at those which were assigned to them. Young men were drafted into the *Arbeitsdienst* or Labor Service and required to "contribute" a certain amount of free labor to the State for road building and other government projects. Work under such conditions would have been tolerable had not the pay been so low in terms of real wages. The propaganda, however, attempted to convince the workers that they should be proud to work for nothing for such a glorious new Germany. Some of them believed it, but others who found that they couldn't eat, wear, and keep warm on "glory" certainly resented it. Those who received a pay envelope found that numerous deductions were made for income tax, old-age insurance, unemployment insurance, "citizen tax," labor front dues, and "winter-relief"; on top of this, each wage earner and salaried worker was supposed to make all kinds of "voluntary" contributions to or to pay membership dues in such organizations as the "Hitler Youth," or the "Strength Through Joy" movement.

Sacrifices of other sorts were required of the capitalist class. They were allowed some profits, to be sure, but were given inadequate control over their factories or businesses. The editors of *Fortune* report¹⁶ that in 1937 the average German businessman had to contend with six different authorities each of which could tell him how to run his business. One authority fixed hours and conditions of labor, another regulated the amount of state credit, another fixed prices, another allocated raw materials, another determined the usefulness of the industry or business for national defense. These various authorities were in conflict with each other. The businessman was torn between many bosses. He was so

16. *Idem*, pp. 138-139.

wound up in red tape that he couldn't even quit, unless he were willing to face a concentration camp or "liquidation."

These are only a few examples of the regimentation of economic life in the Third Reich. It was no doubt most exasperating to people who had been accustomed to freer days. To make matters worse, the people were expected to take it and like it. All former arenas of socially approved innocent aggression were closed. No one was allowed to criticize, complain or organize a countermovement. Civil liberties, which in other countries provide outlets for aggressive feelings, were all denied. Freedom of speech which might be utilized to criticize and blow off steam was *verboten*. Other freedoms which also serve as outlets for aggression, such as voting, travel, creating protest organizations, and striking were also on the blacklist. One avenue of aggression, however, was left wide open—taking it out on others, first on the Jews, the Czechs, the Poles, and finally on the English and Russians.

Aggression and Primitive Animism

Ordinarily when the leaders of an aggressive group attempt to motivate the members by frustrating them with regimentation, deprivation of liberties, and higher taxes, they run the great risk that the aggressiveness thus aroused will be directed back at them. The Nazi leaders skilfully avoided this, partly by deifying the leader, partly by inventing an ideology that demands the complete surrender of the individual to the State, but mainly by utilizing the psychological principle of "displacement."¹⁷ This technique is an ancient one and plays an important role in the aggressive behavior of primitive people. The primitive man attributes all fortunes and misfortunes to personal agents, living or dead, human or divine. He does not believe in *accidents*.

17. For a detailed account of how the Nazis "displaced" aggression, first against the Jews and later against "outside" enemies see Durbin and Bowlby, *Personal Aggressiveness and War*, pp. 126ff.

While there are variations in belief about ghosts and spirits among primitive societies, certain ideas about them are very prevalent if not universal. One is that the spirits of the departed hover around and participate in the affairs of the living. They have various kinds and degrees of power. To the spirits of legendary heroes and ancestors are attributed the special powers of gods. Some are benevolent and cause sunshine, rain, good crops, abundant game, health, childbirth, and give humans many desirable traits and virtues. There are also guardian angels who protect and care for mortals. Supernatural beings are also malevolent and cause diseases, death, pestilence, drought, storms, defeats in battle, and even violations of the moral code. Primitive man, however, does not attribute all his misfortunes and fortunes to supernatural beings. He believes also in the magical powers of sorcerers and medicine men. His living enemies are quite capable, so he believes, to cause much harm by the use of magical powers.

When a primitive society is persuaded that its troubles are caused by its earthly enemies, whoever they may be, it is well on its way toward aggressive war. The more intolerable its burdens and the greater its deprivations and sufferings, the greater will be its tendency to appease or to attack and destroy the causal agent. If the agent is formidable and dangerous, the appeasement technique may be tried; but if he is relatively weak and accessible, he will be attacked and destroyed.

The belief in supernatural beings who influence the lives of men is also quite prevalent among civilized people. There are millions of enlightened people who attribute their misfortunes to the Will of God and their safety to guardian angels. All people who believe in a personal God look to him for protection and expect from him punishment for sins. The great advantage in believing that fortunes and misfortunes are controlled by some person, living or dead, human

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Ordinarily when the leaders of an aggressive group attempt to motivate the members by frustrating them with regimentation, deprivation of liberties, and higher taxes, they run the great risk that the aggressiveness thus aroused will be directed back at them. The Nazi leaders skilfully avoided this, partly by deifying the leader, partly by inventing an ideology that demands the complete surrender of the individual to the State, but mainly by utilizing the psychological principle of "displacement."¹⁷ This technique is an ancient one and plays an important role in the aggressive behavior of primitive people. The primitive man attributes all fortunes and misfortunes to personal agents, living or dead, human or divine. He does not believe in *accidents*.

17. For a detailed account of how the Nazis "displaced" aggression, first against the Jews and later against "outside" enemies see Durbin and Bowlby, *Personal Aggressiveness and War*, pp. 126 ff.

While there are variations in belief about ghosts and spirits among primitive societies, certain ideas about them are very prevalent if not universal. One is that the spirits of the departed hover around and participate in the affairs of the living. They have various kinds and degrees of power. To the spirits of legendary heroes and ancestors are attributed the special powers of gods. Some are benevolent and cause sunshine, rain, good crops, abundant game, health, childbirth, and give humans many desirable traits and virtues. There are also guardian angels who protect and care for mortals. Supernatural beings are also malevolent and cause diseases, death, pestilence, drought, storms, defeats in battle, and even violations of the moral code. Primitive man, however, does not attribute all his misfortunes and fortunes to supernatural beings. He believes also in the magical powers of sorcerers and medicine men. His living enemies are quite capable, so he believes, to cause much harm by the use of magical powers.

When a primitive society is persuaded that its troubles are caused by its earthly enemies, whoever they may be, it is well on its way toward aggressive war. The more intolerable its burdens and the greater its deprivations and sufferings, the greater will be its tendency to appease or to attack and destroy the causal agent. If the agent is formidable and dangerous, the appeasement technique may be tried; but if he is relatively weak and accessible, he will be attacked and destroyed.

The belief in supernatural beings who influence the lives of men is also quite prevalent among civilized people. There are millions of enlightened people who attribute their misfortunes to the Will of God and their safety to guardian angels. All people who believe in a personal God look to him for protection and expect from him punishment for sins. The great advantage in believing that fortunes and misfortunes are controlled by some person, living or dead, human

or divine, is that he is accessible to influence. Primitives believe that ghosts can be insulted, affronted, pleased, or displeased by what humans do or say. Evil spirits can be appeased by sacrifice or ritual; some can be frightened by threats or their power can be curtailed by magic. Benevolent spirits, on the other hand, can be influenced by prayer, ritual and right living. In general it may be said that all supernatural beings can be dealt with on the same basis as one deals with any living person who has unusual powers. This fact gives man some control over his own destiny which is a great source of comfort to him. And more important still, it gives him someone to *thank* or to *blame* for anything that may happen to him.

The bearing of all this on group aggression is that it illustrates the universality of the human tendency to attribute misfortunes and frustrations to some personal causal agent and not to oneself nor to the impersonal cosmic forces. These causal agents are not always gods or ghosts. They can very well be and often are other living people. It is as easy for primitive man to blame his troubles on the magical powers of living enemies as on departed spirits. The techniques of witchcraft, sorcery and conjuring can be used at great distances. An enemy who is far away can still exercise his magical powers. The modern counterpart of this tendency to blame all catastrophes as well as minor losses on the enemy is seen in the readiness of the public to believe that fires, explosions, epidemics, and the like are caused by spies and "fifth columnists."

Experience teaches that the best way to deal with misfortunes and frustrations is to discover the cause and remove it. One of the techniques which some primitives employ for eliminating a bad run of evil spirits is to organize rituals for chasing them away. If, however, the troubles are believed to be caused by the machination of an enemy or any living

group, an effort may be made to punish or exterminate it by a military expedition against it.

In Chapter III it was shown how people learn to be aggressive against those whom they believe, or are persuaded by propaganda to believe, are responsible for their misfortunes. If they have been taught that all their troubles and deprivations, including lack of freedom, are due to the machination of evil spirits, then aggressive behavior will be directed toward these spirits. Or if they have been taught that they themselves are at fault for all their shortcomings, they will become self-aggressive. Aggression may be pointed in any one of several directions depending on what the people believe to be the *source* of the frustration.

There is little doubt but that the great majority of Germans believed that they lost the first world war because they were betrayed by traitors within and not because their armies were defeated in France. There was disagreement, however, concerning precisely who was responsible for the "stab in the back" that the army received. Some thought it was the Kaiser and the ruling class; others blamed the Communists who were among the first to strike, riot, and attempt to seize control of the government. A few, not many at first, thought the Jews were back of it all. Hitler in *Mein Kampf* puts the blame entirely on the shoulders of the Jews and the Communists.

Almost all aggressive movements require a certain amount of hardship, sacrifice, and deprivation from the members. These produce a continuous stream of frustrations which carry the movement toward its goal so long as the aroused aggressive tendencies are deflected from the leaders and aimed squarely at those on whom the demands have been made and who are seen as barriers between the members and their goals. Almost from the beginning Nazi propaganda has insisted that the burdens which the people must bear, the

sacrifices they must make, the deprivations they must suffer are necessary in order to purge the nation of traitors within, avenge its defeats from without, and place it forever in a position of supreme power and prestige in the world.

We return at last to the question which started us on the discussion of the role of habit and motive in group aggression. It is next to impossible to appraise the group habits and motives of aggression in a whole nation such as Nazi Germany. It is even doubtful if they could do it themselves, although they might come closer than anyone else. There are, however, a few relevant facts that are known to all. Prior to the retreat from Moscow the Nazi movement had been eminently successful. It had reached most of its announced goals. Its aggressive action first against the Jews and Communists inside Germany and then against its outside "enemies" and "barriers" had been, on the whole, rewarding. The bold march into the Rhineland, the annexation of Austria, the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, the conquest of Poland, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, France, and the Balkans were all accomplished without effective military resistance. All these achievements must have been exceedingly rewarding to the Germans, especially because they were won without much sacrifice, deprivation, and loss of life. Until the Nazis attacked Russia they had not suffered severely for their aggressive behavior. To what extent the losses in Russia and North Africa, the bombing by the R.A.F., and the deprivations necessary to carrying on the war will offset the reinforcements from former conquests no one knows. Much will depend on whether their memories of the celebrations over Poland, Norway, France, and the Balkans remain more vivid than those of the horrors of bombing and the casualties in Russia. At any rate, the losses inflicted by the United Nations will undoubtedly whittle down the reinforcements gained from earlier aggressive suc-

cesses and hence tend to weaken the habit of group aggressiveness.

But what role does fear play? We have already seen how the Nazis use intimidation and terror to keep their own members in line, and we know that they will use it more and more in the conquered countries to enforce conformity to their plans. This is bound to result in bitter hatred which may, in the long run, be their undoing. Whether the fear of this hatred will restrain the aggressive policy of the Nazis toward these people is doubtful. The fear that will restrain them will be that of a very formidable combination of world power arrayed against them. All aggressive groups cease action when it appears that further aggression will meet with counteraggression which is so punishing that the losses will outweigh the gains. This is certainly true of lynching mobs, riots, and labor strikes. The foreign policies of aggressive nations are surely modified by their fears of counteraggression from stronger powers.

Herodotus once said, "Given time enough anything will happen." Given time enough all aggressive movements come to an end. It took about a thousand years in the case of Rome, but its aggressiveness finally ceased. Aggressive movements end either because the barriers cannot be surmounted or because they meet countermovements and are destroyed or they achieve their goals and stop. When this happens they become defensive.

Aggressive Movements in Democracies

It is commonly believed today that democracies are essentially peaceful governments and dictatorships essentially warlike. As a general rule this is true for the reason that most democracies and republics are born of revolutions, which typify one method of achieving the successful realization of demands on tyrants. But not all revolutions result in

democracies. It depends upon who starts them and who wins. A revolution by subordinated groups often results in a republican form of government and passes from the aggressive to the defensive phase.

A republic or a democracy is established sometimes before the aggressive phase of expansion ceases. This happened both in Great Britain and in the United States. But in both the period of expansion, either by purchase or by conquest, came to an end. From that time on their problem has been to consolidate gains and defend them against any and all threats.

As a rule, however, aggressive movements do not thrive well in a democracy for two or three reasons. First and foremost, the defenders of the *status quo* claim a monopoly on all the intangible values of a democracy (namely, freedom of speech, of worship, of assembly, etc.) and any threat to the powers that be is publicized as a threat to these values. In the second place, it is peculiarly difficult to mobilize aggressive tendencies in a democracy even in time of war. This is due partly to the fact that individuals who have been socialized in a democracy have not acquired the same capacities to hate, to fear, and to fight that are inculcated in totalitarian states. Moreover, democracies provide many more socially approved outlets for aggressive feelings.

The various freedoms that people have in a democracy are enjoyed not only because they are escapes from frustration but also because they are outlets for aggression due to other and more inevitable frustrations. The freedom of speech which is so greatly cherished is, among other things, a socially approved procedure for getting out of one's system many pent-up feelings. It not only provides a means of finding the best solutions to social problems but also serves as a psychological cathartic. Many people enjoy complaining, swearing, "belly-aching," denouncing, speaking their minds, boasting, threatening, and "blowing-off steam" in general. After

an emotional explosion they usually feel better. Aggressive jokes, especially about the President, Governor, Mayor, or even the teacher—in fact about anyone in authority who is identified as the source of the frustration—are generally enjoyed, always by the narrator and usually by the listener. Often the audience of readers and listeners gets as much “kick” out of aggressive language as do the writers and speakers. Writers and especially columnists who have a facility in the use of aggressive language are widely read. Westbrook Pegler and the late Hugh Johnson are two examples.

There is a good psychological reason why plain speaking and fight talks reduce frustration. Such language stands somewhere between aggressive thoughts and aggressive acts. Indeed, all language is a stage in a process that begins with an impulse and ends in an act. If for any reason the act cannot be performed, either because it is incompatible with other acts that have priority or because of anticipated punishment, the next best thing that can be done is to make what is known as a “fractional anticipatory goal response.” The language is a part of the final goal response. When the whole response cannot be made, at least a part of it may be. It may or may not always be a satisfactory substitute. Sometimes “blowing-off steam” ends the aggressive feeling, but it may be *preparatory to* aggressive action. In many instances when aggressive action is intended it is not announced in advance by fight talk. An amusing illustration of the substitution of vocalizing for fighting is found in habits of Howler monkeys. These animals travel in bands from tree top to tree top, and when they encounter another band the males of each group open up with a grand chorus of howling which is kept up for hours until the defeated side (i.e., the side that is howled down) retires.

There are other freedoms which also serve as outlets for aggression. One is the free election in which every citizen

has the right to vote. In a democracy the exercise of this right is regarded as a duty; but to some it is a duty that is also a pleasure. The pleasure is derived, in some part at least, from the satisfaction of voting against a candidate or party that is believed to be the source of many frustrations of daily life. Experts on the analysis of election returns claim that often a high percentage of the voting is motivated by a desire to "throw the rascals out" rather than by convictions concerning "issues." One of the reasons why government in a democracy changes hands so often is that the party in power gets blamed for everything that is bad, including floods, droughts, famines, depressions, not to mention high taxes and bad roads.

Another socially approved outlet for both aggression and anxiety is the freedom to organize and join associations, fraternal orders, clubs, and societies of all kinds. Those Americans who were particularly frustrated by the New Deal organized and joined the Liberty League. Persons who resent the mistreatment of dumb animals may join the Humane Society. Protest groups, whether spontaneous and temporary, or organized and permanent, represent a convenient method of expressing aggression in a socially constructive manner. Many such groups are outspoken in their purpose to *protect or defend, prevent or eliminate* something or someone. Patriotic societies such as the American Legion are particularly aggressive against communists, anarchists, and radicals of any shade or hue. By attending meetings, passing resolutions, issuing proclamations, appointing committees, lobbying at legislatures, marching in parades, and taking part in demonstrations, a great deal of pent-up frustration is relieved and anxiety dissipated. It is no accident that members of a democratic society are continually creating and joining organizations. By these and other devices their fear and frustration are not only kept in control but often directed into socially constructive channels.

Aggressive movements in a democracy seldom reach revolutionary proportions partly because there are so many of them. There is often much more bitterness between the various shades and hues of Left Wing organizations than between any one of them and the conservative group against whom all radical movements are directed. There is plenty of frustration in a democracy but it is difficult to mobilize it under one movement and direct it against any objective, even an outside enemy.

CHAPTER VIII

DEFENSIVE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

A DEFENSIVE movement is illustrated by the case of a prize fighter who has reached the goal of world championship and must defend his title against all challengers who are deemed worthy to try for it. The politician who holds a high elective office defends his position against all future candidates, unless he chooses to challenge the position of another man who holds a higher office. The defensive position is that of "sitting on the lid," holding fast to gains already achieved, conserving that which has been won. Its one aim and purpose is to protect and maintain ground already gained and value possessed whether it be wealth, prestige, leisure, or security.

Defensive movements are the inevitable outcomes of successful aggressive ones. An aggressive movement, as we have already seen, aims to get something its members want or to get rid of something they do not want or to change things into shapes more favorable to themselves. If these goals are reached and there are no others in sight, then the movement becomes conservative. An example is found in the case of the railroad brotherhoods. A few years ago they constituted an aggressive labor movement making repeated demands on the railroads and enforcing them by strikes. By and by they discovered that the railroads could not meet further demands without financial collapse. The major goals having been reached, they settled down to defend their positions not only against counterencroachment by capitalists and managers but against other "upstart" labor movements. In a few years they had shifted from a left wing aggressive movement to

a right wing conservative one. The Crusaders, Inc., is another example. This movement was organized to secure the repeal of the Volstead Act and the Jones Law, and to center liquor control in state governments. But after repeal the movement became defensive not only of the liquor interests but of the constitution of the United States, the U. S. Treasury, and of big business in general. It stated its aims to be opposition to the encroachment of the government on business, to all organized self-seeking minorities, and to increases in government spending. Further instances could be recited but are unnecessary to make clear the essential nature of defensive movements.

Not all defensive movements are preceded by organized aggression; they may arise in other ways. In societies which encourage free enterprise individuals may achieve their desired goals by different routes and by independent effort and skill. On the way up they are not necessarily members of any aggressive groups. But having arrived at the top, and finding their positions threatened, if the menace appears too formidable to be dealt with singlehanded, they tend to look about for others who are similarly situated for the purpose of combining their total strength in a program of defense.

Origins of Defensive Social Movements

The general background of such movements may be described briefly as follows. In our society there are enormous differences between people in respect to the things they *want* and the things they can *have*. The process of social education—especially in a democracy where most children attend the public schools and where everyone listens to the radio, goes to the movies, visits big cities, and reads adventures—results in a large number of acquired drives, wants, and cravings that are common to most of the people. Everyone wants decent clothes, jewelry, a watch, an automobile, a telephone, a radio, and a bank account. Almost everyone wants a cer-

tain amount of social recognition, prestige, and to "be somebody." All want safety and security. But the society that creates, by social education, a large body of common wants and fails to provide adequate means for satisfying them equally throughout the population is preparing the way for aggressive movements. The result is competition for money, property, prestige, status, safety, leisure, and positions of power from which these rewards may be commanded. Those who win out in this competition attempt to consolidate their positions for themselves and their children.

Let this process continue generation after generation for a few hundred years and finally there will emerge a stratification of the population in social and economic classes. This stratification of population is aided and abetted by efficiency systems of organization in which there is a hierarchy of positions with authority from the top down and responsibility from the bottom up. The top positions are, with few exceptions, occupied by those who have either won out in competition in their lifetime or inherited prestige and status from some ancestor who won his position by competition. In our society this hierarchical plan of organization is seen not only in business and industry, but everywhere—in the army, the church, the government, the schools, and even in the home. Every institution has a top and a bottom. The individuals who are at the top in one may be distributed up and down the social scale, but as a rule the same people tend to drift toward the top, the middle, or the bottom of each.

It is necessary to understand how societies are structured before we can see the significance of social movements. All civilized societies, and many primitive ones too, are set up after the pattern described above. It is also descriptive to some degree, of the relation between nations. They, too, are arranged in hierarchies of power and prestige. In all hierarchical social systems the main lines of pressure are vertical and mostly from the bottom up with counterpressure from

the top down. In a university, for example, all assistant professors look forward to being promoted to associates and then to full professors, and they work hard to achieve these promotions. But no full professor, except a crazy one, would work to be demoted to assistant professor. Most people whose incomes are now \$2,000. a year are looking forward to increases to \$3,000. or even \$4,000. or \$5,000., but no one who has \$5,000. is pressing to have his salary reduced, except under rare circumstances. Wherever human beings are arranged in hierarchies with some superordinate to others the tendency is always upward. This general pressure from the bottom upward, always demanding more recognition, authority, prestige, and security, is the essence of the *revolutionary tendency*.

It often happens that when an individual is demoted—a most humiliating circumstance—he is replaced by someone from below. It also happens that when the incomes of those above are reduced it is because the incomes of those below have been increased. When these and similar incidents occur, there is a tendency for those in the upper positions to hold down or to "keep in place" those who are surging upward from below. This is the *reactionary tendency*.

Strictly speaking, however, the goal of revolutionary movements is to change things so they will be more favorable to the members of the movement; whereas a reactionary movement aims to keep things as they are because they are already satisfactory to members of the movement. An aggressive movement is, therefore, not revolutionary unless one of its goals is to effect some drastic change in the social, economic, or political system. If the *system* is perceived as the barrier between it and its goals, it is then revolutionary. Similarly a reactionary movement is one that defends the system and not necessarily one that defends some particular achievement which could be surrendered without altering the system. But most large aggressive movements such as the

C.I.O., Huey Long's "Share the Wealth" program, and the Townsend Plan are threats to the economic system and are, therefore, regarded as revolutionary. In like manner defensive movements such as the Liberty League and The Crusaders, Inc., are defending not only their statuses, incomes, and safety, but also the system that made these achievements possible.

Who Are the Members of Defensive Social Movements?

From the foregoing analysis it is easy to predict what kinds of people will be found associated with defensive movements. Usually it is those who have most to defend who are most vulnerable. But it often happens that those who have most to defend are the least vulnerable because invulnerability and safety are parts of their achievements. They can, therefore, afford to stand aloof from most defensive social movements. They will come in, however, when the system of which they are a part is seriously menaced. The most vulnerable groups in our society are the upper middle classes who enjoy a comfortable standard of living but who are less well represented in positions of power and influence. In times of great national distress as in a depression or inflation or in times of war and revolution no one is invulnerable.

But any group that has something in common to defend which is being threatened from above or below can readily become a defensive movement. Defensive movements are by no means limited to the upper social and economic classes. Small home owners may band together in an association to defend their homes against higher property taxes or mortgage foreclosures. Among the most defensive groups in America are the Grange and other movements which are organized to maintain prices, keep down taxes, defend against encroachments from large landlords, middle men, and speculators. We have already mentioned the defensive character

of the right wing labor organizations. Defensive movements may even occur among the lowest economic classes.

Activities of Defensive Movements

The activities of defensive movements vary greatly from group to group and from time to time depending on what it is that is being defended, how and by whom it is threatened, the strength or weakness of the position, and so on. Nearly all such groups in the United States seek protection from Congress, state legislatures, and legal action. Some maintain powerful lobbies and employ political experts to watch the legislatures. Others go in for propaganda and public relations to win sympathy and support for their cause from those who are not formally identified with it. But the legal and political actions of conservatives need not detain us except to note that the battlefields on which aggressive and defensive movements clash are courtrooms and legislative halls.

In days of national distress when the moral, political, social and economic foundations of society are shaken, when no one is secure, when times are out of joint, and when fear, anxiety and dread prevail, many people seek escape from it all in esoteric religious movements, of which there are many. Among the more successful in contemporary America are Christian Science, Bahia, Moral Re-armament (Buchmanism), Theosophy, and New Thought. In addition to increased interest in these nonecclesiastical movements the more orthodox and better organized churches and religious sects experience religious awakenings. These religious movements are classified as defensive primarily because they seem to provide some comfort and solace to those who have so much at stake and who see no other way out. As we have already seen, fear arouses powerful tendencies to escape from the threatening danger. One avenue of escape is via a new

orientation in the world, a new philosophy of life, a new view of the situation. If the individual can maneuver himself into a vantage point from which the danger situation looks less forbidding and more favorable, his anxieties will tend to disappear.

Defensive Aggression

There are other defensive movements which travel neither the road of politics nor that of religion but rather that of decisive aggressive action. When they do strike, it is usually with powerful fury. Let it be remembered that a defensive movement can employ aggression as its best method of defense. And it does not always wait until it is attacked. When the threatening menace appears, it may strike the first blow. A white mob lynching a Negro is an excellent illustration of defensive aggression at its highest fury. The excited hunt for the victim, his capture, torture, death, and post-mortem mutilation, usually followed by further rioting against other Negroes, is a practice of human aggression which is almost unbelievable. Strange as it may seem, a Negro lynching must be classed as a defensive group movement in which the action is violently aggressive. Negroes are lynched not because they have committed a crime of murder, rape, or assault, but because they have threatened the color line. When crimes of this sort are committed by whites on blacks, by whites on whites, or by blacks on blacks, there are no lynchings. Lynchings occur only when the crime is black against white. Such crimes are regarded by the whites as a threat to their status position. In the South it is of the greatest importance to the whites that the caste line be always sharply drawn, that all trespassing over that color line be met with punishment that is prompt, decisive, and easily understood. Lynchings are motivated basically by fear and their sole purpose is to "keep the Negro in his place" which is a decidedly *subordinate* one across the color line. Moreover, it has been pointed

out¹ that the individuals who are the ringleaders in most Negro lynchings, who actually apply the torture and deliver the blow that kills the victim or who participate in the post-mortem mutilation of the body are the lower-class whites who have most to fear and lose by Negro competition for jobs and for favors with the powers that be.

When aggressive action comes from the defensive position and is made in response to threats, warnings, menaces, and the like, it is usually quicker, more violent and more decisive than when it stems from the frustrations of the aggressive participants. This is also seen in all the relations between whites and Negroes in the South.² It may be understood partly in terms of stronger habits and stronger motives but mainly in terms of weaker inhibitions from counterfears. In the early days of trade unions in America some employers responded very promptly and vigorously with decisive action against any *sign* or *threat* of rebellion among employees; but as the unions became stronger and accumulated more power for punishing such action, it tended to disappear. But apart from cases of this sort, the general rule seems to be that people who occupy superordinate positions have greater power to reward and punish those below them, than vice versa. Most positions of authority, prestige, and influence may be defined in terms of the rewarding and punishing powers that go with them. It is true that persons in subordinate positions can in some measure reward and punish those over them, but not with the same vigor and directness as those below.

Defensive aggression is usually prompt and decisive also because it encounters fewer inhibiting drives. The boss strikes the slave on the slightest provocation or the foreman "bawls

1. Miller and Dollard, *op. cit.*, chap. xv and Hadley Cantril, *op. cit.*, chap. iv.

2. See John Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1937) and Davis and Gardner, *Deep South* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1941).

out" the men when the least thing goes wrong; but no slave will strike back and no worker will talk back except under the goad of a strong drive of anger. In such a situation the habits of aggression from the superordinate toward the subordinate position are much stronger than those of the reverse. However, the habits of hatred from the lower toward the upper position may be much stronger than those that run in the opposite direction.

Defensive aggression meets with fewer counter and inhibiting habits than does offensive aggression. For one thing, in our society at least, it is less condemned by conscience. It is a well-known fact that most individuals and groups are reluctant to admit being or having been in the role of the aggressor. Many will own up to having struck the first blow but justify it on the ground that it was duly provoked by aggressive intentions of the enemy. After the first world war both sides published and widely distributed their official white papers and the historians and political scientists of each country spent much time and effort in "discovering" that most of the war guilt was on the other side. The present war was scarcely begun before white papers appeared. Even when aggression is quite evident, as in the case of Italy against Ethiopia or of Japan against China, a mighty effort is made to justify it before the world.

Why Aggression Is Socially Disapproved

In the case of violent combat between individuals it is quite easy to see why the role of the aggressor is denied. In most civilized countries in-group aggression, especially direct assault, is socially disapproved and usually prohibited by law. Self-defense, on the other hand, is generally approved and is usually not punished by law. Indeed, it often happens that the failure to defend oneself against unprovoked attack and especially to go to the defense of members of one's family or intimate friends is highly disapproved. But the case of

national aggression is different. It is not, as a matter of fact, controlled by international law and is by no means as universally disapproved as is internal private violence. In fact, some nations make it a matter of political policy. Yet it is often those very nations which loudly proclaim the virtues of war that are the first to issue white papers. The obvious answer to this paradox is that political leaders know that it is easier to secure popular support for a defensive than for an aggressive war. But why should this be so?

Our answer to this question runs briefly as follows: In-group aggression is controlled by two kinds of authority: (1) that which is external and represented by parents, teachers, policemen, and "the law," and (2) that which is internal and represented by self-restraint, respect for the rights of others, group loyalty, and conscience. The greatest of these is conscience. All civilized adults, save perhaps some degenerates and criminals, have some sense of right and wrong which exerts a powerful influence over their conduct. This moral sense, as we have already seen,³ is not an innate part of human nature but a direct outcome of social learning, reflecting the customs and mores of the society. If in-group aggression is condemned by a moral code which is accepted and followed by parents, teachers, and others in authority, it will eventually be reflected in the sense of right and wrong developed by those who are brought up by them. If the code condemns the use of all violence including war, as is the case in the creed of the Quakers and some other religious groups, then those who are of that faith and persuasion will be conscientious objectors to all war.

So far so good, but still we have not explained why aggressive war is generally disapproved by people brought up in countries where war is a major instrument in national policy and where its virtues are widely preached. Two answers may be given. One is that such people know that aggressive

3. *Supra*, Chapter IV.

war is generally disapproved in most civilized countries and do not wish to be classed with barbarians and criminals. But why should they worry about what people of other nations think of them unless for purposes of trade and prestige? The civilized world kept on trading with Japan and Italy after the Manchukuo and Ethiopian affairs. The explanation, therefore, must lie deeper.

Earlier we pointed out that during the period of childhood when habits of conscience are being formed (probably from about the age of three to ten or twelve) the child learns by experience that when he is involved in a fight either alone or as a member of a group, his behavior is less condemned and he is less likely to be punished by parents and teachers if he fights in the role of a defender; and more likely to be punished if he is in the role of the aggressor. It is drilled into him at a tender age by admonition, precept, example, and bitter experience to avoid being *responsible* for a fight. This habit becomes a permanent fixture in his conscience and no amount of political propaganda appealing for his support of an aggressive war will shake it loose. Having the approval of parents, teachers, lawyers, clergymen, and all people good and decent, it becomes woven so tightly into the intricate network of habits called conscience that it cannot be easily dislodged later in life. But if he has been rewarded for aggression against aggression, for defending himself and others dependent on him, for having beaten off a bully, for having taken upon himself the task of punishing offensive aggression, he later suffers no pangs of conscience for defensive fighting.

But as we have already seen, defensive fighting often requires tactical aggression. It is impossible to wage defensive war without letting loose a torrent of those very aggressive impulses that are so roundly condemned by conscience in times of peace and held in check by its repressive power. Once the battle is on, no matter who was to blame for start-

ing it, the flood gates of hell and hate are bound to break loose. Meanwhile, conscience must be set aside or something done to save its face. If it is ruthlessly swamped by the outbreak of aggressive and sadistic impulses, the system of habits on which it is built may fall apart and the whole structure deteriorate with the result that soldiers will return from the front to become hardened criminals, conscienceless killers, and civilians will relax the taboos on violent forms of in-group aggression. One safeguard against this calamity is the fact that old habits are persistent in the surroundings in which they were formed.

Ideologies of Defensive Movements

They are usually expressed in terms of *sound principles* and replete with phrases about upholding all that has been found satisfactory to members of the movement. An example is found in the American Liberty League which was incorporated August 15, 1934, in the District of Columbia.

The League opposes all unnecessary competition by government with private enterprise. It opposes the socialization of industry and agriculture, the spread of monopoly, the growth of bureaucracy and the nationalization of property.

It is a movement aimed at those who in the name of the law and in the name of government would rob Peter to pay Paul, who would repress honest dollars and issue fictitious money, and who would confiscate by taxation and by government competition the savings of 150 years of Americanism. To the extent that Congress has disregarded the pleas of business, the American Liberty League will begin in due time to help the election of Democrats or Republicans, as the case may be, who avow themselves in favor of principles of sound economics.

One of the functions of ideology in any movement is to provide convenient and easy means of self-stimulation and inter-group stimulation. Words are admirably suited to this

purpose. But the verbal descriptions of the goals of aggressive movements and the justification of the means employed to reach them are usually very concrete, simple and easily grasped. As we have seen, the goals are stated in terms of demands for better economic conditions, more land, redress for wrong, and the like. The members of such movements know what they are fighting for and are effectively goaded toward their goals by a few simple verbal stimuli such as "we want bread" or "we want liberty." The defensive side, on the other hand, finds it much more difficult to state its "war aims" as concrete goals to be reached, for the simple reason that there are no goals except to defend those that have already been reached and are now threatened. The real aim of all defensive movements is to get rid of the threatening menace or, more precisely, to get rid of the anxiety produced by the menace. Chamberlain stated the war aims of Great Britain as plainly and accurately as they could be stated when he said it was to rid Europe and the world of Hitlerism. By Hitlerism he meant Hitler and all like him who threaten the position of the British in Europe and the peace of the world. More about this later.

Defensive War Movements

Up to this point we have been considering defensive movements which arise inside a nation in times of peace. Let us now turn to the problem of transforming a whole nation into a defensive movement when it is threatened by a powerful outside force. This problem, large and complicated as it may seem, boils down to three minimum essentials: first, adequate motivation; second, an intelligent plan of action; and third, an effective execution of the plan.

In the pages which follow I shall have little to say about the plan of action or its mode of execution except insofar as it is related to motivation which is clearly a problem in social psychology and to which our attention will be given.

Motivation cannot be considered apart from the plan of action and how it is executed, for the reason that the greater the effort that is required, the more the deprivations and sacrifices that are demanded, and the higher the taxes, the longer the hours, the more new skills to be learned and old ones to be unlearned, the stronger must be the motivation. Motives are inversely related to habits. Individuals who are accustomed to hardships, long hours, low pay, high taxes, few luxuries, and little leisure will require far less added incentive in times of crisis than will those who have been used to higher standards of living and have enjoyed more of the blessings of life. It is when people are asked to do more, to pay more and get less that increases in motivation are needed. The problem of morale in wartime is how to get people to take more punishment, suffer more deprivations on reduced rewards or prospects of reward.

Motivating a large heterogeneous population such as ours to endorse an expensive program such as we now have and to participate enthusiastically in it, cheerfully making all the sacrifices that it demands, is a task of colossal proportions. First, let it be remembered that not all individuals can be motivated in the same way to participate in a program of national defense. Moreover, motives are nearly always mixed, but usually one is dominant, and the pattern depends on the kinds of drive-producing responses that are evoked by the situation. As we have already seen, most danger situations elicit fear, anxiety, dread, and even terror in most people; but in some they may evoke anger and other drives. The reason is that people react to a new situation according to how they have learned to respond to similar situations. When the situation is world-wide and only selected fragments of it ever reach the focus of attention at any one time, the types of reaction are almost bound to be varied. It is therefore not possible to make predictions about how any individual or group of individuals will react to a national menace with-

out knowing much about their habits of fear, hate, curiosity, in short their whole habit structure, on the one hand, and the standpoint or angle from which they view the situation and what aspects come within the focus of attention, on the other. It is only in a very general way that we can say that the chief sources of motivation for coöperation in a national defense movement are such drives as patriotism, love for country, group loyalty, sense of duty, fear of loss of liberty, status, income; fear of social pressure for nonparticipation or opposition; hatred and resentment toward the menacing aggressive group and its leaders; promise of immediate material rewards in the form of a good defense job, a position of influence and prestige or relief from former burdens and obligations. All these and more too enter into the complex patterns of drives which impel people to coöperate in a movement for national defense.

In a modern nation with a complex culture and a diversified population the incentives for supporting war are not the same for all classes and groups of people. The members of the standing military forces which may be called the "professional" soldiers take war as a matter of duty. When the soldier enlists or is drafted he agrees to obey orders without question. Minor officers are trained to obey their superiors and the superior officers are pledged to wage war when the government deems it necessary. The motives of rulers and those who are in political authority are not easy to ascertain. They are undoubtedly always mixed, involving, on the one hand, genuine concern for the welfare of the nation, but on the other hand a desire to safeguard the interests of special groups and in some instances they may be motivated primarily by hope of winning fame for themselves and remaining in power. The emotional appeal of war to the great masses of common people depends primarily on who they are, with what social and economic classes they are identified and, in general, on what they have to win or lose as individ-

uals. Over and above all this are sentiments of patriotism, love for country, and popular like or dislike for people of other countries. Whether people will support a war depends on their common habits, on their views of the situation, and above all, on their emotional reactions to it.

In some countries a special effort is made to condition children to the symbols of national unity by participation in such activities as saluting the flag, singing patriotic songs, marching in parades, watching military maneuvers, listening to patriotic speeches and radio programs, seeing movies that display national symbols and ideals, reading books, magazines, and newspaper stories which bring into close association the symbols of nationalism and the blessings of life. Each year, in the United States, thousands of school children and adults as well enjoy a trip to the national capital, where the physical symbols of the nation are presented by national monuments, public buildings, libraries, museums, art galleries, and original copies of the most important historical documents.

The connection between the deeds of national heroes and the blessings and comforts of present-day living is heavily reinforced in the teaching of history in the public schools. National history in almost every country is taught in such a way as to magnify and glorify, as far as possible, its achievements in art, science, economics, and social progress.

By frequent and favorable exposure to national history presented in texts, lectures, broadcasts, and movies, and by the unfailing rewards for making approved responses, children easily acquire a complex system of emotional habits which can be lumped together and labeled "the sentiments of patriotism." These habits are often unified around some fictitious person such as Uncle Sam or John Bull or a real person such as Il Duce or Der Führer. Whether the person is real or fictitious is of some psychological interest because it appears that the behavior of Uncle Sam and John Bull is

far more dependent upon the will of the people than that of Il Duce or Der Führer.

It is no doubt true that a great deal of education for nationalism, especially that which is promoted by pressure groups of professional patriots, is superficial, yet it must be recognized that emotional allegiance to national symbols whether they be words and deeds of men or monuments and buildings commemorating their lives are symbols in the presence of which everybody does the same thing. For instance, flags and anthems are factors of tremendous power in the transformation of habits of personal safety into those of group security. They provide a useful mechanism and much of the motive power for its operation.

In some countries, however, the sentiments of patriotism alone may not be strong enough to induce people to make the sacrifices that are often required by a program of national defense. Love for country may never be quite strong enough to induce most people cheerfully to enjoy meatless Tuesdays, gasless Sundays, higher taxes on almost everything, the inconveniences of military training, the risk of monetary inflation and a depression, not to mention the horrors of war itself. It is true that a large part of patriotic education is often devoted to the sacrifices and responsibilities of citizenship which are perhaps sufficient for the requirements of ordinary peacetime conditions, but when war is threatened and the shoe begins to pinch, more powerful motivating forces must be invoked. One of these is anger, hatred, or resentment which we have already considered earlier, and the other is fear and its derivatives.

In Chapters III and IV we described how habits of fear and hatred are acquired and noted that an individual's capacity to fear and to hate depends entirely on his past experiences in dangerous or frustrating situations. In education for safety and health the individual learns the kinds of situations which are to be avoided or guarded against in the

routine of daily life. These habits, however, are more or less personal and private. Some, to be sure, are involved in the protection of the group against diseases and the destruction by physical elements such as earthquakes and floods. But in peaceful countries very little is done to educate people to defend themselves as a nation against aggressive attacks of other nations or to distinguish what moves by other nations are to be regarded as friendly or hostile. Only individuals who have been brought up in a garrison state have acquired a full complement of habits required for national defense. Among these an important one is the ability to read danger signals.

The wide differences of opinion among the people of the United States concerning danger from abroad either now or later indicate a lack of general education in the interpretation of history and current events. This deficiency may very well be attributed to the fact that expert skill is required for reading national danger signals which the great masses of people cannot be expected to possess without devoting a disproportionate amount of time to training. The situation may be quite analogous to public and private health. Most people know when they are sick, but few know when they are dangerously so, and few laymen know the real meaning of most aches and pains. The physician has superior knowledge and skill in these matters which he has acquired by years of study and practice.

Let us grant that the reading of danger signals requires the services of trained experts whose advice and recommendation should be followed with at least the degree of confidence that is placed in the medical profession. But who are these experts and where and how did they get their training? They are, for the most part, diplomats, foreign observers, journalists, and news analysts. Some of these individuals may be far more competent to read and interpret the signs of the times than the average educated citizen; others, however, may oc-

copy their present positions because they possess unusual skills at writing, broadcasting, advertising, and otherwise persuading large groups of people to accept a particular idea or adopt a particular attitude. The response of the public, however, is by no means as wholehearted and unanimous as it is when, for example, the physicians of the community announce that an epidemic is imminent and outline the procedures in which the public must coöperate to avoid it. Here again we encounter a basic difference in public habits. Over a long period of years people have been slowly educated to consult their physicians, dentists, and other medical experts and to follow their advice. On the whole, this program has been rewarding and has therefore crystallized into fixed habits. But national emergencies, on the other hand, occur so infrequently in the lives of most people that there is little opportunity to learn whether or not it really pays to follow the advice of experts on international affairs.

Yet habits of consulting others who are older, wiser, and more expert do exist. Consider the lucrative rewards that come to children for obeying their parents and following the examples of all who are more expert and experienced. On the other hand, they are often punished for following the advice or example of people who are stupid, inexperienced, and have low standing or status in the group.⁴ If an individual has learned that he is nearly always rewarded for following the advice of a person known in the group as an "expert" and punished for following the advice of all labeled "politician," then the counsel of any expert, whatever his specialty may be, will be heeded. It is precisely those who are labeled "politicians" that many people in our country have learned to distrust, not because they are public officials but rather because they are believed to be afflicted with a party bias and influenced too much by special interests. People who bear this label are also apt to be professional alarm-

4. See Miller and Dollard, *op. cit.*, chap. XIII.

ists who have cried "wolf, wolf" so many times that other danger signals proclaimed by them fall on deaf ears.

But this is not all. There are still other difficulties in the way of motivating defensive behavior. One is the relation of the costs of defense to the values attached to that which is to be defended. It often happens, for example, that insurance companies will pay unjust claims rather than defend the case in court. When one is in a defensive position against which attacks or demands are made by an aggressor, the question arises as to whether the cost of defense will exceed the value of the demand. In the case of defensive war a crucial problem is to appraise the value of that which is being defended. This is difficult because people are often unaware of the true worth of intangible assets. It is a common observation that people who have grown up in a land of freedom, milk, and honey, and who have known nothing worse, take it for granted and are indifferent to its safety.

Why Are Blessings So Often Unappreciated?

Several answers have been proposed. One is that people who have had to earn their freedom, their wealth and prestige by hard work and even by fighting their way up are much more appreciative of blessings than those to whom they have been handed by inheritance. We Americans need constantly to be reminded of the tremendous price that was paid for our democratic liberties and prosperity by the sweat, blood, and tears of our forefathers. We are admonished to read and appreciate the history of man's struggle for independence and self-respect. If we could only be made fully aware of the price paid for democracy, we would place on it a much higher value and would therefore be more willing to fight in its defense.

The flaw in this popular argument is that throughout history, and especially European history, the aristocratic classes who for centuries enjoyed special privileges, great

wealth, prestige, and safety, most of which was handed down unearned from generation to generation, were always quick to fight in defense of their favored positions. It may be true that oftentimes they experienced difficulty in getting the lower and middle classes to come to their rescue when threatened by some foreign power, but there was never any lack of disposition to fight. Even in the twentieth century and in all countries individuals who enjoy favored positions are as a rule quick to defend them regardless of whether they were earned, inherited, or bestowed as gifts.

This brings us to the second answer. In a large heterogeneous population where there is stratification in respect to standards of living, some people do in fact have more to defend than others. In a democracy, however, it is true that all have certain freedoms in common including those of speech, voting, organizing, bargaining, worship, and so on. But some people have succeeded more than others in translating these freedoms into better homes, bigger bank accounts, more life insurance, better automobiles, more leisure, more pleasant work, better defense against exploitation and punishment from others, and more political and social influence. The better "fixed" an individual is in relation to others, the more he has to defend, regardless of how he arrived. The more he has to defend, the less verbal stimulation is required from ideologies, propaganda, and slogans to induce him to fight in defense of his position and of the system of government, economics, education, and religion that enabled him to get it.

This argument, plausible as it may seem, omits one important fact. In the first world war a million or so young men from the United States set sail for France with rifle in hand to make the world safe for democracy. Among these were undoubtedly thousands on whom democracy had not smiled so bountifully and who represented the underprivileged social and economic classes. What were they fighting for? To defend the wealth of bankers, munitions makers, and war

profiteers? They didn't think so. They were fighting partly as a matter of duty and partly for a great ideal, a vision of a better world, the benefits of which they expected would be shared by them and their children. Their conceptions of this new world were no doubt vague, but many of them undoubtedly believed that somehow and in some way, if the allies won that war, times would be better for everyone. There would be better jobs, more security, more leisure, and more money. If one were carefully to examine the propaganda for our entry into the first world war it would be found to be essentially aggressive. Therefore, as far as the American Expeditionary Force was concerned, it was psychologically an aggressive war fought in the same spirit as pervades a labor union which makes demands on someone for something. The Kaiser and his followers were represented as a barrier across the path of progress which had to be removed before the world could march on to prosperity and permanent peace. But it was the vision of *prosperity* which lured many young men into that war, not the urge to defend the *status quo*. There were some to be sure who had plenty to defend and were motivated by fear of losing it; for them the war was purely defensive; but for the masses who either had nothing much to defend or who did not believe their possessions, tangible and intangible, were threatened, fought an aggressive war to remove a barrier between them and a goal.

We shall now attempt a straightforward answer to the question posed above concerning the apathy in a democracy having to do with the defense of freedom. In our psychological language *freedom* is a secondary or even tertiary form of reward which tends to lose its value as a drive unless it is reinforced occasionally by more primary rewards. Those who can translate their freedom into tangible satisfactions do indeed prize it most highly. But it must ever be remembered that freedom in and of itself does not satisfy hunger, thirst, relieve fatigue from hard labor, or purchase the safety and

security that men so much desire. It is only when free speech, enterprise, worship, and voting are rewarded by less anxiety, worry, and frustration that they are valued. The reason that people who have purchased their liberties by sweat and blood prize them so highly is that their efforts were successful and hence rewarding. Those who inherited their freedom will prize it too provided it is associated with tangible values; but they will not, if it profits them nothing.

It is clear that if a defense movement is confined exclusively to a group whose members have in common things that are highly prized and that they really would hate to lose, and if these things are severely threatened so that fear spreads and anxiety mounts, the group will become exceedingly defensive and will, if it dares, strike with aggressive fury at the threatening person or persons. If the danger is apparent to all, and if the menace is close at hand, if bombs are falling, buildings burning, people maimed and dying before the public gaze, little will be needed in the way of additional stimulation from propaganda, slogans, ideology, and other verbal stimuli that are calculated to arouse anxiety. But on the contrary words will be needed to calm fears. They are needed to arouse fear only when the nonverbal danger signals cannot be seen or heard, or when those who have much to defend do not believe it is in jeopardy, or when there are some who have little or nothing to defend but whose support and services are needed.

The Role of Fear in Defensive Movements

Words, as stimuli to evoke anxiety, are powerful only when reinforced by a favorable situational context. They must have consistent support from the whole social environment in which they are uttered. Just shouting "boo" at people, or yelling "fire" or whispering "Hitler" is not likely to rouse much anxiety. There are too many counteracting safety signals in the environment. But if one is in a crowded

theater and smells smoke, hears "fire" shouted, sees people rushing out with terror written on their faces, fear is almost certain to mount rapidly and to great heights. There is nothing quite so effective in arousing fear as interpersonal stimulation in a crowd. People are stimulated far more by the way in which others are reacting than by the outside danger signals themselves. All of us have learned that when a lot of people manifest signs of fear there is likely to be something in the environment to be feared.

But after all, even if the fears of people are aroused by propaganda, bombs, and news of smashing victories of the enemy, the problem still remains of how to use this motivation for intelligent and coöperative action. Most people have had so much practice in getting rid of anxiety in ways other than participation in a long-ranged complicated defense program that these easier ways out are almost certain to be employed. Some of them were described in Chapter IV. They include such things as avoidance of the radio, the newspaper, the newsreels, and other sources of anxiety stimulation; also escapes through fantasy, daydreaming, wishful thinking, religion, verbal bluffs, boasts, and useless random behavior. But even if the motivated energies do go into defense work as the program succeeds and as we are better armed, there is less cause for fear and our anxieties disappear. Any defense action that is motivated by anxiety defeats one of its sources of drive by its very success.

Once a defensive movement reaches its aggressive phase and the action passes from preparedness to attack, a whole new stream of motivation is released, that of anger and hatred. These are, of course, precisely the same motives that drive aggressive people when the threatening or menacing object, person, or nation is less of a dangerous thing and more of a hateful, arrogant, and abominable thing. It is pictured as not only a threat and a menace but a barrier to progress, as a thing which deserves to be punished for its

injustice. Fear is also intensified but the course of action for reducing it is much clearer. Not only is fear of loss of life and limb in battle added, but that of the almost certain losses and punishments that would follow defeat. Once the menace is attacked it must be defeated, because if not, the loser will pay far more than he would had he never taken the offensive.

National Defense

The conditions under which a defensive movement can gain national proportions may be summarized briefly as follows: (1) when it has something that it wishes to defend; (2) when it is threatened by some other group; and (3) when there is the "will to fight" even in the face of overwhelming odds against success. There are, of course, wide differences among groups in each of these three respects. In regard to the first, every organized group has *something* to defend. Most political or cultural groups which have been in existence for a long time have developed ways of life, standards of conduct and of living, a form of government, an ideology, and a set of social and moral values, and acquired material possessions in the form of lands, raw materials, manufactured goods, and so on. Whether a group will regard these possessions as worth defending depends on certain psychological factors such as morale, group loyalty, patriotism, and national pride, all of which have some relation to the degree of satisfaction which individual members derive from citizenship and the privileges of participation in the group. A group which is composed of members who are restless, dissatisfied, and disloyal will probably be far less ready to defend itself than it would be if the people were more prosperous, unified, and happy.

The second set of conditions under which defense measures will be taken are those which determine the danger to the group from other groups who may look upon it with

envy, malice, or revenge, or regard it as a barrier to their goals. In a world where national interests are bound to conflict and where force is the last court of appeal for the settlement of international disputes, the position of any nation is more or less fraught with danger. The situation is similar to that of the frontier days in America when law was feeble and officers corruptible. Every honest citizen had to carry arms. But when the country became more "settled" and when law and order were introduced the citizen felt it safe to go to town without a gun. Today cowboys carry six shooters only to kill snakes and amuse dude ranchers. But no nation today which expects to maintain its independence can afford to be without a military force. Otherwise, it must depend on some friendly but bigger and stronger power to protect it from subjugation by aggressor nations, in which case it is not really independent.

In the Middle Ages, city-states defended themselves by building high stone walls behind which the inhabitants could find some security from attack. Today during intervals of peace nations attempt to defend themselves with paper walls of treaties, trade agreements and nonaggression pacts. All such devices rely on honesty and respect for contracted agreements. But in a world where there are no universal morals, where each nation makes up its own principles to suit its own needs or ambitions, it is unsafe to rely too heavily on any paper scheme of national defense. All nations live dangerously but some far more so than others.

Whatever precautionary measures a nation may take in the way of diplomacy, cultivation of friendly relations with neighbors, or the building of a military force, the time may come when the danger of an invasion is imminent. It must decide then whether to yield peacefully to the demands of the aggressor or to fight. The factors that figure in such difficult decisions are undoubtedly numerous and complex and vary from one situation to another. No effort will be made

to sift them here. There is one factor, however, which we believe is always present. It is the "will to fight." This vague term may be illustrated by contrasting the attitudes of small nations of Europe in respect to threatened invasion. Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Denmark surrendered to Germany without war; but Norway, Holland, Belgium, Greece, and Yugoslavia elected to fight. The circumstances in each case were so different that it could not be said that the former group lacked the "will to fight." On the other hand, it is difficult to understand why Yugoslavia, for example, with the odds against victory as great as in the case of other invaded countries, decided to fight. The difference between groups in disposition to fight may be attributed in part at least to the rewards that have accrued to them in the past for fighting. The conditions of social learning in a group may be such as to favor the development of a people who have a strong "will to fight"; or they may favor the development of a "will to compromise."

CHAPTER IX

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS OF PEACE

Relations of Psychological to Environmental Factors

THE psychological conditions of peace are the motives, habits, attitudes, and beliefs which dispose individuals and groups to constructive and coöperative social interaction. Familiar examples are goodwill, brotherly love, tolerance, appreciation and understanding of the problems and limitations of others. There is a widespread belief, especially among people nurtured in the Christian religion, that war is caused by selfishness, greed, hatred, dominance, mastery, and intolerance, and that the best guarantee of peace is found in the type of sentiments and emotional cross-currents that exist within a happy family. According to this tradition, permanent peace may be secured when men everywhere have acquired motives of goodwill, attitudes of tolerance and sympathetic understanding, habits of coöperation and sharing, and above all a sense of duty and responsibility for the welfare and happiness of all mankind.

This view which emphasizes the importance of subjective factors may be contrasted with other views that stress the importance of environmental forces. Such views hold that the essential conditions of peace are found not so much in the personal qualities of individuals as in the conditions under which they live. If, for example, food is plentiful, there is little if any competition for it. Competition is occasioned by scarcity of desired commodities and goods. Geographical factors are also important. Groups living in close proximity and in frequent contact with each other have more opportunities and occasions for strife than groups separated by great

distances. Additional environmental factors that affect peaceful relations are weapons and useful raw materials.

There is really no conflict between these two views concerning the conditions of peace. Behavior always depends on two sets of factors—the outer and the inner. The inner correspond roughly to the state of the organism at the moment; the outer to the conditions in its immediate environment. Explanations of conduct, particularly of group behavior, tend to stress one or the other of these two sets of factors. In emphasizing the psychological conditions of peace in the discussion that follows there is no intention to minimize the importance of history, geography, economics, and armaments.

The psychological factors in peaceful relations are not necessarily the counterparts of those that favor armed conflicts. Only in a very loose and general sense can it be said that fear favors war and a sense of security promotes peace, that war is motivated by hate and peace by love, or that war is favored by habits of competition and aggression while peace is promoted by habits of coöperation. Love for country is clearly a prominent motive in war and both fear and hatred may be used to motivate peace. Much depends on who it is and what it is that is feared or hated. The psychological factors that favor peace within a group, particularly an organized state, may at the same time favor war between groups or states. Fear and hatred of other groups are often used politically to achieve internal coherence. In considering the psychological factors of peace it is necessary to maintain a distinction between peace within an organized group and peaceful relations between independent groups.

The conditions of peace within a group depend in the first place on the nature of the group and the purpose for which it exists. We are concerned here only with political groups commonly called *states*. Our first purpose is to outline briefly the emotional and intellectual factors that facilitate social

solidarity and peaceful human relations within the modern state, and our second to ascertain the extent to which these factors also characterize the relations between states.

Control of In-Group Aggression

The psychological conditions of peace within an organized group may for convenience of discussion be put into two classes. In the first are the factors by which in-group aggression is controlled; in the second are those by which group solidarity is achieved. To maintain peace within a group it is obviously necessary to provide adequate controls for aggressive tendencies. In Chapter III it was pointed out that human interactions inevitably generate a certain amount of friction that gives rise to feelings of antagonism which may grow into intense hatreds. Even with the best of intentions and the greatest amount of goodwill people do in fact often rub each other the wrong way. This is especially true when interactions are frequent, relations intimate, and interests conflict. No form of social organization has yet been invented in which all the people have all that they want at the same time and in which there are no situations that occasion conflict. It was also noted in Chapter III that the process of socialization in all societies entails a certain amount of discipline which often leaves within the individual a deposit of unconscious resentment toward persons in authority.

If frustrations resulting in aggressive tendencies are unavoidable both in the socialization of the young and in the daily contacts of adults, society must find ways of preventing antagonisms from issuing in open conflict. The techniques of handling aggression vary from one society to another, yet in all there are certain common elements. Three may be considered here.

First all societies attempt to control in-group aggression by applying social sanctions. Sanctions are most effective in groups that have a common culture, an important part of

which is an accepted code of conduct. This code is one expression of the system of values of the culture. Violations of the code are punished by criticisms, public denouncement, loss of status, ostracism, or even banishment, depending upon the seriousness of the offense. The more dependent the individual is upon the group for basic necessities of life, the more effective sanctions become as controls over his conduct.

The second way of controlling in-group aggression is by law and its enforcement. If a state is composed of two or more cultural groups, as some modern states are, and if the codes of these groups differ in respect to taboos on in-group aggression and particularly if aggression against fellow citizens of other races or cultural groups is sanctioned, then it becomes necessary for the state to enact laws covering types of relations that are liable to result in conflict and to institute machinery for the enforcement of these laws. It is recognized, of course, that there are many other reasons for the existence of government, but one function is clearly that of maintaining law and order.

The extent to which fear of legal punishment is deterrent to crime is a moot point in criminology and need not be discussed here. The important fact is that law and its enforcement promote peace within the state not only by fear of punishment but also by providing machinery for the settlement of disputes, grievances, and wrongs in an orderly and peaceful manner. The existence of law and legal machinery gives the peaceful citizen a sense of security from violence at the hands of antagonists and personal enemies. This sense of security is enhanced in many ways, one of which is by the laws that prevent carrying concealed weapons. By removing the conditions that may cause citizens to fear each other, the tendency to protect oneself by aggressive methods is curtailed.

A third technique for controlling internal aggression within a state is providing forms of social and economic or-

ganization that keep frictions and tensions at a minimum, on the one hand, and providing harmless outlets for aggression on the other. In order to avoid occasions for conflict concessions are made to local pride and prejudice and particular care is taken not to force people into types of social interaction in which conflicts are certain to arise. Individual initiative, civil liberties, and the right of self-determination, insofar as it is not incompatible with group welfare, are expressions of principles which enhance smooth social intercourse. But in spite of all these precautions it is impossible to reduce social tensions to zero. It is possible, however, to provide socially sanctioned outlets through which aggressive tendencies may be drained off. Prominent among these are freedom of speech, of assembly; the right to organize protest associations, to vote, to criticize, and to grumble. Democratic states, as a rule, have more provisions for sublimating aggressive tendencies than are found in totalitarian states. For one thing, democracies usually permit open criticisms of the government and the expression of a good deal of verbal hostility toward it. In a democracy one technique for deflecting aggression away from the government itself is to center it on the political party that happens to be in power. It is a common observation that the political party in control of the government during a period of national disaster is apt to be defeated at the next election.

Development of Group Solidarity

Peace within an organized group is maintained not only by the control of aggression but also by factors that favor the development of coherence and solidarity. In Chapter V where this problem is discussed, social solidarity was attributed to three main factors—patriotism, identification, and social conscience. A further word may be said about each in the present context. Love for country facilitates internal peace provided it is strong enough to motivate people to put

the welfare of the state above personal interests and selfish gain. Patriotism results not only from emotional conditioning to symbols such as a flag, monuments, documents, and the memory of national heroes, but also from satisfaction derived from life within the group and from opportunities and services provided by its government. Loyalty to government entails obedience to laws including those that forbid internal violence.

Identification with the group as a whole means more than a sense of belonging or a belief that the welfare of the individual is dependent on that of the group. It contains an element of "empathy," which means that each individual reacts to the fortunes and misfortunes of his fellows as though they were his own. When an individual is well identified with others he suffers upon witnessing the suffering of others, experiences joy when others appear to be happy, or feels honored when others are honored. One test of the solidarity of a group is the extent to which an affront to one is an insult to all or the praise of one is rewarding to all.

A third factor in social solidarity which is an important and positive psychological condition of peace is social conscience. Conscience is a complex system of attitudes and motives which is manifest not only in a sense of duty and responsibility for the welfare of the community but also in habits of peaceful interaction which operate smoothly and often automatically. One of the most significant facts about conscience is that it is the internal counterpart of the external authority of social sanctions. It is therefore always on the side of law and order, particularly those laws to which society attaches greatest value. The kinds of aggression condemned by conscience are usually those that are forbidden by the moral and legal codes. For example, conscience usually permits fighting in self-defense but strongly prohibits unprovoked aggression.

Relations between Organized Groups

This completes our brief analysis of the psychological conditions of peace within an organized group. Let us now see how well these principles can be applied to relations between states. It is recognized that peace between states may rest upon an entirely different set of psychological factors than those that favor peace within the group. If, however, a detailed examination is made of the conditions under which states have in the past maintained peaceful relations with each other, it will be found that the psychological factors that appear obvious and prominent are the popular dread of war, fear of defeat and consequence of war, friendship based on the fear of a common enemy, pacifism promoted by educational and religious forces, the willingness of some states to send relief to people in other states that have suffered from famine or disaster, and finally the ties of common cultures, common language, and the corresponding absence of prejudice.

Compared with the factors outlined above for maintaining peace within an organized group, these appear to be weak and do not provide an adequate psychological foundation for world peace. Perhaps the strongest point in peaceful relations between modern states is cultural homogeneity. But cultural ties, however strong they may be, do not necessarily impose social sanctions against interstate wars. In most cultures only in-group aggression is tabooed and the in-group is defined politically. The French culture, for example, may condemn Frenchmen who live under the same government for fighting against each other but at the same time may permit French Canadians to fight against the French who are sympathetic with or who have gone over to the side of the Axis. Cultures no doubt vary in this respect. For example, the Japanese code of conduct probably forbids its nationals to

fight against each other regardless of citizenship in foreign countries.¹ A test of the extent to which a culture sanctions loyalty to state rather than to tradition may be made by observing whether or not members of one culture condemn each other for fighting against each other as members of warring states. Whether cultural unity between states will prevent war depends upon whether that culture sanctions loyalty to state rather than to culture in the event of war. The great advantage of intercultural unity is that it removes one of the most formidable barriers to political unity even though it does not guarantee that unity.

There is a common belief that psychological conditions favorable to peace may be promoted by breaking down barriers of prejudice and ignorance that exist between states. This process is facilitated not only by agreeable trade relations but by cultural exchanges in art, music, literature, and particularly in science and invention. It is further promoted by international organizations consisting of groups that have common interests and similar problems. This process of acculturation at least has the effect of reinforcing friendly relations between individuals of different states. It also works in the direction of greater tendencies to identify with individuals who live beyond state boundaries. While the psychological effects of such interactions tend to favor peace, they do not guarantee it.

Achievement of Peaceful Relations between Groups

The conditions which provide the best insurance for peace within an organized group are usually achieved by a long process of trial and error, including much dissension, strife,

1. There are no doubt wide individual differences among Japanese who are American citizens in their political and cultural loyalties. Those who have become thoroughly Americanized, i.e., who have acquired motives, attitudes, and values that correspond to the American way of life, may be regarded as loyal American citizens for the reason that they are not only politically but also culturally American.

and even civil war. If it is assumed that peace between states must ultimately rest upon a psychological foundation which is at least as secure as that found within the most coherent individual states, it is important to inquire how these factors may best be achieved. If the building of a peace group is mainly a matter of developing habits of peaceful interaction, attitudes of loyalty, mutual goodwill, and a sense of social responsibility, and if these are achieved mainly by social conditioning and education, it is obvious that conditions favorable to such education must first be created. Only by living in families did men learn the ways of interfamily peace. The same is true for life in the clan, tribe, and state. An individual becomes an integral part of a peace group only by living in it and by experiencing satisfaction from participation in its affairs.

The process is well illustrated by the development of the sense of civic duty and responsibility. An individual becomes a law-abiding citizen and a person of high character as he accepts more social responsibility, develops more group loyalty, and above all gains control over his own antisocial impulses. He lives in peace with his fellows not because he fears the law or retaliation but because he is rewarded both by society and by his conscience. The larger the number of individuals who have a strong civic conscience the less need there is for law and police.

Franz Alexander² has pointed out that law and order are maintained by two kinds of authority—that of the law and that of conscience. He accepts the conventional Freudian view that conscience (superego as Freud calls it) is the internalization of external authority. Moreover, there appears to be a close parallel between the scope of conscience and that of the authority which it reflects. The authority which maintains peace within the family becomes that part of conscience

2. Franz Alexander. "The Psychiatric Aspects of War," *Amer. J. of Sociol.* (Jan., 1941).

that governs intrafamily relations; and the authority of the wider community is reflected in the inner control over interpersonal relations within the community. Conscience therefore stops at international boundaries, for beyond there is no supernational authority to be internalized.

If men belonging to different national units would be further domesticated so that their consideration for the lives of people of other nations would be equally as strong as that for their own compatriots, peace would be possible. There is no reason to assume that the domestication can go only thus far and no farther. One could imagine a kind of education which would lead to the development of an international or world-conscience. Education, of course, is not a matter of individual action, and therefore such an education could be introduced only after an international organization of nations is established.³

With this conclusion we agree. It is true that effective education for world peace will perhaps not occur until there is first established a strong international authority. The reason, however, is not that there must first exist a world authority before it can be inwardly reflected in conscience but rather that parents, teachers, and others who have direct authority over the education of children *do not dare or care* to build strong sentiments of international relations until such a time as *they feel it safe to do so*.

There are many instances in which individuals have achieved a world-wide conscience in spite of the fact that no world authority has ever existed. In most people, however, conscience is "spotty" and operates selectively in respect to interpersonal relations with foreigners. Individuals differ widely in their tolerance and in respect for people of other nations and races. Race and national prejudice is undoubtedly a product of social education. But even people who are hated and disdained are not attacked unless they are seen as

3. Franz Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 514.

members of an aggressive enemy group. Let it not be forgotten that conscience is a system of habits which may be very general or highly specific depending on the conditions under which they were established. There are some respects in which it extends to all living things. Cruelty to animals is abhorrent to some people but not to all. There are some who would not steal from any man; others would steal from foreigners but not from fellow citizens. Hence the interpersonal and intergroup relations between all men are to some degree determined by the kinds of relations within the family and the group that are sanctioned by conscience. But for most people conscience does thin out and weaken when it crosses international and interracial boundaries.

Our faith in the potentialities of human learning leads us to believe that most if not all people could acquire an international conscience quite readily provided the necessary learning conditions were arranged. Most parents make it a matter of conscientious duty to train their children against aggression within the family and the community but are rather indifferent to how they may feel about "foreigners." They also teach or attempt to teach sentiments of patience, love for country, loyalty to tradition, respect for the flag, and so on, but are inclined to do little or nothing about teaching the brotherhood of all men, even though they may subscribe to it as a nice Christian doctrine. Conscience develops early in life, and is therefore patterned after the habits and attitudes of parents. If the parent image is devoid of the qualities that would give the child an international conscience, then how is it to be achieved?

This is an exceedingly difficult problem. It is doubtful if the present generation of adults and children in the conquered European countries could in their lifetime achieve a feeling of loyalty and patriotism toward a super-European state, to say nothing of a united states of the world. Their habits are too well established and they are too prone to com-

municate them to their children. It would be asking too much of a patriotic Frenchman to replace his love for France with love for a new Europe or a united states of the world. The best that could be expected would be that his grandchildren or great-grandchildren might do so provided their parents are sufficiently rewarded by such a citizenship.

Loyalty to a superstate cannot be taught effectively until one has been created. If the State of Texas, for example, were still an independent political unit, it is doubtful if its parents and schools would dare teach allegiance to the flag of the United States. In like manner effective education for citizenship in a united states of the world, a league of nations, or any peace group larger than those existing nations and empires cannot take place until the political union has already come about.

Barriers to a Federation of States

This analysis of the psychological conditions of peace would seem to force us to the conclusion that the only road to permanent world peace is the progressive unification of nations into larger and larger political units until finally all peoples of the earth are under one central government. It is recognized that there may be other roads to world peace that are shorter and less difficult to travel. There may be various types of international relations that will permit each state to retain its sovereign independence and at the same time create conditions that are favorable to education for world peace. The fact that all plans thus far proposed and tried have failed to prevent war is no proof that a successful one cannot be found. But social psychology offers little if any encouragement to those who believe that world peace can be permanently assured by any possible arrangement between independent states that are in competition with each other for economic and political power. One reason is that no na-

tion will dare educate for peace so long as its competitors are at liberty to educate for war.

If the conditions most favorable to education for world peace are yet to be created by a federation of the most powerful nations of the world, what are the chief barriers to the formation of such a union and how may they be removed? We are interested here only in the psychological aspects of the problem. Consider the question of motivation. What are the motives that have driven men to form larger and larger peace groups? Under what conditions will politically independent units merge into larger ones?

The history of civilization shows how slow the process of creating larger and larger states and political units has been. They are usually created by conquest or voluntarily formed by dire necessity. Humans do not form groups, live in cities, and create nations because they are driven blindly by some gregarious instinct but because it pays. It pays not only in bread and butter but in shelter, mating, reduced anxiety, greater economic security, and so on. But these benefits are not without cost. For them man must endure frustrations from others, must work, plan, compete, and above all must accept and live by the rules of the group. If two or more groups join to form a larger social unit, some changes are bound to occur in laws, rules, taxes, and responsibilities. Apprehensions and even anxieties are certain to follow. To compensate for these men must expect greater security or other rewards from their allegiance to the enlarged state. If left free to vote, the common man will not as a rule favor political unions unless driven to it by extremely hard times.

What motives besides those of fear of conquering rulers are strong enough to induce men to surrender even a fraction of their national sovereignty? Is the fear of future wars an adequate drive? Up to the present time it has not been. Either war anxiety has not been strong enough or it has been

dispelled by other arrangements. The present war, however, may create greater and more universal fears of future wars partly because of its greater costs and more intense destruction and partly because it is experienced personally by civilians as well as by soldiers. The psychological question is whether this war will result in profounder and more universal fear of war and whether that fear can easily be dispelled by peace terms similar to those that have been tried in the past.

There are, of course, other motives besides the fear of war that may induce some nations to surrender some part of their sovereignty to an international authority. Nations that have been less favored economically may see an opportunity for wider markets and better access to raw materials. Nations that have been weak as military powers in recent years may feel that they will gain in relative prestige. As a member state in a world federation there may be less tendency for people to classify nations as first-, second-, and third-rate powers. If a strong international authority were once established and if all first-rate powers were members, especially those of the present United Nations, many of the smaller and weaker countries could be, if necessary, forced to join. The problem is with the larger and stronger nations. A political union of them will, if it ever occurs, be motivated most likely by the desire to guarantee permanent world peace.

In making decisions motives are balanced against each other. The desire for peace is usually strong but peace is not a top-ranking value. Above it are ranked liberty, national honor, and freedom in the pursuit of happiness. Most men are unwilling to purchase peace at the price of slavery or tyranny. The price that they will pay for peace is determined mainly by the satisfaction that they can derive from life under conditions of peace. The word *prosperity* is usually coupled with peace. It is the prosperity that goes with peace that men really desire. Peace without prosperity may or may not be preferable to war with prosperity.

The surest way to motivate men to accept an international arrangement that will guarantee world peace is to convince them not only that it is good insurance against war but that it also favors the prosperity that should go with peace. The conditions of peace must be something more than war risk insurance. They must produce the conditions under which men can earn more than enough to pay the premiums on their insurance policies. It is now clear that the cost of the present war is only the first down payment on the peace. Any international organization that is strong enough to insure the world against future wars cannot be maintained cheaply. The people of each nation who will enjoy its protection and participate in its benefits will undoubtedly be required to pay high taxes into its treasury. This they can and will do provided their earnings are adequate not only to pay their taxes but also to purchase the goods that they deem necessary for their welfare and happiness.

Even if all the people of all nations were strongly motivated to create a world federation of states there would remain the problem of finding a formula on which all could agree. The chief difficulty is that of defining voting rights. It stems from the vast inequalities among states in respect to size, resources, and present economic, political, and military power. If all states were given equal voting power the smaller ones, being more numerous, could easily outvote the larger ones. If unequal voting power is agreed upon as a principle, on what basis shall it be determined? The formula by which this problem was solved by the thirteen American colonies is familiar to all, and there is a strong temptation to believe that it can be used to solve the problem of representation in a federated states of the world. In judging its merits in respect to the world situation it must not be forgotten that a long and bitter civil war was fought to clinch the American union.

This brief analysis may be concluded with the observation

that an adequate psychological foundation for world peace has not yet been laid. The techniques for controlling in-group aggression cannot now be used for preventing wars between states because existing international laws against aggression cannot be enforced, the dominant cultures of the states of the world still sanction war not only as a defensive policy but also as an aggressive measure, and no satisfactory techniques for reducing interstate tensions or for draining them off in harmless channels have yet been devised. Furthermore there is no such thing as international patriotism, the sense of identification across international boundaries is weak, and individuals who possess an international conscience are exceedingly rare. We conclude further that these foundation stones cannot be laid until conditions favorable to their development have been created by the formation of a strong central political authority endowed with power sufficient to enact and enforce international laws designed to promote the welfare of all people. If the peoples of the world and their respective governments are not yet ready to take this step either because of inadequate motivation or because of failure to find a satisfactory formula, then they should realize clearly that the war which will end wars has not yet been fought. They are caught in a vicious circle. A federation of world powers will not and probably should not be attempted until the people are more ready for it, yet they cannot be made ready, except very slowly and with great difficulty, until it has been established. A suggestion concerning how this circle may be broken is made at the end of the next chapter.

CHAPTER X

THE PRESENT WAR AND THE FUTURE PEACE

IF ANYONE still doubts the fundamental thesis of this book, that social attitudes and habits favorable to peace can be produced by education, let him consider what happened in the United States and England in the two decades following the first world war. The great masses of people believed that the world had been made safe from the menace of aggressor nations and that the rising generations should be conditioned against war. This mass education against war and for peace and prosperity seemed to arise spontaneously and simultaneously from many quarters. Popular books appeared describing the horrors of the war that had just ended. Other books revealed the deception and trickery of propaganda. Textbooks on the social studies for high school and college denounced war as stupid and wasteful. From the pulpit, platform, press, and the movies came a stream of condemnation of war and glorification of peace. High hopes were held for the League of Nations, and later for the Kellogg Peace Pact.

This mass education for peace in the United States and in Great Britain was notably successful. It was most successful among labor groups, high school and college students. When the present war broke out in Europe there was much comment in the press concerning the apathetic attitude of American youth and especially of college students; yet their views and sentiments toward war were shared by many of the older generation. There was wide public support for the passage by Congress of the Embargo Act, the Johnson Act,

and other legislation designed to keep the United States out of future wars. But unfortunately while the United States and Great Britain were educating for peace, Germany, Italy, and Japan were educating for war. The well-known effectiveness of education for war in Germany and Japan further illustrates the tremendous power of learning as a factor in war and peace.

The negative attitudes toward war in general and toward another European war in particular, that were formed during the 1920's and '30's, were determined to no small degree by the aftermath of the first world war. Even though we were on the winning side and even though Germany was, for the time being at least, eliminated as a menace to democracy and to the peace of the world, we nevertheless suffered great losses during the war and in the years that followed it. Moreover, we experienced a great disillusionment; gradually we realized that the world was not safe for democracy after all. Taking stock of our gains and losses we found that we had not only lost thousands of our best young men and millions of dollars worth of equipment and billions in unpaid war debts but, most disheartening of all, that we had lost the peace. Then on top of it all came the great economic depression of the 1930's and Hitler came to power.

When war broke out in Europe in September, 1939, we were determined to stay out of it. The punishment and losses we had suffered in the first world war were still fresh in our memories. We knew that we were in for another period of obstruction to progress. We knew also that we would be tempted to join in the attack. Our first fear was that of temptation to enter the war. Hence, we took steps to avoid all irritating or angering incidents with the warring nations. We forbade our ships to enter the zones of combat, we refused passports to our citizens to travel in belligerent countries and ordered home all who were there. Our determination not to permit ourselves to become angered was admission

of the fact that it was frustration that led us into the first world war. We were afraid that if our ships were sunk, our flag insulted, and our citizens killed, we would again lose our temper and plunge headlong into war unprepared. Our prayer to Washington was "lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from the evils of war." So great was our determination to avoid the highway of frustration which we were sure would lead us to war that as late as February, 1941, the Gallup Poll showed that 61 per cent of the respondents would not favor declaring war on Germany even if American ships with American crews were sunk while convoying aid to England; 27 per cent said they would favor war if this happened; 12 per cent were uncertain.

It would be a mistake to assume that the people of the United States were unanimous in their emotional reaction to the wars in Europe and Asia. There were great variations depending on geographic sections of the country, economic interest, racial backgrounds, and personality type. We exhibited all the typical emotional reactions to an obstruction in the path of national progress—detached curiosity, despair or feeling of futility, resentment, and fear. In no case did these emotions appear pure and unmixed. They were experienced in various mixtures or patterns, but in most cases one of them was predominant.

The Isolationists and the Interventionists

It is not surprising that different individuals reacted in accordance with their past experiences and their present knowledge of the obstructing situation. A small majority wanted to repeat the process of 1914-16 and make an aggressive attack by declaring war on Germany. According to the Gallup Poll this was never more than twenty per cent of the population during 1939-41. A second group reacted with a feeling of futility and despair. It claimed that the United States was unable to build a war machine in a short

time that could give effective aid to England, to say nothing of resisting Germany and possibly Japan single-handed. These were the extreme isolationists who favored national defense but a negotiated peace. A third group, known as the interventionists, reacted with great fear of an Axis victory and favored "all out" aid to England even at the risk of war. A fourth group, without name, took a detached attitude toward the situation, regarding it as a challenging problem to be solved by the most expedient measure, whatever that might be.

Unfortunately we have no exact figures on the sizes of these groups at any one time. The Gallup and *Fortune* Polls, however, did give some indication of the fluctuations in war attitudes. From the votes on various questions certain inferences could be made. Dr. Hadley Cantril of Princeton analyzed the answers to questions concerning the war and was able to identify three main patterns of reaction which he called the *isolationist*, the *interventionist*, and the *sympathetic*. The isolationists were the people who thought that

it is more important for the United States to keep out of war than to help England, and at the same time believe either that we should do less or at least no more to help England than we are now doing. Although most of these people believe that Germany will win the war, they tend to think a German victory would not disturb their own lives or the security of this country. Still at least half of them want to take the precaution of training men for military duties.¹

The persons who composed this group were in it for different reasons. There were those who thought they would not be personally affected by a German victory and would have least to lose by a German invasion. Their anxieties over a possible invasion were relatively low. Then there were those

1. Hadley Cantril, "America Faces the War: A Study in Public Opinion," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* (1940), 4, 895.

—like mothers—whose anxieties about war were relatively high. The *isolationists* were mainly those people who had high anxieties over war or low fears of a German victory or both.

The *interventionists* were described by Dr. Cantril as people who

believe it is more important to help England, even at the risk of war, than it is for this country to keep out of war. They also think that we should do more than we are now doing to help England. Unlike the "isolationists," they do not feel immune to the consequences of a Nazi victory, either as individuals or as members of a nation. Sixty per cent fear a German attack on this country, while ninety per cent foresee that their own lives will be affected if Germany wins the war.²

It is clear that the anxiety of these persons over a possible German victory was far greater than the anticipated losses and deprivations that would result from entering the war.

The third group, called the "sympathetic," fell midway between the extreme isolationists and the extreme interventionists. It was characterized by the attitude that we should give aid to England but should not weaken our own defenses or risk becoming involved in the war. This group agreed with the appeasers that it would probably be better to risk the defeat of England than to become involved in the war unprepared.

The size of these groups varied from time to time, from the beginning of the war to December 7, 1941. According to Dr. Cantril's interpretation of the Gallup Poll about two-thirds of the nation were interventionists in the Spring of 1941. While it is risky to place too much confidence in straw ballots, it appears fairly certain that a large majority of the people of the United States were afraid of a German vic-

2. Hadley Cantril, *op. cit.*, pp. 402-403.

tory. Some were more afraid of our entering the war. All were on the road of fear. It was a two-way road: one way, fear of a German victory, leading toward war; and the other way, fear of war, leading toward a negotiated peace.

The Advice of the President

There were those who held that the only road to world peace was via the defeat of dictators; that to avoid war because we dislike sending our sons to fight overseas would be a short-sighted and suicidal policy. As long as Hitler rules Europe there can be no peace, just as there was no peace as long as Napoleon was in power. This was the conviction of the President of the United States and of his close friends and advisers. In his various talks to the nation he made clear where he stood and why. He admitted that he was worried over the consequences of an Axis victory. In his address of March 15, 1941, to White House correspondents, he said: "Before the present war broke out on September 1, 1939, I was more worried about the future than many people —most people. The record shows I was not worried enough."

First, he believed that the consequences to us of an Axis victory would be far more devastating and menacing than most people supposed. He pointed out that an Axis victory would result in a long period of military preparation at great cost and an economic war which would result in a depression far worse than the one we had just experienced. To bring this home he compared it with experiences familiar to all of us. The depression of the 'thirties was fresh in our memories. We had not forgotten its hardships and deprivations. It was, therefore, a convenient yardstick with which to measure the possible economic consequences of an Axis victory. When the man in the street was told that an Axis victory would mean a depression ten times worse than the one that he had just experienced, he had no difficulty in under-

standing fully what this could mean. When the laboring man, who for years had been struggling for economic independence, was told that a German victory might mean labor slavery,³ he too was addressed in a language that he could understand. When the taxpayer was told that a German victory would mean income taxes far greater than any that he had ever experienced, not to mention other economic sacrifices that he would be called upon to make, he too had a background of personal experience that enabled him fully to appreciate the importance of forestalling an Axis victory.

When war was declared in Europe most of the people of the United States felt that it was far away, separated from us by an expansive ocean. The inland population of the United States was less concerned about the war either in China or in Europe than were persons on the seabards. The people on the Atlantic seaboard were more concerned with the war in Europe; those in the Pacific with the war in China. The gradient of fear of war, therefore, was greater along the coasts and tapered off inland. But during 1940 a good deal was said in the press, over the radio, in public speeches, and in testimony before congressional committees and elsewhere concerning the proximity of the danger.

The danger was seen as near not only in space but also in time. In the early spring of 1941 much was said over the radio and in the press about the need for immediate action on account of the possibility of a crisis within one to three months. In his message to Congress on January 6, 1941, the President said:

I have recently pointed out how quickly the tempo of modern warfare could bring into our very midst the physical attack which we must expect if the dictator nations win this war;

3. The Gallup Poll of December 27, 1940, showed that 80 per cent of the respondents believed that Germany intended to make slaves out of conquered people.

But we learn much from the lessons of the past years in Europe—particularly the lesson of Norway, whose essential seaports were captured by treachery and surprise built up over a series of years.

The first phase of the invasion of this hemisphere would not be the landing of regular troops. The necessary strategic points would be occupied by secret agents and their dupes—and great numbers of them are already here, and in Latin America.

As long as the aggressor nations maintain the offensive, they—not we—will choose the time and the place and the method of their attack.

That is why the future of all American republics is today in serious danger.

That is why this annual message to the Congress is unique in our history.

Anxiety is increased when one becomes suddenly aware that he is already in the midst of dangers that are not visible or otherwise perceptible. People are alarmed by reports of the operation of spies, saboteurs, and fifth columnists. In his Fireside Chat of December 29, 1940, in speaking of the secret activities of the Axis powers, the President told the nation:

Let us no longer blind ourselves to the undeniable fact that the evil forces which have crushed and undermined and corrupted so many others are already within our own gates. Your government knows much about them and every day is ferreting them out.

Their secret emissaries are active in our own and neighboring countries. They seek to stir up suspicion and dissension to cause internal strife. They try to turn capital against labor, and vice-versa. They try to reawaken long-slumbering racial and religious enmities which should have no place in this country. They are active in every group that promotes intolerance. They exploit for their own ends our national abhorrence of war. These

trouble-breeders have but one purpose. It is to divide our people into hostile groups and to destroy our unity and shatter our will to defend ourselves.

In his talk to the White House correspondents on March 15, 1941, he added this: "From the bureaus of propaganda of the Axis Powers came the confident prophecy that the conquest of our country would be 'an inside job'—a job accomplished not by overpowering invasion from without, but by disrupting confusion and disunion and moral disintegration from within."

A third psychological factor contributing to the increase of national anxiety was the limited possibilities of escape. Life is filled with danger situations which never arouse fear for the reason that an effective avoidance or defensive response is always ready at hand. The thousands of automobiles that fill the city streets and highways of the nation do not, as a matter of fact, generate much fear although they are dangerous. The reason is that there are so many good ways of dodging them or keeping out of their way. As the avenues of escape from a danger situation are progressively shut off anxiety tends to mount; when the last door has been closed, the individual tends to become resigned to his fate and his fear disappears.

Quoting again from the Fireside Chat of December 29, 1940:

Some nations of Europe were bound by solemn non-intervention pacts with Germany. Other nations were assured by Germany that they need never fear invasion. Non-intervention pact or not, the fact remains that they were attacked, over-run and thrown into the modern form of slavery at an hour's notice or even without any notice at all. As an exiled leader of one of these nations said to me the other day—"the notice was a minus quantity. It was given to my government two hours after German troops had poured into my country in a hundred places."

The experience of the past two years has proven beyond doubt that no nation can appease the Nazis. No man can tame a tiger into a kitten by stroking it. There can be no appeasement with ruthlessness. There can be no reasoning with an incendiary bomb. We know now that a nation can have peace with the Nazis only at the price of total surrender.

In pointing out to the nation that our best way of escape from the consequences of an Axis victory, including being involved in a later war with Germany, was to aid England, the President had to safeguard one point. If from a danger situation there is only one way of escape and if that is doubtful, the psychological effect is likely to be defeatism. It is important, therefore, to have confidence in that way of escape. The Gallup Polls continued to show that the interventionists were far more confident that England would eventually win than were the isolationists. The President said: ". . . the Axis Powers are not going to win this war. I base this belief on the latest and best information. We have no excuse for defeatism. We have every excuse for hope for our civilization and for a better civilization in the future."

Let it be said with emphasis that these statements of the President are not here challenged; they are used only to illustrate the way in which basic psychological principles apply in the present situation. The President was well aware of the fact that a full and frank discussion of the danger signals as he saw them would arouse anxiety.

During the past week many people in all parts of the nation have told me what they wanted me to say tonight. Almost all of them expressed a courageous desire to hear the plain truth about the gravity of the situation. One telegram, however, expressed the attitude of the small minority who want to see no evil and hear no evil, even though they know in their hearts that evil exists. That telegram begged me not to tell again of the ease

with which our American cities could be bombed by any hostile power which had gained bases in this Western Hemisphere. The gist of that telegram was: "Please, Mr. President, don't frighten us by telling us the facts."

Fluctuation and Conflict of War Anxieties

Every individual who has any anticipations concerning how his life or that of his friends or of his nation would be influenced by war may be said to have, in some measure, a war anxiety. In some individuals it is undoubtedly very strong, amounting almost to panic; in other individuals it is weak and appears as apprehension, uneasiness, concern, or mild worry. If it were possible to measure the war anxieties of the population of a nation, one would perhaps find that they are distributed on a scale which runs from very mild to very strong fears. The average of these fears could then be called the national anxiety mean. This average emotional state of affairs of the nation fluctuates from day to day and if these fluctuations were plotted on cross-section paper, the result might be called the national-anxiety curve. This curve would, no doubt, look very much like the curves that show the ups and downs in the stock market. Such curves are made by averaging the daily prices of selected lists of stocks. If instead of basing the curve on the price of stock, it were based on the fears and hopes of the buyers and sellers of the stocks, a curve could be drawn showing the accompanying fears which would, no doubt, parallel the curve showing the price of the stocks. In general, it might be said that we buy in hope and sell in fear.

Unfortunately no adequate measure of the fluctuations in national anxiety is available. The best approximation is found in the Gallup and *Fortune* Polls. While these straw ballots do not claim to record fears, they do reflect them indirectly. We have, therefore, summarized part of the results

of these polls covering the period from the declaration of war by England and France in September, 1939, to September, 1941.

It may be fairly said that beginning as far back as 1920 the great majority of the people in the United States had little if any fear of becoming actively involved in another European war, at least not for many years to come. Our national anxiety on that score was close to zero. It remained at this low level for ten to fifteen years until Hitler came to power in Germany and it appeared that he was forming a central European military alliance with Italy. The people of the United States were somewhat alarmed over the occupation of the Rhineland by Hitler in 1936 and by his open challenge to the Treaty of Versailles. The next alarm came in March, 1938, with the Anschluss with Austria and then again with the Czechoslovakian crisis in August and September of 1938. After the Munich Conference in September, 1938, fear of war in Europe subsided temporarily but arose again in 1939 when Hitler violated the Munich pact and took possession of Czechoslovakia. By that time the fear of a European war in which the United States would be involved had gone up quite perceptibly above the level that it maintained during the 1920's.

On August 22, 1939, when it was announced that Germany had signed the nonaggression pact with Russia and when it became apparent that the pact included the partitioning of Poland, it appeared that war in Europe was inevitable and our fear of becoming involved in it immediately began to rise even higher. During the first two weeks of September, 1939, after Germany had invaded Poland, and France and England had declared war, a wave of fear of our becoming actively involved spread over the United States. The first reaction of the people was: Can we or can we not stay out of this war? In August, 1939, the Gallup Poll showed that 65 per cent of the respondents thought that if England and

France went to war against Germany and Italy, the United States would send to the Allies either troops or materials or both. The ballot of September 3 showed 70 per cent in favor of a special session of Congress. The same ballot showed only 50 per cent of the nation in favor of changing the neutrality law so that England could buy war materials here. The poll of September 14 showed that 82 per cent of the respondents were in favor of the United States forbidding its citizens to travel on the ships of countries which were at war; 84 per cent were in favor of keeping our ships out of the war zones; 94 per cent were in favor of requiring France and England to carry away goods in their own ships (if the neutrality law should be repealed); 90 per cent were in favor of requiring France and England to pay cash for goods. On the ballot of September 17, Gallup asked, "If it looks within the next few months as if France might be defeated, should the United States declare war and send our troops abroad?" Fifty-six per cent of those responding said "no." When *Fortune* asked whether we should send our army and navy abroad to help France and England if it became clear that they were being defeated, 66 per cent replied "no."

While these data are scattering and by no means an adequate measure of national psychology, they do indicate that the fear of becoming involved in another European war went up very sharply after the declaration of war. In the fall of 1939 there was little fear of an Axis victory. Only 7 per cent of the respondents to the poll thought Germany would win. However, another 11 per cent were undecided. Only 10 per cent were in favor of credit to the Allies and 39 per cent in favor of compulsory military training. Apparently everyone believed that Germany could not possibly beat the combined resources of the British and French empires, especially with the then neutral countries of Europe being more on the side of the Allies than on the side of Germany.

During the winter months of 1939-40 there was very little

change in the general pattern of attitudes of Americans toward the war. Ninety-six per cent were opposed to declaring war on Germany. Twenty per cent thought we should enter the war to prevent an Axis victory in the event that that seemed necessary. But 68 per cent thought that we should actually stay out and 65 per cent wanted a constitutional amendment requiring a national vote before men could be drafted for over-seas duty. These scanty facts indicate that during these months the fear of becoming actively involved in the war was considerably greater than the fear of the consequences of a German victory.

The curve representing the fear of the consequences of a German victory rose sharply, overtook and passed the curve representing the fear of entry into the war in April and May, 1940, shortly after the invasion of Norway. It was at that time that the United States began to wake up to what could possibly happen here. News analysts and newspaper columnists began to talk about the possibilities of a German invasion of the United States. Walter Lippmann and Dorothy Thompson in particular pointed out the consequences to us of a German victory. It became suddenly and increasingly clear that it would be necessary for the United States to embark upon an unprecedented defense program. By midsummer of 1940 the percentage of the respondents in the Gallup Poll who thought that Germany would win reached its peak (40 per cent) and those in the doubtful column rose to 30 per cent, leaving only 30 per cent who thought that England would win. Those who thought that they would be affected personally by an Axis victory rose from 47 per cent in March to 67 per cent in July. There was a corresponding increase in the percentage in favor of compulsory military training. Those who believed that more aid should be given to England jumped from about 18 per cent in March to 78 per cent in June. Those in favor of more taxes for the defense program rose from 58 per cent in April

to 82 per cent in May. This change was concurrent with Roosevelt's speech asking for billions for defense.

The phase of the war that began in midsummer of 1940 with the determination of England to resist invasion and with the successes of the English army in North Africa and the Greek army in Albania decreased rather sharply the percentages of those who thought Germany would win or who were doubtful concerning the ultimate outcome of the war. The fact that Germany had no military successes whatsoever from the fall of France to the fall of Greece strengthened the determination of the people of the United States to aid England. This was based partly on the fear of the consequences of a German victory and partly on the belief that England would win with our aid. Naturally we would not be very anxious or enthusiastic about betting huge sums of money on a losing horse. These considerations rather overshadowed our fear of becoming involved in the war and convinced more and more people that aid to England at the risk of war was decidedly the lesser of two evils. Moreover, we were steadily but surely overcoming the initial shock that we experienced in September, 1939, the fear of the possibility of becoming involved in another European war. Gradually we came to terms in our own minds with this thought and made our plans accordingly. As this psychological process went on, our fear of becoming involved in a war decreased. When one is faced with a grave danger, it often happens that the maximum fear occurs early and as one plans how the danger may be met, what the best mode of response to it is, how its consequences may be in some manner alleviated, the fear tends to subside.

Apparently the people of the United States were persuaded (by May, 1941) that the best course of action was to see that England was not defeated. Having determined on this course of action, fears of entering the war gradually decreased and fears of an Axis victory increased. The Gallup

Poll shows a steady increase in sentiment for aid to England during 1940-41 and a steady decrease in isolationist feeling. The Lend-Lease Bill which passed the Congress in February, 1941, probably could not have been passed a year or even six months earlier. In May, 1941, it appeared that the nation was prepared emotionally to enter the war provided it was clear that only by so doing could England be saved. The Gallup Poll release of April 28, 1941, showed that while 81 per cent of the respondents would vote against declaring war, 68 per cent said they would favor it if it appeared that there were no other way to defeat Germany and Italy; 71 per cent said they would favor convoying aid to England if that were the only way to victory. On the same ballot 82 per cent said they thought we would actually enter the war sooner or later.

Certainly one interpretation that could be put on these two ballots is that the fear of an Axis victory was already (on May 1, 1941) greater than the fear of entering the war and sending an army abroad. The only reason we were not in the war on that date was the fact that a majority of Americans believed at that time that England did not need a declaration of war from us in order to win.

The Psychology of Lend-Lease

But England did need our aid. The problem was how to give it and at the same time avoid entering the war. Part of the solution was the passage of the Lend-Lease Bill. Before examining the psychology of how this was accomplished, let us first briefly review the facts. There was a marked increase in public sentiment for more aid to England from the invasion of Norway in March, 1940, to November, 1940. Those who were in favor of more aid to England at the risk of war increased from 36 per cent in June, 1940, to 68 per cent in January, 1941. But even so there was considerable caution about convoying aid to England in our ships. The

proportion of Gallup respondents in favor of this never exceeded 42 per cent.

At the time of the passage of the Lend-Lease Bill (February, 1941) 58 per cent of the Gallup respondents were in favor of it. But by March, 1941, the percentage had dropped to 55. It will be recalled that the debate in Congress concerning the wisdom of this act was exceedingly vigorous. While the Act passed with a safe margin of congressional votes, it may be said that public sentiment was almost evenly divided. Many people were indeed dubious concerning the wisdom of it. It reflected in a national way a conflict which seemed to be fairly typical in the population. The conflict was, as we have already stated, between the fear of an Axis victory and the fear of entering the war.

One way out of this difficulty was to help England win the war without becoming actively involved in it. To do this it was necessary to cease all pretense of neutrality and deliberately come out on the side of England. Psychologically this meant that by approaching nearer to England we tended to resolve our dilemma. By using England as an object of approach in order to resolve the conflict of war or an Axis victory we encountered another type of conflict. The nearer we approached England the more we avoided an Axis victory, but at the same time the more likely we were to become involved in the war. So the problem involved in the Lend-Lease Bill was how close we dared approach identification with England and her cause.

In laboratory studies of conflict it has been shown that both men and animals tend to avoid situations in which they expect punishment and to approach those in which they expect reward. The tendency to approach or to avoid depends primarily upon two factors. The first is the strength of the habits that have been established in similar situations and the second is the strength of the dominant motive. Most people have learned to avoid drinking salt water and nor-

mally have no trouble in so doing. But a shipwrecked sailor who is very thirsty and has no fresh water is under strong temptation to drink the salt water even though he knows that it will not quench his thirst but on the contrary will greatly increase it. Whether one will approach a situation which is known to be dangerous will depend upon the relative strengths of the avoidance and approach tendencies; whether an individual will forego approaching a pleasant situation will depend upon a similar balancing of strengths.

In laboratory experiments on conflict, when a choice must be made between two unpleasant alternatives both humans and animals tend to make compromise responses. They move first toward one horn of the dilemma and then back toward the other and settle down in between, depending on the relative strengths of the two avoidance tendencies. This is apparently what we did as a nation from September, 1939, to December 7, 1941. Our fear of becoming actively involved in the war to the extent of sending ships and troops abroad made us cautious on such matters as giving credit to England, convoying supplies to her, or taking steps that would bring us too close to the brink of war. Our fear of a German victory, on the other hand, instigated us to give more and more aid to England even at the risk of war. The distance that we were willing to go in this direction depended upon the relative strengths of these two conflicting fears, primarily in governmental officials but secondarily in the great masses of the population.

Actually what we did was to move slowly but steadily toward more and more aid to England, first with the motto "short of war" and then, as the approach tendency became stronger, with the motto changed to aid to England "at the risk of war." From September, 1939, on the approach tendency became increasingly stronger while the avoidance tendency perhaps remained stationary or if anything became

weaker. Our aid to England was first, to repeal the Arms Embargo Act; next, to give her preference for war supplies over our own defense needs; then to exchange destroyers for naval bases, to pass the Lend-Lease Bill, to seize Nazi ships and those of Italy, to negotiate with Denmark for air and naval bases on Greenland, and to patrol our side of the Atlantic with orders to shoot on sight. Every one of these steps was taken against some resistance on the part of those in whom the avoidance tendency was much stronger than that of approach. But in spite of these facts no retreat from the steps taken could be made because even stronger resistance would have been encountered. We did not move up and then back off, but rather moved up gradually and somewhat hesitantly.

It is possible that the conflict involved in aid to England was not the same for everyone. Some Americans were strongly prejudiced and wanted to aid her because they loved her or because they expected to share in the rewards of her victory. Others believed that aid to England was our best self-defense, that she was really fighting our battles. The difference between these two attitudes was that in the case of the former the contemplated action promised to arouse a counterdrive; whereas in the latter it promised to increase the existing drive. In the former case, the motive for aiding England was sympathy, but this motive was met by the countermotive of fear that by aiding England we would become involved in war. In the second case, however, the original motive was fear, and aid to England generated more fear. Persons who wanted to avoid going to war and at the same time avoid having a fight with Germany later without the aid of England were in the traditional dilemma between the devil and the deep blue sea. There were other persons who were anti-British but who at the same time believed that by giving aid to Britain we were defending our shores. They were mo-

tivated both to approach and to avoid England, yet on the other hand they wanted to avoid war with Germany now or later. This was the position of the Irish.

On Sunday afternoon, December 7, 1941, this conflict was speedily resolved by the attack of Japan on Pearl Harbor. In a very few hours the emotional state of the nation underwent a remarkable transformation. It was changed from a state of conflicting fears to one of intense indignation. We had been attacked. The fears that we had entertained of becoming involved in the war immediately disappeared and were replaced by bitter anger and determination to punish Japan. All antiwar sentiments disappeared immediately. The America First Committee which was the central organization of the isolationist movement was dissolved. Members of the Congress who were most opposed to our becoming a belligerent in the war immediately swung over and there was only one dissenting vote against the declaration of war against the Axis powers. Such a majority would have been impossible forty-eight hours earlier.

This sudden transformation and unification of our attitude toward the war provides an excellent illustration of the central theme of this book. Prior to the Pearl Harbor incident there was great diversity in our reactions to the war, partly because the situation was confused but mainly because we had no common background of experience in similar situations. The attack on Pearl Harbor provided a situation to which we had already learned a common mode of response. Actually no one was transformed in the sense that his basic habits and motives were changed; what happened was that almost everyone made the same kind of response to the situation. It was the response that we have all learned to make in similar situations. From early childhood everyone has learned that it is right and proper to become angry at and to punish acts of unprovoked aggression. As we have already noted in an earlier chapter, this is one kind of situation in which anger

and aggression are expected and rewarded. Persons whose aggressive tendencies were most strongly conditioned to situations of this sort were the ones who reacted with the greatest amount of anger and resentment. Others reacted more with fear. But this too was undoubtedly the result of previous emotional conditioning. When one member of a group is attacked, all others are in potential danger. If the Japanese were daring enough to attack Honolulu it is easy to believe that they would also attack the cities on the mainland.

The Shift from Fear to Anger

There are two main emotional highways to war, both of which are marked in red with blood on the map of history. One is hatred and the other is fear. Hatred leads to aggressive warfare, fear to defensive action. The highways of fear and frustration begin at the point where the paths to peace are blocked. The highway of fear, as we have already seen, leads to avenues of escape, avoidance and circumvention of the danger, if at all possible. In 1940 and 1941 our avenue of escape was already paved by the lend-lease program. It seemed certain that our fears would not mount high enough to compel us to declare war for the reason that they were continuously dispelled by our belief that the danger was well in hand and that our security was not immediately menaced.

When we were attacked our habits of fighting in self-defense were immediately mobilized. We were not only angry but morally indignant. No wrath has quite so much drive as that of moral indignation because it encounters no opposition from conscience. We believed that ours was a just and righteous cause, that Japan should be punished for her unannounced aggression. On this we were in complete agreement and toward this end directed our efforts.

But What of the Peace?

President Roosevelt has announced and others have worn

threadbare the expression that the allied nations won the last war but lost the peace. This time they are determined to win both the war and the peace. At the present time, December, 1942, the strategy for winning the peace has not been announced. It may be planned already or in the process of planning to be announced when the psychological moment arrives, or it may be postponed until the war is over. Meanwhile numerous suggestions have been made by private citizens, peace organizations, and governmental officials.

The top men in the present governments of the United Nations have agreed to the Atlantic Charter as a declaration of purposes and principles on which hopes for a better world after the war may be based. The Charter asserts that the present governments of the United Nations have no desire for aggrandizement; oppose territorial changes made against the will of people concerned; approve all peoples having a right to choose their form of government; agree that all should have equal access to raw materials and to world trade that is needed for their prosperity; that economic collaboration between nations in respect to labor standards, economic adjustments, and social security is desirable; that aggressor nations and all groups, large or small, which threaten or menace the peace of the world must be disarmed; that freedom of the seas must be guaranteed; and that when the war is won a peace will be established "which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want."

This Charter has not been ratified by the present governments of the United Nations and does not have the status of a treaty. The Lend-Lease agreements between the United States and other of the allied nations have been made binding and contain provisions stated vaguely for a more liberal economic foreign policy after the war. Great Britain and

Russia have entered into a mutual assistance pact that is binding on both nations for a period of twenty years. In addition to these agreements on principles there are a number of coöperative arrangements for winning the war and for reconstruction after the war. Examples are the Pacific War Council, which is a consultative board made up of representatives of the nations most concerned with the war in the Pacific, a combined munitions assignment board, a shipping board, and the combined Chiefs of Staff of Great Britain and the United States. At the present time there is no board or council composed of representatives of all the United Nations endowed with authority to make decisions concerning policy and strategy either for winning the war or for planning the peace.

The unity that now exists between the United Nations is mainly psychological. It is based upon common purposes and interests occasioned by the necessity for winning the war. If the responsible heads of the existing governments of the United Nations have reached any agreements concerning plans for peace beyond the broad statement of principles contained in the Atlantic Charter, public announcement of these agreements has not been made. The most explicit statement of principles of peace that has yet come from an official source is found in an address by Vice-President Wallace made on December 28, 1942, in commemoration of the birthday of Woodrow Wilson. He suggests that two of the guiding principles in the establishment of a world democracy "must be liberty and unity, or in other words, home rule and centralized authority." The United Nations are "groping for a formula which will give the greatest possible liberty without producing anarchy and at the same time will not give so many rights to each member nation as to jeopardize the security of all." The formula, he thinks, should provide for the maximum of home rule not only in local but also in regional matters and a minimum of central authority which

should be concerned mainly with broad principles by which unity, security, and equality between member groups can be maintained. The first task of the proposed central authority, to which he refers as a "kind of world council," would be to disarm and provide machinery for keeping disarmed all groups that threaten the peace of the world. Another urgent problem will be that of economic reconstruction, especially of countries that have been overrun by Axis Powers. Relief in the form of food, clothing, and shelter must be provided for these peoples while the reconstruction of private enterprise is in progress. The Vice-President stressed the importance of full employment of all peoples in all lands as a basic requirement of economic prosperity.

The response to these proposals, insofar as it can be judged by editorial comment and other crude indicators of popular reactions, was on the whole favorable. There is some evidence that public opinion in the United States supports the view that the United States should take an active part in world affairs after the war. A question on this point was asked by the Gallup Poll five different times in 1942. The results show that approximately two-thirds of the respondents favor the proposition that the United States take an active part in world affairs after the war. On a poll conducted by *Fortune* magazine in April, 1942, approximately 60 per cent of adult respondents were in favor of active participation by the United States in the postwar world but only 34 per cent were in favor of the formation of a new league or association with all the different nations of the world. Opinion of high-school students was also polled by *Fortune* later in the year with the result that 82 per cent were in favor of participation by the United States in world affairs and almost 51 per cent favored the formation of an international organization. These scraps of evidence indicate that in 1942 public opinion in the United States seemed to favor a postwar foreign policy of more active participation in world affairs.

but did not support the proposal for the establishment of an international authority when the war is over.

In the preceding chapter the conclusion was reached that the psychological conditions of world peace can best be achieved by the establishment of a central authority endowed with power to enact and enforce international laws. It may be true that the peoples of the world are not yet ready to take this step and will not be ready when the war is over. There are those who believe that unless the step is taken before the war is over the opportunity will be lost. At least agreements should be reached on a more specific statement of principles than the one provided by the Atlantic Charter. Others believe that it is unwise to go beyond the announcement of general principles at least until victory is definitely assured. In support of this opinion the following arguments are offered: (1) It is highly important that the psychological unity that now exists between the United Nations shall not be disturbed. They can remain united on principles but when it comes to detailed applications, especially to questions that involve competing interests, there is danger that dissension leading to disunity may arise. In addition there is the further danger of precipitating dissension among the people of the stronger of the United Powers, particularly in the United States where strong isolationist sentiment is suspected to exist beneath the surface of expressed public opinion. (2) Too much talk of peace in time of war may be interpreted by our enemies, and by our allies as well, as a sign of military weakness and as a move toward a "negotiated peace." Any encouragement they receive to carry on will prolong the war. (3) There is no guarantee that the present governments of the various allied nations will be in power at the end of the war. Should they attempt to negotiate and to execute concrete arrangements now, these decisions might conceivably be reversed by the new governments coming into power about the time the war is over. Moreover, political parties that are

now out of power in the democratic countries might attempt to use the actions of those that are in power as political issues in future elections. (4) It is apparent that permanent world peace cannot be secured without considerable cost. It is difficult at this time to estimate the costs of organizing and operating an international organization that is powerful enough to prevent future wars. It is clear, however, that it cannot be organized and maintained unless the participating nations are willing to surrender certain fractions of their national sovereignty, are willing to pay higher taxes and to share more freely in world markets, and some of them may be required for a time at least to endure lower standards of living. To announce the probable cost of peace before the war is over might have the effect of defeating the plan before it could be put into operation. (5) At present no one can be certain that the United Nations can win a decided victory over the Axis Powers. The war could conceivably end in some kind of military stalemate. The one outlook that is now certain is that the Axis Powers cannot win a decided victory over the United Nations. (6) The barriers that prevent the establishment of a central authority by the United Nations for the purpose of winning the war will be equally if not more difficult to overcome for the establishment of one to win the peace. If the war can be won without an inter-allied war council whose decisions are final, it is unlikely that one will be established for the purpose of winning the peace.

These arguments seem sound and plausible but they are balanced if not overbalanced by convincing considerations for attempting to reach agreements and take appropriate actions concerning peace before the war is over. These arguments may be stated briefly as follows. (1) Unless the peace is won before the war is over the motivations that now exist for unity and coöperation among the United Nations will weaken if not disappear entirely when victory has been won. (2) The worst possible time to negotiate conditions of a just

and lasting peace is at the close of a bitter war. (3) As the sacrifices and hardships required to win the war increase, there is greater need for a more concrete definition of war aims in terms of the positive values that may be expected from victory. Specific and concrete knowledge concerning what we are fighting for will strengthen and maintain our morale. (4) If the peace is won now, it can be used as a propaganda weapon for helping to win the war. (5) If the new world organization is already set up and in partial operation before the war is over, it may receive part of the credit at least for winning the war and will therefore command the prestige and influence that may be required to carry it over the difficult period of readjustment immediately following the war.

Let us consider these arguments in more detail. First, the unity and coöperation that now exist between the United Nations are clearly and obviously motivated by the common fear of the aggressive policies and actions of the Axis Powers. The strength of this motivation is measured in part by lend-lease agreements to pool war resources, to remove trade barriers, to share food and supplies, and to promote mutual understanding of various ways of life. It is quite unlikely that any group of nations in peacetime would or could achieve so great a degree of unity.

If the war should end in a stalemate leaving the world divided into three or four great powers so that future wars are a distinct possibility, the United Nations might under these conditions be motivated to remain united. If, on the other hand, the common enemy is defeated and disarmed so that the peace of the United Nations is not likely to be disturbed again for many years, the war anxieties of the people will disappear and the motivation for remaining united will be greatly weakened. It will be recalled from Chapter IV that the strength of fear depends upon the nearness of the danger, the severity of the anticipated deprivations and pun-

ishments, and the absence of avenues of escape. When victory is won the possibility of future wars will appear remote and a variety of plans for avoiding them will be suggested. If, therefore, the existing desires to win the war are to be used as motives for the acceptance of a plan of peace that calls for international unity under a strong central authority, they must be utilized before they disappear.

Even though the fear of future war does not disappear, and some think it will not, it does not follow that international unity under a strong central authority is the only plan that will dispel war anxieties. When an individual or group of individuals is driven by fear or any other strong motive, any response that reduces the drive is satisfying and is therefore reinforced. The first responses that are tried are as a rule those that are most habitual and require the least effort. It is not likely that the people of the United Nations will favor a hard and expensive plan for prevention of future wars if easier and cheaper ones appear as possible solutions. The danger involved is, of course, that the easy plan may dispel war anxieties at the present but will not in fact prevent future wars. The problem is to motivate people to accept the best possible plan regardless of its cost. The establishment and maintenance of a strong international authority is certain to be an expensive undertaking. The cost will be measured not only in terms of higher taxes, continued sharing of food, fuel, and other commodities, but also in terms of the amount of national sovereignty that each of the participating countries will be called upon to surrender to the international authority. The weaker countries that stand to benefit most from free trade, freer access to raw materials, removal of restrictions on immigration, may, of course, be expected to favor a plan of international relations that provides them with these benefits. But the people who have been accustomed to higher standards of living protected by tariff walls and restrictions on immigration and who have strong

isolationist sentiments may be expected to oppose what to them will appear to be a high-priced peace. It will be far easier to convince such people before the war is over that the advantages of peace are worth the price than it will be after the war has been won. In either case it will not be easy.

In launching any new enterprise the greatest difficulty is to overcome initial inertia. Much greater effort is usually required to motivate people to take the first plunge or to try out a new mode of response than is needed to maintain the activity once it is under way. In times of war people are more accustomed to innovations, new organizations, and untried procedures than they are in peacetime. An idea that seems wildly fantastic in times of peace may appear quite reasonable and sensible in time of war. Shakespeare must have recognized the significance of this when he wrote in Hamlet:

But let this same be presently performed,
Even while men's minds are wild; lest more mischance
On plots and errors happen.

The "mischance of plots and errors" has been one of the major obstructions to man's progress toward his goal of permanent and universal peace. When men are in great danger and their minds are wild with ideas of defense and escape, they are far more likely to try out plans of action that have hitherto been regarded as fantastically impracticable. Military leaders have long recognized that the most successful tactics are often those that the enemy have considered but dismissed as impossible. Will those who plan the conditions of peace be as daring as those who invent the strategy of war?

The second argument for negotiating and executing plans of peace before the war is over is that when victory is won there will be a strong tendency to impose upon the Axis Powers conditions that are unfavorable to permanent peace.

There is danger of repeating what happened at the close of the last world war. Treaties made at the end of wars reflect the fears, hatreds, and frustrations that existed during the war; indemnities or reparations are levied against the conquered who are disarmed both militarily and economically. The result is continued hatred, resentment, and determination to seek revenge.

In order to avoid the mistakes of a hasty and ill-considered peace treaty it has been proposed that the war should be followed by a prolonged armistice or cooling-off period lasting perhaps several years, during which the terms and conditions of peace could be evolved gradually and experimentally. It is surprising that men have been slow to realize the importance of this obvious suggestion. One may well suspect, however, that the reason it has never been employed in the past is not that no one thought of it but rather that the victorious nations demanded an immediate and definitive settlement. The plan encounters a basic psychological obstacle which is that most people have been heavily conditioned to the belief that the punishment for crime must be swift, just, and inevitable. They have learned, moreover, that it is futile to negotiate with gangs of criminals or to attempt reforming them; they must be caught, disarmed, killed, incarcerated, or otherwise rendered incapable of repeating their crimes. This conclusion follows inevitably from the common tendency to regard the enemy as a criminal. Already it is reported that the governments in exile have prepared lists of names of Nazis who are to be shot immediately after the war. It is quite impossible, therefore, for victorious nations to escape immediate decisions concerning what to do with the people and the governments of the conquered nations. These decisions are bound to affect future relations with these people.

A third argument in favor of proceeding rapidly with peace plans even to the point of calling a congress of repre-

sentatives of the United Nations for the purpose of organizing a central international authority is that such action would have a favorable effect on civilian morale. Repeated demands have come from people of the United Nations for more concrete and positive statements of war aims. The statements in the Atlantic Charter are too general, vague, and subject to various interpretations.

Insofar as our war aims have been stated explicitly they are mainly negative. The popular conception of the war is that we are fighting to *defend* our way of life which has been challenged by the dictators of the aggressor nations. This means that we are fighting to save and to secure that which we have already attained and to *avoid* living under the domination of the Axis Powers. Psychologically we are on the defensive.

At the beginning of a war and during its earlier phases the psychological defensive seems to be the stronger position. In most civilized societies aggression is disapproved but defense against an aggressor is sanctioned. Defensive warfare is therefore more easily justified than aggressive action. But in a long, costly, and bitter fight to the end there is apt to come a time when a shift from defensive to offensive psychology is desirable. Fighting to defend and secure against future challenge and attack that which has already been achieved is motivated mainly by fear of the deprivations and hardships that would ensue if the battle were lost. If, however, the costs and the sacrifices required to defend that which has already been achieved appear greater than those anticipated if these achievements are lost, the motive for keeping up the fight is likely to weaken. As long as the people of democratic countries still enjoy their freedom, even though standards of living may be reduced, it is easy for them to imagine how much worse off they would be should the war be lost. Economic conditions in countries already overrun by the Axis Powers are vivid examples and reminders of the

dreadful consequences of military defeat. But as the war goes on, as taxes increase, as the rationing of food and fuel results in more hunger and cold, as the casualty lists mount and especially as people are asked to surrender their liberties one by one, the time may come when they will begin to wonder whether the things that they are fighting to defend are worth the effort and sacrifice that are required to defend them. This situation is somewhat analogous to that in which an innocent man is sued for damages but deems it cheaper to pay an unjust claim than to defend a law suit. This illustrates the weakness and the danger of defensive motivation.

In order to shift to an offensive psychology it is necessary to state war aims positively and concretely. The psychological shift does not follow automatically when the armies of the United Nations take the offensive on the fields of battle. This will not alter our ideas of why we are fighting and what we are fighting for. It may make us more optimistic and give us renewed encouragement but it will not transform our motives from defensive to offensive. This transformation can be achieved only by convincing the people that they are in the war not only to defend their liberties and their democratic ways of life but also to secure for themselves and others a better world.

What opportunities and conditions not hitherto available to the people of the United Nations can be obtained by victory over the Axis Powers? No single answer can be given to this question for the reason that the standards of living and economic opportunities in the various United Nations before the war were by no means the same. Those that have felt the pinch of economic competition and have been thwarted in world trade by tariff restrictions will undoubtedly profit economically by a world order in which free trade is permitted. The nations that have hitherto enjoyed a high standard of living, unlimited economic opportunities, and

many civil liberties have little to gain materially from victory. On the contrary, the economic losses occasioned by the war will be tremendous and the opportunities to regain these losses under conditions that guarantee world peace are not very promising. The one thing that these stronger nations may hope to obtain from victory is iron-clad insurance against future aggression by any one power or combination of powers.

If the most important positive return to the stronger of the United Nations for their war effort is an insurance policy against future wars, it is not unreasonable to ask that the terms and conditions of this policy be stated rather explicitly before the war is over. If not at present, at least in the near future, the people of these nations will need concrete assurance that the world will be set free from the menace of aggressor nations and that the resources of the world can forever be used for constructive ends. With such assurance the costs of the war could easily be regarded as investments in the future prosperity of the world. The people who are investing their wealth and their lives in this gigantic enterprise are certainly entitled to know how the new world order is to be managed and by whom.

The fourth argument in favor of executing the principles of peace before the war is over is the value that such actions might have for winning the war. If the United Nations should organize and put into operation now an international authority based upon principles of democracy and endowed with powers sufficient to enforce international law but with adequate provisions for self-determination of existing cultural and political groups, would an invitation to join such an organization appeal to the people of the Axis Powers? The present rulers of enemy countries would, of course, do all they could to thwart such a move but there is some hope that the people, especially in Germany and Italy, might see in such a plan a solution to their problems. It is doubtful,

however, that they would be impressed by promises or "points"; but they might be tempted to revolt against their leaders if they could be assured of a voice and a vote in a world organization that was already in existence. If vacant seats were awaiting them in a council of nations and if laws were being enacted that would affect their welfare in the event of ultimate defeat, they might feel that much more would be gained by ending the war and joining the organization. In fact they would be asked to do only what other nations had already done—surrender their arms to an international authority and agree to its provisions for the enactment and enforcement of international law. This authority would guarantee to them the same basic rights that are accorded to any member nation. They, of course, could not expect to have a controlling hand in the police powers of the international authority.

The appeal of such a proposal to the people of the Axis Nations would depend largely on how the war is going at the time when it is made. If they still believe that they will eventually win the war or even if they can count on a stalemate, it is doubtful if they would be greatly impressed by such a peace offer. If, on the other hand, the war is going against them and the promise of victory is diminishing, they might well accept the proposal rather than risk a worse fate.

The fifth and final argument for speed in the construction and execution of peace plans is that if the new world order is organized and in operation when victory is achieved and if its operations have clearly contributed to winning the war, it may well receive the credit and prestige that will be necessary to tide it over the difficult period of reconstruction. If those who live under it have already experienced some of its benefits, the desire to continue its existence will be strengthened.

The arguments that have just been passed in review are

mainly psychological and can no doubt be supplemented by many others advanced from other points of view. The issue appears to resolve itself into the question of timing the relations between the war and peace efforts. If both are to be won, the activities devoted to each must be geared together and overlap in time. Too much attention to peace at this time might well result in a prolongation of the war although it is difficult to see how it could result in the loss of the war. Conversely, if peace is neglected until victory is assured, there is great risk of losing it. If the war moves steadily toward victory, peace plans can be matured more safely and steps toward their definite realization can be taken. Only those who are in positions to command comprehensive views of the changing world situation can decide when the psychological moment arrives for calling a congress of the United Nations for discussion and agreement of plans for the new world order.

In any event winning the peace will be a longer and more arduous task than winning the war. Agreement on plans is only the first step and one that has been taken many times already. Far more difficult is the task of designing and setting in motion an adequate machinery by which these principles may be applied to concrete situations. Beyond this is the tedious task of education for world citizenship which in the long run is the best guarantee of permanent peace.

It is not too soon to plan the educational reconstruction of the new world. When plans for the new world order are announced they are certain to meet with disapproval by a great many people in the countries concerned. It is unthinkable that any really effective international authority would receive unanimous approval. Everyone will appraise it in terms of anticipation of personal costs and benefits. But the costs of government are always more conspicuous than its benefits. Local and Federal governments are supported primarily because people are socially conditioned to them as an

indispensable but costly necessity. Even local governments find it hard to convince citizens that police and fire protection, education, paved streets, garbage collection, and so forth, are adequate returns for taxes. Citizens pay their taxes partly because they are afraid not to, but mainly because they have a vague and general notion that government is better than anarchy. Only the more enlightened perceive the values of its intangible assets.

When a world government is proposed a tremendous amount of educational propaganda and persuasion will be necessary first to induce people to accept it and try it out, and second, to continue supporting it. First they must be convinced that it too is an indispensable necessity for world peace. This education must be first for adults because they are the voters who will have a voice if not a direct vote in the ratification of the proposal for the establishment of an international authority. Living under a world government is going to be a new experience for everyone. Those who stand to benefit materially and socially from it will undoubtedly like it, but those who receive only its intangible benefits of security and liberty will have to learn to like it. How well they can learn to support it will depend upon the values that they attach to its intangible benefits. This will depend on how well these benefits can be translated into personal satisfactions. Much enlightenment on the complex process of social interdependence will be required, therefore, before any effective plan for peace can be launched. The forces of education and propaganda must be put to work preparing the masses for its acceptance and support.

Statesmen, diplomats, and social planners are apt to overlook the tremendous possibilities of social conditioning and base their plans on conditions that the present generation of adults will accept. Looking out over the world one sees a wide diversity among peoples in respect to language, art, religion, customs, morals, standards of living, types of government

and social institutions, and philosophies of life—and the task of achieving unity and coöperation seems truly Herculean. The key problem of international and intercultural relations is that of providing conditions and motivations for the development of more common social habits and attitudes. Just as the cultural unity that exists within a nation depends on common learning and uniform social conditioning, so does that which exists between nations.

In spite of the wide diversities among the cultures of the world, there are nonetheless many uniformities. Everywhere the basic social unit is the family; the culture is usually transmitted by parents, teachers, priests, and playmates; all have a system of government; all are more or less trained to respect and obey those in authority. The problem is to whittle down the diversities and increase the uniformities, especially in respect to matters that produce intercultural conflicts. This may be accomplished in many ways. Ever since citizens of different nations have been trading with one another, have been sending missionaries to convert one another, have been traveling in other countries, have been reading and speaking other languages than their own, a tremendous amount of cultural diffusion has taken place. In recent years this process has been enormously facilitated by the airplane and the radio. This common ground, small as it is, may at least provide an adequate building lot for the temple of peace.

How fast the United Nations will proceed with the blue-prints and the construction of the edifice will depend first on the courage and wisdom of the leaders who now occupy positions of influence and prestige; second, on public opinion among the peoples of the United Nations from now until the close of the war; and third, on the military progress of the war.

The wisdom and the courage of the leaders of the United Nations are of supreme importance because during the war

only they are in a position to interact freely with each other. Their wisdom is important because on it depends the development of a plan that in the long run has the greatest chance of success. Their courage is important because they are apt to be influenced too much by what they think will work and not enough by what they think can be made to work in the long run. It has been repeatedly pointed out that one of the reasons for the failure of the League of Nations was not that it was an idealistic scheme but that no provision was made for the people of the member nations to learn of its benefits to them in ways that were concrete and meaningful. The war is being fought more for the benefit of future generations than for that of the present generation. The peace, therefore, should be framed from the standpoint of our best judgment as to what may benefit future generations most rather than from the standpoint of what we happen to like or dislike.

Public opinion is important especially in democracies because leaders do not dare outrun it, but public opinion can and does change rapidly depending upon changing conditions. The limits within which it can change, however, are determined primarily by the basic social attitudes, emotional habits, ways of thinking, convictions, beliefs, and ideals that are common to the masses of people. These are determined by education more than by propaganda. One of the basic problems of peace therefore is to create world conditions that will favor the cultivation of a soil in which public opinion favorable to the minimum essentials of permanent peace will grow and thrive.

The military outcome of the war is important because it will influence the motivations for a united or disunited action after the war. If the war ends in a military stalemate and results in the establishment of spheres of political and economic influence centering in four or five world powers, the motivation that will bind these larger blocks of nations to-

gether will continue to be that of fear. Under these conditions the principles of permanent peace are not likely to be realized. If, on the other hand, the allied nations achieve a clean-cut military victory, they will hold in their hands an opportunity for guaranteeing the peace of the world. The use that is made of this opportunity may very well determine the destinies of men for more than a thousand years.

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